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ABSTRACT
South African administrative law has undergone drastic changes since the inception of
the interim Constitution, which elevated 'administrative justice' to a constitutionally
entrenched fundamental right in section 24. Although the successor of this section, the
'must administrative action' clause in section 33 FC, did not enter into force on 5
February 1996 with the rest of the Constitution, it required more changes to
administrative law in the form of legislation, when read together with item 23 Schedule 6
FC. The two most significant factors that brought about change were the passage of the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 in terms of section 33 FC read with
item 23 Schedule 6, and the ruling of the Constitutional Court in the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers case.
This study shows that in order to give effect to the requirements of the Constitution, the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act and the ruling of the Constitutional Court,
administrative law must be reorganised. When this happens, section 33 FC, which gives
force to the common law that informs administrative law, becomes the starting point in
administrative law matters. Although the Act exists under the Constitution and parallel to
the common law, Parliament foresees that the Act and the common law will in time
become one system of law. It further provides for the direct application of the
Constitution by those who cannot find a remedy in the Act.
The study further shows that, as not all the common law constitutional principles that
previously provided the common law grounds for review of administrative action have
been taken up by the Constitution, the possibility exists that some of the common law
grounds do not continue to be relevant to the review of administrative action. The Act,
which articulates the right to 'just administrative action' as viewed by government,
contains most of the common law grounds for review. It is therefore argued that, after
the Act has entered into force, the continued relevance of those that have been omitted
from the Act, needs to be determined before they can be used through the direct
application of section 33 FC.
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To test for relevance, the requirements in section 33(1) Fe, 'lawfulness', reasonableness'
and 'procedural fairness', are therefore interpreted in the study in order to determine
which statutory grounds relate to each and which common law grounds have been
omitted from the Act. The conclusion reached is that grounds available for the review of
administrative action consist of the statutory grounds for review together with the omitted
common law grounds that continue to be relevant to the judicial review of administrative
action.
ii
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OPSOMMING
Sedert die inwerkingtreding van die interim Grondwet, wat 'administratiewe
gerigtigheid' tot 'n grondwetlike reg verhef het in artikel 24, het die Suid-Afrikaanse
administratiefreg drastiese veranderinge ondergaan. Al het die reg op 'n 'regverdige
administratiewe optrede' in artikel33 FG nie op 5 Februarie 1996 in werking getree saam
met die res van die Grondwet nie, het die klousule nog veranderinge, in die vorm van
wetgewing, vereis. Die twee belangrikste faktore wat veranderinge to gevolg gehad het,
was die aanneming van die Wet op die Bevordering van Administratiewe Geregtigheid,
Wet 3 van 2000, en die beslissing van die Konstitusionele Hof in die Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers-saak.
Hierdie studie bevind dat die administratiefreg heringedeel sal moet word om effek te gee
aan die vereistes van die Grondwet, die Wet op die Bevordering van Administratiewe
Geregtigheid en die beslissing van die Konstitutionele Hof. As dit plaasvind, word
artikel 33 FG, wat aan die gemenereg krag verleën, die beginpunt in
administratiefregtelike aangeleenthede. Al bestaan die Wet onder die Grondwet en
parallel tot die gemenereg, voorsien die regering dat die Wet en die gemenereg in die
toekoms een stelsel word. Daar word verder voorsiening gemaak vir die direkte
toegpassing van artikel33 deur persone wat nie 'n remedie in die Wet kan vind nie.
Die studie bevind verder dat, omdat al die gemeenregtelike konstitusionele beginsels wat
voorheen die gronde van hersiening verskaf het nie in die Grondwet opgeneem is nie, die
moontlikheid bestaan dat sekere van die gemeenregtelike gronde nie relevant bly vir die
hersiening van administratiewe handelinge nie. Die Wet, wat die reg op 'n '[r]egverdige
administratiewe optrede' verwoord soos dit gesien word deur die regering, bevat meeste
van die gemeenregtelike gronde van hersiening. Daarom word daar geargumenteer dat
die voortgesette relevantheid van die gemeenregtelike gronde van hersiening wat
uitgelaat is uit die Wet eers bepaal moet word voordat hulle gebruik kan word deur die
direkte toepassing van artikel 33 nadat die Wet in werking getree het.
iii
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Om te toets vir relevantheid, moet die vereistes in artikel 33 FG, 'regmatigheid',
'redelikheid' en 'prosedurele billikheid' geïnterpreteer word om te bepaal watter statutêre
gronde onder elk klassifiseer en watter gemmenregtelike gronde uitgelaat is uit die Wet.
Die gevolgtrekking is dat die gronde van hersiening beskikbaar vir die hersiening van
administratiewe handelinge bestaan uit statutêre gronde van hersiening sowel as die
weggelate gemeenregtelike gronde van hersiening wat relevant bly vir die judisiële
hersiening van administratiewe handelinge.
iv
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CHAPTERl
INTRODUCTION
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Problem area and approach
The problem underlying this study is the confusion in the South African legal society
regarding the grounds available at present for the judicial review of administrative action,
and more generally, the application of administrative law in terms of the interaction
between the Constitution, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 and the
common law.
Four interrelated factors gave rise to this problem. First, 'administrative justice' in
section 24 of the interim Constitution ('IC')! was, and 'just administrative action' in
section 33 of the final Constitution ('FC'i is elevated to a constitutionally entrenched
fundamental right. Second, the mechanism in section 33(3) FC, read together with item
23 Schedule 6 FC, has been inserted in the Constitution to give effect to this right. Third,
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. The Kempton Park negotiations
on a right to 'administrative justice' were contested mainly because the right was seen as
potentially inhibitory on the transitional government's policy of reconstruction and development.
The inclusion of the right itself was uncontroversial but the precise formulation thereof was an
issue of much debate.
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. Van Wyk submits that the
numbering of the Constitution as Act 108 of 1996 is unconstitutional and should therefore be
changed to 'Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996'. Acts of Parliament are numbered
by year, but the Constitution is not an Act of Parliament and can therefore not be numbered as
such. The Constitution was adopted by the Constitutional Assembly, an independent body
established with the aim of adopting the final Constitution as the Constitutional Assembly and not
as Parliament. Further, the current numbering undermines the authority of the Constitution as a
product of the Constitutional Assembly and reduces the importance and status of the Constitution
as the supreme law of the country. (See Van Wyk "'n Paar Opmerkings en Vrae Oor die Nuwe
Grondwet" (1997) 60 THRHR 377 378-379.)
1
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although the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act ('the Act')" was passed on time in
terms of this mechanism, the Act has not entered into force yet. Fourth, the ruling in the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case" had a profound effect on the review of the exercise
of public power in general and administrative action in particular. All these factors
jointly and separately constitute a new administrative law dispensation that derives its
force from the Constitution, and further, that involves the Constitution at every level of
judicial review of administrative action.
The approach in this study is to determine the relationship between the Constitution, the
Act and the common law with reference to the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case.
Secondly, the aim is to interpret the requirements of 'lawfulness', 'reasonableness', and
'procedural fairness' in section 33(1) FC with reference to the available material on
sections 24 IC and 33 FC, bearing in mind the differences between them. Thirdly, a test
is developed, with reference to the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case, for the
'continued relevance' of common law grounds for review that have been omitted from
the Act. Fourthly, the statutory grounds for review and common law grounds that have
been omitted from the Act relating to the requirements of 'lawfulness', 'reasonableness',
and 'procedural fairness' in section 33(1) FC, are discussed. Fifthly, the continued
relevance ofthe common law grounds for review that have been omitted from the Act are
determined, with reference to the test for relevance developed in this Chapter. Finally,
the influence of the Act on the application of remedies provided and procedures applied
in the common law with regard to the judicial review of administrative action in terms of
the grounds found to be available is examined.
1.2 Chapter sequence
In Chapter Two the requirement of 'lawfulness' in section 33(1) FC is interpreted,
followed by a discussion on the grounds for review relating to the 'lawfulness'
requirement. In Chapter Three the requirement of 'reasonableness' in section 33(1) FC is
4
Act 3 of 2000.
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte The President of The Republic of
South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC).
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interpreted, followed by a discussion on the grounds for review relating to. the
'reasonableness'requirement. In Chapter Four the final requirement in section 33(1) FC,
'procedural fairness', is interpreted, bearing in mind that 'reasons for administrative
action' in section 33(2) FC relates to the requirement of 'procedural fairness'. The
grounds for review relating to the 'procedural fairness' requirement are also discussed in
that chapter. Chapter Five discusses the statutory procedures and remedies for the review
of administrative action while Chapter Six contains the conclusion.
2. SOURCES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
2.1 Introduction
Administrative law is that section of public law that governs the organisation, powers and
actions of state administration.' The sources of administrative law, that is, the place
where legal rules needed to resolve administrative law problems might be found, include
the following:
In the previous dispensation South Africa had a system of parliamentary supremacy. This meant
that Parliament was the supreme law-making authority of the Republic and citizens and all organs
of state, including the courts, were subordinate to Parliament and its laws. This had very serious
and negative consequences for administrative justice, as the government abused administrative law
through statutory constructions like ouster clauses (clauses used in empowering legislation to
exclude the power of the court to review administrative actions) to exclude persons from
administrative justice, and to govern the lives of the majority of South Africans with
administrative regulations. These regulations controlled access to housing, education and jobs and
prohibited, amongst other things, freedom of movement. This unfortunate situation no longer
prevails in the current system of constitutional supremacy. The Constitution is now the supreme
law of the Republic and is elevated above other legislation, which is subordinate to the
Constitution. (See sec 2 FC, 'This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or
conduct inconsistent with it is invalid ... ') Furthermore, the executive authority at all levels
derives its power and capacity from the Constitution and is bound by it. (See sec 2 FC, ' ... the
obligations imposed by it (the Constitution) must be fulfilled.') See also Chap 4 FC
('Parliament'), Chap 5 FC ('The President and the National Executive'), Chap 6 FC ('Provinces')
and Chap 7 FC ('Local Government'), which impose obligations on government at all levels.
3
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(a) Legislation
The vast majority of the rules of administrative law are contained in legislation.
As a source of administrative law, legislation includes the final Constitution,
parliamentary and provincial statutes and administrative (subordinate)
legislation."
(b) Case law
Based on the precedent rule," case law forms an extremely important source of
administrative law. Over the years, the review powers of the courts has led to the
development of an extensive body of substantive administrative law by the
courts.!
(c) Common law
Although administrative law may be described as predominantly South African,
English common law and Roman-Dutch law have both contributed to its
development." Insofar as one regards the common law rules relating to estoppel
6 Administrative legislation emanates from the executive sphere of government, whereas
parliamentary and provincial legislation emanate from the legislative sphere. See fu 2 above for
remarks on the Constitution as an Act of Parliament in this regard.
The principle of judicial precedent determines that the decision of a court is binding on lower
courts until such time as a court of equal or higher status overrules the decision.
Bums Administrative Law Under the 1996 Constitution (1998) 82-84.
For example, the rule that the state should compensate an individual when his property is
expropriated has its origin in Roman-Dutch law (see fn 41 Chap 5), and the doctrine of ultra vires
has its origin in English common law. Before the concept of ultra vires can be explained,
'legality' needs explanation. In short, administrative actions need to meet the requirement of
legality to be legal (valid). 'Legality' is therefore the source of all the grounds for review of
administrative action (Boulle, Harris & Hoexter Constitutional and Administrative Law (1989)
255 and 260). Ultra vires is the opposite of intra vires. Ultra means 'outside' and vires 'power'.
Literally ultra vires therefore means 'outside power' and intra vires 'inside power'. Ultra vires
can be interpreted in a wide or narrow sense. Wiechers Administratiefreg (1984) 198-200 prefers
the narrow interpretation. Accordingly, ultra vires means that the formal grounds afford review
for administrative action performed 'outside power'. The formal grounds for review are those that
have to do with administrative action exceeding the express limits of power, or failing to comply
4
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as a source of administrative law, this is also covered by 'common law' as a
source.l"
(d) Administrative practice
Although the recognition of administrative practice as a source of administrative
law is the exception rather than the rule, administrative practice, such as internal
directives and circulars, can acquire the force of law under certain
circumstances. II
In terms of these legal rules, actions of state administration (administrative actions)I2
need to adhere to certain requirements to be valid. In other words, courts review the
validity of administrative action in terms of the Constitution, legislation and the common
Il
with express statutory prerequisites. Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 307-312 prefers the wide
interpretation. Accordingly, ultra vires is a justificatory doctrine for the existence of judicial
review. In effect, the wide interpretation means that legality and intra vires are synonymous and
that illegality and ultra vires are synonymous. The wide interpretation of ultra vires therefore
relates to all the grounds for review. All reviewable administrative action found invalid were
therefore performed 'outside power'. Included in 'grounds for review' are the formal grounds for
review and the rules of the common law that postulate the intention of the ideal legislature. Courts
have developed these common law rules over time as judges' notion of what an ideal legislature
would have stipulated in a statute where there are no stipulations on certain matters in an
applicable statute. An example of one of these rules is the principle that where there is doubt as to
the meaning of a statute, it should be construed so as to do the least harm to the liberty of the
individual. In terms of the rule, if the legislature intends a benefit to be taken away from a person
by an administrator without affording the affected person a hearing, it would explicitly have to
stipulate this intention in the empowering legislation. See Staatspresident v United Democratic
Front 1988 (4) SA 830 (A) which has authoritatively restated the law in this respect. (See also fn
24 Chap 2.)
Public authorities may acquire authority by way of estoppel in some instances if it is in the 'public
interest' (Burns Administrative Law Under the J 996 Constitution (1998) 86 fn 22). However,
estoppel is one of the possible sources of administrative power (see Baxter Administrative Law
(1984) 400-404) and not a place where legal rules to resolve administrative law problems might be
found.
Burns Administrative Law Under the 1996 Constitution (1998) 85-86.
See 2.5.2 below.
10
12
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law grounds for review.':' The grounds for judicial review of administrative action are in
general divided into those relating to administration that exceeds its statutory authority
and those relating to irregularities in the exercise of power. Since reasonableness was not
regarded as an independent ground for the review of administrative action at common
law, administrative action could generally not be reviewed purely for being unreasonable.
2.2 The Constitution and the common law
A right to 'administrative justice' was included in section 24 IC and a right to 'just
administrative action' is included in section 33 FC. The purpose of section 33 is (and
that of section 24 was) neither to provide an exhaustive statement of the grounds for
review of administrative action, nor to create a codification of administrative law.14 The
courts therefore remain empowered to develop administrative law to give effect to the
right to 'just administrative action' in section 33 and to bring administrative law in line
with the Constitution. However, in the development of administrative law the
relationship between the Constitution and the common law becomes problematic.
In the Container Logistics case," the question arose whether an administrative decision
may still be reviewed purely on common law grounds. Hefer JA responded in the
following way:
'Judicial review under the Constitution and under the common law are different concepts. In the
field of administrative law constitutional review is concerned with constitutional legality of
administrative action, the question in each case being whether it is or is not consistent with the
Constitution, and the only criterion being the Constitution itself. Judicial review under the
common law is essentially also concerned with the legality of administrative action but the
u See Wiechers Administratiefreg (1984) 194 for the relationship between grounds for review and
validity requirements of administrative action.
Corder "Administrative Review in South African Law" (1998) 9 Public Law Review 89 89-97 and
Devenish "The Interim Constitution and Administrative Justice in South Africa" 1996 TSAR 458
14
459.
15 Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Container Logistics (Ply) Ltd; Commissioner of Customs
and Excise v Rennies Group Ltd tla Renfreight 1999 (8) BCLR 833 (SCA).
6
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question in each case is whether the action under consideration is in accordance with the behest
ofthe empowering statute and the requirements of natural justice.':"
'But although it is difficult to conceive a case where the question of legality cannot ultimately be
reduced to a question of constitutionality, it does not follow that the common law grounds for
review have ceased to exist. What is lawful and procedurally fair within the purview of section
24 is for the courts to decide and I have little doubt that, to the extent that there is no
inconsistency with the Constitution, the common law grounds for review were intended to
remain intact.' 17
Hefer JA in effect viewed judicial review of administrative action in terms of the
Constitution and judicial review of administrative action in terms of common law
grounds for review as two systems of law existing parallel to each other. He therefore
continued to find the administrative action in question invalid in terms of the common
law grounds for review, without considering whether the action infringed section 24 IC.
The implication of this judgment was that the review of administrative action becomes a
constitutional matter, with the Constitutional Court having the final jurisdiction, only
when the administrative action's consistency with the Constitution is questioned
specifically. However, when the consistency of the administrative action with the
Constitution is not questioned, the Supreme Court of Appeal ('SCA') has the final
jurisdiction in terms of common law grounds for review.
In the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case, Chaskalson P for the Constitutional Court,
replied to Hefer lA's statements in the Container Logistics case with reference to the
relationship between the Constitution and the common law in the judicial review of
administrative action in the following manner:
'The control of public power by the courts through judicial review is and always has been a
constitutional matter. Prior to the adoption of the interim Constitution this control was exercised
through the application of common law constitutional principles.' 18
16 See Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Container Logistics (Pty) Ltd; Commissioner of
Customs and Excise v Rennies Group Ltd tla Renfreight 1999 (8) BCLR 833 (SCA) 843 C-E.
See Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Container Logistics (Pty) Ltd; Commissioner of
Customs and Excise v Rennies Group Ltd tla Renfreight 1999 (8) BCLR 833 (SCA) 843 H-1.
See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte The President of The Republic of
South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [33].
17
18
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Chaskalson P further held:
'I cannot accept the contention that treats the common law as a body of law separate and distinct
from the Constitution. There are no two systems of law, each dealing with the same subject
matter, each having similar requirements, each with its own highest court. There is only one
system of law. It is shaped by the Constitution which is the supreme law, and all law, including
the common law, derives its force from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional
control... [T]hat is not to say the principles of common law have ceased to be material to the
development of public law. These well-established principles will continue to inform the
content of administrative law and other aspects of public law, and will continue to contribute to
their future development.' 19
Accordingly, in the assessment of the validity of an administrative action, the courts have
to determine whether the action in question conflicted with the constitutionally
entrenched right to 'just administrative action' in section 33 FC. In order to determine
the scope, content and application of this right, the courts have to take recourse to the
common law principles of administrative law that inform the content of the right. The
courts may therefore still review administrative actions in terms of common law grounds
for review, but in doing so, the common law does not constitute a system of law separate
from the Constitution. Since the common law derives its force from the Constitution and
is subject to constitutional control, there is only one system of law.
2.3 The relationship between section 24 IC and section 33 Fe
Section 33(3) FC requires the enactment of national legislation within three years from
the date on which the Constitution took effect on 4 February 2000. The legislation must
give effect to the right to 'just administrative action' and provide for review of
administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, an independent and impartial
tribunal. Further, the legislation must impose a duty on the state to give effect to the
rights in section 33(1) and (2) FC and promote an efficient administration"
19 See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte The President of The Republic of
South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [44] and [45].
The constitutionality of the envisaged legislation, if enacted within the required time frame, will
therefore be tested in terms of both the provisions of sec 33(3) FC and sec 36 FC ('limitations
20
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In terms of item 23(3) Schedule 6, section 33(3) FC would have lapsed if the envisaged
legislation had not been enacted within three years from the date on which the new
Constitution took effect. If the deadline had not been met, Parliament would still have
been entitled to enact national legislation to limit the right to 'just administrative action',
although the special circumstances in section 33(3) would have fallen away. This would
have left only the provisions of section 36 FC ('limitation of rights') and the rest of the
Constitution as a test for the constitutionality of the restrictions in the Act on section
33(1) and (2).21
Item 23(2)(b) Schedule 6 FC stipulates that section 33(1) and (2) FC must be read as if it
has been phrased like section 24 IC until the national legislation is enacted. The idea
behind this was to afford government time to draft legislation in accordance with section
33(3) FC, read together with item 23 Schedule 6.
However, as the envisaged legislation was passed on 3 February 2000, section 33(1) and
(2) Fe seems to have entered into force and section 24 IC seems to have lapsed on 3
February 2000. In effect, therefore, section 24 was in operation from the inception of the
interim Constitution on 27 April 1994 until 3 February 2000 and section 33 FC has been
in operation since 3 February 2000.
2.4 The relationship between section 33 Fe and Act 3 of 2000
2.4.1 Enactment: mere passage or 'entering into force'?
Section 33 was designed to afford a generous guarantee of 'just administrative action',
which was then to be limited and given effect to in lcgislation.f The passage of the
envisaged legislation created two problems. Firstly, as the meaning assigned to enact is
21
clause'), the equivalent of sec 33 IC, whereby a right in the Bill of Rights can be limited by a law
of general application if the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom (S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665
(CC). (See Corder "Administrative Justice in the Final Constitution" (1997) 13 SAJHR 2832 and
Govender "Administrative Justice" (1999) 14 SAPL 62 65.)
Corder (1997) 13 SAJHR 2832.
Corder (1997) 13 SAJHR 2831.22
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uncertain.f it is not clear whether mere passage of the Act was sufficient to fulfill the
constitutional obligation to enact legislation. Secondly, if passage did indeed amount to
enactment, it is uncertain what the effect of the timely enactment of the Act was on
section 33 FC. The best view seems to be that enact has to be interpreted generously, as
a narrow interpretation would create the unfortunate situation, in which the Constitutional
Court would fetter the discretion of the drafters.i" Further, as an interpretation which
results in validity should be followed in terms of the statutory presumptions of
interpretation, enacted should be interpreted in such a way that its interpretation results in
the validity rather than the invalidity of section 33(3) FC (the section lapsed if legislation
had not been enacted on time). In other words, enacted should be interpreted generously
to include passage in order to avoid the lapsing of section 33(3) FC.
23 'Enact' seems to refer to the stage when a Bill has been adopted/passed, assented to and signed by
the President, in other words when it 'becomes an Act of Parliament' (sec 81 FC). The dictionary
meaning of enact is 'to enter among the acta or public records' or 'to make into an act'. (See
Simpson and Werner The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) Vol V.) It can therefore not be said
with absolute certainty whether enact means 'pass' or 'enter into force'. As the concept used in
the Afrikaans translation of the Constitution, "verorden", could also mean either 'pass' or 'enter
into force', turning to the Afrikaans translation does not provide a solution to the problem either.
If government had not enacted legislation on time, (within three years from the date on which the
final Constitution took effect), legislation passed after the deadline would have had to comply with
every standing judicial interpretation of sec 33(1) and (2), which would have entered into force on
3 February 2000. (See Corder (1997) 13 SAJHR 28 32.) Non-compliance with the deadline
would therefore have taken the initiative to develop administrative law from the administration
and given it to the courts. This unfortunate situation has to be avoided (Govender (1999) 14 SAPL
62 65-66). Further, Asimow suggested that an Act was needed to protect the legitimacy of the
Constitutional Court, as the public should not see the Constitutional Court judges as policymakers.
(See Asimow "Administrative law under South Africa's Final Constitution: The need for an
Administrative Justice Act" (1996) 113 SALJ 613 626-627.) Klaaren (Klaaren "Constitutional
Authority to Enforce Rights of Administrative Justice and Access to Information" (1997) 13
SAJHR 549 552) argues that the inclusion of sec 33 in the final Constitution expanded the
constitutional authority given to Parliament to legislate in the area of 'just administrative action'.
The Constitutional Court should therefore not be put in a situation where it fulfills Parliament's
role in this regard.
24
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The effect of the timely enactment of the Act on section 33(1) and (2) FC requires
explanation. The intention of the drafters of the Constitution was clear with regard to the.
resulting situation if legislation was not enacted on time: section 33(1) and (2) would
have become freestanding." However, it is not so clear what the intention of the drafters
of the Constitution was with regard to the future of section 33(1) and (2) if legislation
was enacted on time. Some authors.i" relying on the interpretation of 'must give effect
to' in section 33(3), suggested the possibility of a permanent constitutional lockout of
section 33(1) and (2).27 According to them 'must give effect to' suspends the direct
effect of the right to 'just administrative action' in section 33. However, the
Constitutional Court required by implication in the Certification case28 that the fate of
section 33(1) and (2) be based on the interpretation of the 'transitional measure' in item
25 Item 23(3) Schedule 6 FC stipulates that sec 33(3) FC lapses if the envisaged legislation is not
enacted within thee years from the date on which the Constitution took effect. This means that
only subsec (1) and (2) would have remained in sec 33 FC, in other words, that sec 33(1) and (2)
would have stood free from sec 33(3) and the limitation imposed on sec 33(1) and (2) by it.
Davis and Marcus "Information" in Davis, Cheadle and Haysom (eds) Fundamental Rights in the
Constitution (1997) 154 and Pashke "Open Democracy Bill Some Constitutional Issues"
(Unpublished memorandum presented at a workshop on the draft Open Democracy Bill presented
by Idasa's Political Information and Monitoring Service, the Human Rights Committee, the
Human Rights Commission (Cape Town Office), and the Black Sash, 28 August 1997.) (See
Klaaren (1997) 13 SAJHR 549 555 ffn 23 and 24.)
According to this view, national legislation establishes the machinery for the concrete exercise of
the constitutional right in sec 33 FC. Once the legislation passes constitutional muster, by passing
the test implicit in sec 33(3) and the limitation analyses in terms of the provisions of sec 36 FC
(see page 9 and fn 25 above), it becomes the sole legal avenue for the application of the right to
'just administrative action'. As the Act regulates 'just administrative action', which sec 33(1) and
(2) regulated before, it therefore gives effect to sec 33(1) and (2), which is then locked out of the
Constitution.
26
27
28 In Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) [83] and [85], the Constitutional Court
ruled in terms of sec 32 FC ('access to information'), that the 'transitional measure' in item 23(2)
Schedule 6 FC is a means of affording Parliament time to provide the necessary legislative
framework, in other words, mandates the suspension of sec 32 FC until the legislative framework
is provided.
11
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23(2)(b) Schedule 6 FC.29 Accordingly, section 33(1) and (2) must be read as if it has
been phrased like section 24 IC until national legislation has been enacted, which implies
that section 33(1) and (2) entered into force after legislation was enacted. This is the
reason why no permanent constitutional lockout of section 33(1) and (2) occurred, which
means that the legislation is not the only legal avenue for the application of the right in
section 33.
In the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case, the Constitutional Court strengthened both
the suggestion that the mere passage of the Act fulfilled the obligation to enact
legislation, and the explanation that section 33(1) and (2) FC entered into force after the
passage of the Act. As the case was heard on 11 November 1999 (before the passage of
the Act), but only decided on 25 February 2000 (after the publicised" passage of the
Act), the judges must have been aware of the passage of the Act. However, the decision
was based on section 33 FC read as if it were phrased like section 24 IC, which was the
law in force at the time the case was heard.31
29 See Klaaren (1997) 13 SAJHR 549 556-557 and Corder (1997) 13 SAJHR 28 33-34. Corder
further argued, with reference to the appearance of the right to 'administrative justice' in the
interim Bill of Rights and Constitutional Principle II IC, that sec 33(1) and (2) enters into force
after the enactment of the Act. Constitutional Principle TI required the final Bill of Rights to be
drafted with due consideration to the previous (then current) Bill. If sec 33(3) qualifies the right to
'just administrative action' by making its direct enforcement conditional on whether legislation
had been enacted or not, this aspect of the Bill of Rights could have been non-certifiable for taking
away a guarantee provided in the interim Constitution. The substantive right in sec 33 ought
therefore to be able to be applied directly by a court even after the enactment of the required
legislation. National legislation should merely make the implementation of the right to 'just
administrative action' in sec 33 easier by providing the procedures and statutory mechanisms to
give concrete effect to the right. It should further provide guidance to public administrators in the
performance of their tasks. (De Lange Parliament 12 June 2000.)
The passage of the Act was afforded media coverage because of its controversial definition of
'administrative action'. (See Bezuidenhout "Staat Kry Reg op Inligting in Konsepwet" Die
Burger 21 January 2000.)
The Act was passed on 3 February 2000. Sec 24 IC was therefore in force on Il November 1999.
30
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Chaskalson P for the court held that:
'The control of public power by the courts through judicial review is and always has been a
Constitutional matter ... [S]ince the adoption of the interim Constitution such control has been
regulated by the Constitution which contains express provisions dealing with these matters.v"
'Although the common law remains relevant to this process, judicial review of the exercise of
public power is a constitutional matter that takes place under the Constitution and in
accordance with its provisions. ,33
The Constitutional Court used the words 'since the adoption of the interim Constitution',
which implies that such control is still regulated by the Constitution. Further, the Court's
statement that the Constitution 'contains express provisions dealing with these matters'
(matters of the judicial review of public power) has to refer to, amongst other things,
section 33. If the Act caused a permanent constitutional lockout of section 33(1) and (2),
the cited passages would have been without force for administrative law in future, as the
'just administrative action' clause would have been locked out of the Constitution on 4
February 2000. As administrative law forms an integral part of the review of the exercise
of public power, this cannot be the case.
Further, the Act itself implies that section 33(1) and (2) entered into force when it was
enacted. Section 6(2)(i) of the Act affords review for administrative action that is
otherwise unconstitutional or unlawful. In other words, section 6(2)(i) affords review on
grounds other than statutory grounds. This refers to the suggestion that review of
administrative action takes place through the interaction between the Act and section 33
FC.34 Grounds for review that have been omitted from the Act could therefore continue
to be relevant to the review of administrative action through the direct application of
section 33 FC.3s
32 My emphasis. See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte The President of
The Republic of South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [33].
My emphasis. See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte The President of
The Republic of South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [51].
De Lange Parliament 12 June 2000.
See 2.4.2 below.
33
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The conclusion is that the Act exists under section 33 FC. Section 33(1) and (2) therefore
provide a safety net for those falling through gaps in the Act. 36 This is strengthened by
the suggestions of both Breitenbaclr'Ï and De Lange.38 As section 33 is still available for
those who cannot find a remedy in the Act, Breitenbach suggests that the Act is not sub-
standard despite its inadequate regulation and omission of certain aspects of
administrative law. De Lange, for the government, suggests that the common law exists
parallel to the Act for those persons not finding a remedy in the Act, and further, that the
common law system and the statutory system will in time become one"
Until the Act enters into force, the judicial review of administrative action therefore takes
place through the direct application of section 33(1) and (2) FC. Accordingly, review
takes place in terms of the Constitution, the content of which is informed by the common
law that will also contribute to the future development of administrative law.
2.4.2 Tbe continued relevance of tbe common law grounds for review
Chaskalson P made the following statements in the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case
that inform the core of this thesis:
'The common law principles that previously provided the grounds for the review of public
power have been subsumed under the Constitution, and in so far as they might continue to be
relevant to judicial review, they gain their force from the Constitution. In the judicial review of
public power, the two are intertwined and do not constitute separate concepts. ,40
36 Corder "Administrative Justice: A Cornerstone of South Africa's Democracy" (1998) 14 SAJHR
3852.
37 Breitenbach at the VCT New Legislation Seminars 6 April 2000.
De Lange Parliament 12 June 2000.
This doesn't mean that the common law exists parallel to the Constitution. Both the Act and the
common law with regard to administrative law are constitutional matters even though they exist
parallel to each other at this stage. Both therefore obtain their force from the Constitution. See
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte The President of The Republic of
South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [44] and [45].
See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte The President of The Republic of
South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [33].
38
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Accordingly, the common law grounds for review, previously provided by common law
principles, can only 'in so far as they might continue to be relevant' be used for the
review of administrative action. The Court further explained:
'The most important of these principles were the rule of law, the supremacy of
Parliament ... [T]he exercise of public power was regulated by the courts through the judicial
review of legislative and executive action. This was done by applying constitutional principles
of the common law, including the supremacy of Parliament and the rule of law. The latter had a
substantive as well as a procedural content that gave rise to what courts referred to as
fundamental rights, but because of the countervailing constitutional principle of supremacy of
Parliament, the fundamental rights could be, and frequently were, eroded or excluded by
legislation. ,41
This however, has been fundamentally changed by our new constitutional order. We now have a
detailed written Constitution. It expressly rejects the doctrine of supremacy of Parliament, but
incorporates other common law constitutional principles, and gives them greater substance than
they previously had. The rule oflaw is specifically declared to be one of the foundational values
of the constitutional order, fundamental rights are identified and entrenched, and provision is
made for the control of public power ... ,42
The 'continued relevance' of common law grounds for review, therefore needs to be
determined with reference to the entrenchment of the common law principles that
previously provided them. If the principle that previously provided a certain common
law ground for review has been entrenched in the Constitution, the ground for review
continues to be relevant to the review of the exercise of public power, which includes
administrative action. However, if the common law principle that previously provided a
certain common law ground for review has not been entrenched in the Constitution, the
ground for review does not continue to be relevant to the review of the exercise of public
power.
41 See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte The President of The Republic of
South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [35] and [37].
See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte The President of The Republic of
South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [40].
42
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In addition to the above, the Constitutional Court held:
'What is "lawful administrative action", "procedurally fair administrative action" and
administrative action that is ''justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it" cannot mean one
thing under the Constitution, and another thing under the common law. ,43
Now, under the final Constitution, the common law grounds for review of administrative
action, conversely the requirements for valid administrative action should be included
under the constitutional categories of 'lawfulness', 'reasonableness' and 'procedural
fairness' .44 The Act, which gives effect to the right in section 33 FC, articulates the
content of the right in section 33 FC as viewed by Parliament. It contains most of the
common law grounds for review, although some common law grounds have been omitted
from the Act. The question raised is therefore whether the common law grounds for
review that have been omitted from the Act continue to be relevant to the judicial review
of administrative action.
As Corder argues, the Act should merely make the implementation of section 33 FC
easier by providing the procedures and statutory mechanisms to give concrete effect to
the right.45 De Lange adds that it provides guidance to public administrators in the
performance of their tasks." Section 33 FC, the content of which is informed by the
common law, therefore exists above the Act for those not finding a remedy in the Act.47
However, it needs to be determined whether the common law grounds for review omitted
from the Act remain relevant to the review of administrative action, before such actions
can be reviewed through the direct application of section 33 FC. A test is accordingly
developed in this thesis to determine the continued relevance of common law grounds for
review that have been omitted from the Act.
43 See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte The President of The Republic of
South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [50].
The case was decided under sec 33 FC read as if it was phrased like sec 24 IC. However, sec 33
has since entered into force.
44
45 See fn 29 above.
De Lange Parliament 12 June 2000.
See fn 29 above.
46
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In determining relevance, the following two questions need to be asked. The first
question is whether one or more of the statutory grounds overlap the common law ground
that has been omitted from the Act.48 If this is indeed the case, it continues to be relevant
to the review of administrative action through the application of the statutory ground (or
grounds) that overlaps it. However, if the first question is answered in the negative, the
second question is asked.
The second question is whether the omitted common law ground was previously provided
by a common law principle that has now been entrenched in the Constitution. If the
answer is in the positive, the common law ground continues to be relevant to the review
of administrative action through the direct application of section 33 FC. If not, the
common law ground does not continue to be relevant.
2.5 General remarks
2.5.1 Organs of state49
In the past, there has been a measure of difficulty in defining 'organ of state'. The
concept is important; as one of the parties to an administrative law relationship has to be
an administrative organ while the other could either be a private person or another organ
of state. In common law, certain tests were applied to determine whether a body or
official was an administrative organ, that is, whether the body was instituted by statute,
whether it is or has become part of an established administrative hierarchy, whether it
performs public duties or functions, or whether it is the bearer of authoritative power.
Both the interim and final Constitutions provide a definition of 'organ of state'. Section
233 IC defined 'organ of state', to include 'any statutory body or functionary', while
section 239 FC defines the term as follows:
48 There is a presumption of statutory interpretation, which stipulates that the legislature does not
include superfluous provisions in a statute.
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"Organ of state means-
(a) any department of state or administration in the national, provincial or local sphere of
government; or
(b) any other functionary or institution-
(i) exercising a power or performing a function in terms of the Constitution or a provincial
constitution; or
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation, but
does not include a court or judicial officer ... "
Section 239 therefore goes a long way in resolving the confusion that surrounded 'organ
of state' in the past. Although the section includes state departments of government at all
levels, public functionaries and institutions, the emphasis falls on the activities of
functionaries and institutions. To qualify as an organ of state, functionary or institution,
there must be either constitutional authorisation or other legislative authorisation.
The Act defines 'administrator' in section l(ii) as 'an organ of state or any natural or
juristic person taking administrative action'. In terms of section l(ix), the Act affords
'organ of state' the meaning assigned to it in section 239 FC and therefore fully adheres
to the definition of 'organ of state' in the Constitution.
2.5.2 Administrative action
Administrative action is the conduct of state administration in the exercise of public
power in one form or another, which includes conduct of entities that are not formally
part of the administration. This includes judicial administrative action (conduct of
administrators that approximates the activities of a court of law), legislative
administrative action (issuing of delegated legislation) and the powers exercised in the
implementation of law (administrative actions which implement policy, legislation or
adjudicative decisions). 50
Defining 'administrative action' has always been problematic in common law. However,
as 'administrative action' has become the threshold requirement for the right to 'just
49
50
Bums Administrative Law Under the 1996 Constitution (1998) 16,56-57,93-95.
De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2000) 456-462.
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administrative action', it has become more problematic since the entrenchment of the
interim Constitution and later also the final Constitution. The Constitution does not
define 'administrative action' but merely defmes 'organ of state' .51 Since 'organ of state'
is so widely defined in the Constitution, defming 'administrative action' in terms of
'organ of state' is problematic.
The Constitutional Court follows a narrow approach with regard to the interpretation of
'administrative action,.52 Accordingly, legislative actions consisting of resolutions taken
by 'an elected, deliberative legislative body established by the Constitution itself, does
not constitute administrative action. 53 Further, excluded from 'administrative action' are
powers conferred on the President as head of state listed by section 84(2) FC, and powers
concerning the assent to and signature of Bills in section 79 FC. Similar powers accorded
to provincial executives by sections 121 and 127 FC do not constitute administrative
action either. The power conferred on the President to appoint commissions of enquiry is
closely related to policy and is not concerned with the implementation of legislation,
which is an administrative action. 54 A decision by the President to bring an Act of
Parliament into force is not an administrative action either, as it requires a political
judgment that lies between the law-making process and the administrative process. 55
In section lei), the Act also defines 'administrative action' narrowly." It lists numerous
exclusions to 'administrative action' and stipulates the features that must be present
before an action can qualify as 'administrative action'. There must be a 'decision' or a
'failure to take a decision' ,57by an 'organ of state,58 or 'a natural or juristic person',59
51 See sec 239 FC P 17 above.
See Hoexter "The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law" (2000) 117
SALJ23-24 (forthcoming).
See Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburgh Transitional Metropolitan
Council and Others 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC) [33] to [45].
See President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby and Football
Union and Others 1999 (lO) BCLR 1059 (CC) [132] to [149].
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte The President of The Republic of
South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [79].
See Hoexter (2000) 117 SALJ 32-34 (forthcoming).
'Decision' is defined in sec l(v) of Act 3 of2000.
52
53
54
55
56
57
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which 'adversely'I" 'affects,61 the 'rights,62 of any person and which has 'direct external
legal effect' .63
2.5.3 Access to administrative justice
In terms of section 24 IC, the right to 'administrative justice' was only afforded to certain
classes of persons with affected or threatened rights, interests and legitimate
expectations." These thresholds were removed from the right to 'just administrative
58 Organ of state is defined in sec 239 FC. (See sec l(ix) of Act 3 of 2000, which mentions sec 239
FC.)
'A natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state, when exercising a public power or
performing a public function in terms of an empowering provision ... ' (See sec l(i)(b) Act 3 of
2000.) 'Empowering provision' is defined as ' ... a law, a rule of common law, customary law, or
an agreement, instrument or other document in terms of which the administrative action is
purportedly taken.' (See sec l(vi) Act 3 of2000.)
'Adversely' points to a higher degree of effect than was required in relation with sec 24 IC (and is
required in relation with sec 33(1) FC). (See fn 10 Chap 4 for the meaning of 'adversely'.) Sec 3,
4 and 5 of the Act have an even higher threshold, namely, 'adversely and materially affected
rights'. (See fn 45 Chap 4 for the meaning of materially.)
'Affects rights' can be interpreted in a wide or narrow sense, depending on whether the section
contains the notion of 'creation of rights' in terms of the determination theory or 'abolishing
rights' in terms of the deprivation theory. As rights are created and not abolished in application
cases, the wide interpretation in terms of the determination theory is preferred, as all applicants for
benefits, advantages, and privileges and applicants for permits, licenses and other concessions will
be excluded from the application of the Act if the narrow interpretation is followed. (See fn 44
Chap 4 and Hoexter (2000) 117 SALJ 32-33 (forthcoming).)
It is suggested that 'rights' should be interpreted widely in order to include all persons with
affected or threatened rights, interests and legitimate expectations. (See fu 33 Chap 2.) Further, it
is suggested that sec 3(1) ofthe Act specifically includes the concept of 'legitimate expectations'
in order to make sure that persons with legitimate expectations are included in the application of
sec 3.
'Direct external legal effect', from German origin, means that the decision must affect outsiders
and should not be a purely internal matter of departmental administration or organisation. (See
Hoexter (2000) 117 SALJ32-33 (forthcoming).)
See Du Plessis and Corded Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) 167.
59
60
61
62
63
64
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action' in section 33 FC, which affords 'just administrative action' to everyone."
However, section 33(2) FC demands that rights be adversely affected for access to
'reasons for administrative action', thereby setting a higher threshold for section 33(2)
than section 33(1).66
The Act qualifies access to administrative justice by defining 'administrative action', the
threshold requirement for the application of the Act, narrowly. Certain sections in the
Act contain even higher threshold requirements by requiring 'materially and adversely
affected rights' in addition to 'administrative action' for the application of that particular
section.67
However, as the Act exists under section 33 FC, those who cannot find a remedy in the
Act as a result of the threshold requirement(s), could perhaps find a remedy in section 33
FC if access is afforded to it. In other words, if they are included in 'everyone' for
purposes of section 33(1), 'everyone with adversely affected rights' for purposes of
section 33(2) and 'administrative action' as interpreted by the Constitutional Court, they
could find a remedy in section 33 FC. Further, the common law ground for review those
persons attempt to apply through the direct application of section 33 FC, has to 'continue
to be relevant' to the judicial review of administrative action.
2.5.4 The Constitution and 'administrative action': the doctrine of constitutional
legality
In the Fedsure case, the SCA referred two questions to the Constitutional Court. The
first was whether administrative action constituted by resolutions made by a local
government was consistent with the interim Constitution; and the second, whether or not
the interim Constitution preserved for the predecessor of the SCA any residual or
concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate upon an attack on such administrative action on the
ground that it fell to be set aside, reviewed or corrected at common law.
65 Everyone in sec 33(1) FC therefore includes all persons with 'affected' or 'threatened' 'rights',
'interests' and 'legitimate expectations' .
66 See ffn 4 and 6 Chap 2.
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The Constitutional Court stated that a series of provisions in Chapter 10 FC made it plain
that the powers of local governments to act were limited to the powers conferred on them
by the Constitution or laws of a competent authority.f The Court continued:
"It is a fundamental principal of the rule of law, recognised widely, that the exercise of public
power is only legitimate where lawful. The rule of law - to the extent at least that it expresses
this principle of legality - is generally understood to be a principle of constitutional law ... [T]he
principle is also expressly recognised in the 1996 Constitution. ,69
The Constitutional Court accordingly ruled that:
'There is of course no doubt that the common law principles of ultra vires remain under the new
constitutional order. However, they are underpinned (and supplemented where necessary) by a
constitutional principle of legality. In relation to "administrative action" the principle of legality
is enshrined in section 24(a). In relation to legislation and to executive acts that do not constitute
"administrative action", the principle oflegality is necessarily implicit in the Constitution.V"
The review of legislative and executive action that does not constitute 'administrative
action' for the purpose of section 33 FC, therefore takes place in terms of the doctrine of
constitutional legality. As the action reviewed in the Fedsure case constituted legislative
action rather than 'administrative action', it was decided on the ground of constitutional
legality.
In the SARFU case, the question arose whether the exercise of power conferred upon the
President by section 84(2)(f) FC constituted 'administrative action'. The Court ruled that
the focus of an enquiry whether conduct was administrative action or not, was on the
nature of the power so exercised. In addition, it stated that some, but not all, of the acts of
members of the executive constituted 'administrative action'. Accordingly, it was held
67 See sec 3, 4 and 5 Act 3 of2000.
The Court cited sec 174(3) FC as an example. It reads as follows: 'A local government shall be
autonomous and, within the limits prescribed by or under law, shall be entitled to regulate affairs.'
See Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburgh Transitional Metropolitan
Council and Others 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC) [56] and [57]. Sec 1 Fe reads that: 'The
Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values ... (c)
supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law ... '
See Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburgh Transitional Metropolitan
Council and Others 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC) [59].
68
69
70
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that the performing of specifically controlled constitutional responsibilities directly
related to the legislative process and the constitutional relationship between the
executive, the legislature and the courts, do not constitute administrative action.
As the Court held that the 'special constitutional power' in section 84(2) FC, which
permits the President to appoint commissions of inquiry, was closely related to policy and
not concerned with the implementation of legislation (which is an administrative action),
the appointment of a commission of inquiry by the President was not the exercise of
power administrative in character.Ï' However, significant constraints on the exercise of
the President's power arose from provisions of the Constitution other than the
administrative justice clause. Further, the President had to exercise his power in terms of
section 84(2) FC in good faith and should not misconstrue his powers. The case was
therefore also decided in terms of constitutional legality, but with the added requirement
of bonafides.
In the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case, the Constitutional Court held that a decision
by the President to bring an Act of Parliament into force was not 'administrative
action,.72 The exercise of power to bring a law into force requires a 'political judgment'
and lies between the law-making process and the administrative process. However, the
action in question still had to comply with the principle of constitutional legality that was
implicit in the Constitution. The Court added yet another requirement to the principle of
constitutional legality by requiring that the exercise of public power should not be
arbitrary or irrational. Rationality was seen as the minimum requirement applicable to
the exercise of public power. The test for rationality had to be objective, as irrational
decisions exercised in good faith might otherwise pass muster.
As the doctrine is applied in the review of legislative and executive action that does not
constitute 'administrative action', constitutional legality is a concept separate from
legality sought to be achieved by either section 24 IC or section 33 FC.73 In effect
71 See Hoexter (2000) 117 SALJ22 (forthcoming).
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte The President of The Republic of
South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [79].
See page 31 and fn 28 Chap 2.
72
73
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therefore, the Constitutional Court narrowed the application of 'administrative action'
and, in doing so, the judicial review of administrative action. Legislative and executive
action falling outside of 'administrative action', as interpreted by the Constitutional
Court, must therefore be reviewed through the application of the doctrine of
constitutional legality.Ï"
2.5.5 Conclusion
Section 33 of the Constitution, the content of which is informed by the common law,
therefore exists above the Act for those persons who cannot find a remedy in the Act.
The Act, that articulates the content of the right in section 33 FC as viewed by
Parliament, contains most of the common law grounds for review although some
common law grounds have been omitted from the Act. However, before section 33 FC
can be applied directly by those persons who cannot find a remedy in the Act, the
continued relevance of the common law grounds for review that have been omitted from
the Act needs to be determined. Further, both the Act and the Constitutional Court
74 However, Klaaren "Red light, Greenlight: Fedsure Life Assurance v Greater Johannesburg
Transitional Metropolitan Council; Premier Mpumalanga v Executive Committee, Asosiation of
state-Aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal" (1999) 15 SAJHR 209 212 (see Hoexter (2000) 117 SALJ
23 fu 101 (forthcoming» observes that the use of constitutional legality constitutes the use of
administrative law principles even if by another name. He points out that the principle allows the
court to engage in 'an extensive and disputatious examination of whether the resolutions were
intra vires the relevant legislation'. Further, Hoexter argues that requiring the President to act in
good faith, as in President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby and
Football Union and Others 1999 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC), is also administrative law by another
name as 'lawful administrative action' in section 24(a) IC and sec 33(1) FC also implies 'bona
fide action'. (See Hoexter (2000) 117 SALJ 23 (forthcoming), Rapholo v State President 1993 (1)
SA 680 (T), Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 515-517 and page 38 and fu 58 Chap 2.) Finally,
Hoexter (2000) 117 SALJ 23 (forthcoming) argues that the concept of 'rationality' as used in
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte The President of The Republic of
South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC), is widely regarded as a component of reasonableness, a
requirement for valid administrative action in sec 33(1) FC. (See page 53-54 Chap 3.)
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qualify access to 'just administrative action' by defining and interpreting 'administrative
action', the threshold requirement for access to 'just administrative action', narrowly.
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CHAPTER2
LAWFULNESS
1. INTRODUCTION
Section 33(1) FCI demands administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and
procedurally fair. In this Chapter the requirement of 'lawfulness' is discussed with
reference to interpretations of section 24(a), the section relating to 'lawfulness' in the
interim Constitution.' and section 33(1) FC. The statutory and common law grounds for
review relating to the requirement of 'lawfulness' in section 33(1) FC are then discussed.
Finally, the relevance of the common law ground for review that relates to the
requirement of 'lawfulness', which has been omitted from the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act ('the Act'),' is determined with reference to the test for
relevance developed in Chapter One.
2. THE INTERPRETATION OF 'LAWFULNESS'
Section 33(1) and (2)4 FC entered into force on 3 February 2000 with the passage of the
Act.5 It has therefore been in operation for only a few months, since for all intents and
purposes section 24 IC6 was in force from 27 April 1994 until 3 February 2000.7 A
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. See fn 2 Chap 1.
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993.
Act 3 of2000.
4 "Just administrative action
(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the
right to be given written reasons."
See fn 24 and page 10Chap 1.
6 "Administrative Justice
Every person has the right to-
(a) lawful administrative action where any of their rights or interest is affected or
threatened;
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reasonable volume of jurisprudence and academic views on section 24 IC arose in this
period of five years and nine months. Conversely, very little was produced on section 33
FC by way of academic views and jurisprudence. The discussion on 'lawfulness' in
section 33(1) FC is therefore based on the available jurisprudence and academic views on
'lawfulness' in section 24(a) IC, bearing in mind the differences between the two
sections.
The two main differences relate to their differing structures.f First, section 33 guarantees
'just administrative action', which is wider and more generous on the face of it than the
guarantee of 'administrative justice' in section 24.9 Second, the thresholds that qualified
9
(b) procedurally fair administrative action where any of their rights or legitimate
expectations is affected or threatened;
(c) be furnished with reasons for administrative action which affects any of their rights
or interest unless the reasons for that action have been made public; and
(d) administrative action which is justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it where
any of their rights is affected or threatened."
Sec 24 IC had been in operation since the entering into force of the interim Constitution on 27
April 1994 until the passage of the Act on 3 February 2000. See Item 23(2)(b) Schedule 6 FC.
See fn 4 and 6 above.
This wider or more generous guarantee is the result of a compromise reached between conflicting
views on whether a right to 'just administrative action' should be included in the final Constitution
or not. The debate on the inclusion of the right was dominated by similar issues to the issues
raised in the debates on the formulation of the right to 'administrative justice' in the interim
Constitution (see fn 1 Chap 1). There were three important issues. The first was the inhibitory
effect that such a right could have on government policies for reconstruction and development.
Second, as the right allows for the review of all administrative actions, administrators could be
discouraged from acting for fear of being reviewed. The passivity of administrators was the
biggest concern for a government that wants to promote reconstruction and development
programmes (De Lange Parliament 12 June 2000). The third issue, a concern absent from the
debates on the formulation of the right to 'administrative justice' in the interim Constitution, was
the frequent use of sec 24 IC together with sec 23 IC ('access to information') to gain access to
information and reasons for administrative action from the state and government at all levels. A
compromise was reached that allowed for the inclusion of a right to 'just administrative action' in
sec 33 FC, which affords a wider or more generous guarantee than the guarantee of 'administrative
justice' in sec 24 IC. Further, the compromise entailed an agreement to both limit and give effect
27
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the right to 'administrative justice' in section 24 were removed, which also rendered the
guarantee of 'just administrative action' in section 33 wider or more generous."
The second difference between sections 33 and 24 requires further explanation. The
concepts of 'rights', 'interests', and 'legitimate expectations', together with the words
'affected' and 'threatened', were used in different combinations to create the thresholds
that qualified the components of the right to 'administrative justice' in section 24 IC. As
a result of the removal of the above-mentioned concepts and words, 'everyone' in section
33(1) FC now includes all persons with affected or threatened rights, interests and
legitimate expectations.
There are important differences between 'lawfulness' in section 24(a) IC and
'lawfulness' in section 33(1) FC. While 'lawfulness' formed part of just one component
of the guarantee of 'administrative justice' in section 24(a) IC, it forms part of a more
general guarantee of 'just administrative action' in section 33(1) FC. Also, as a threshold
qualified the right to 'lawful administrative action' in section 24(a) IC, only persons
whose 'rights'!! and 'interests'V were 'affected'V or 'threatened'I" had a right to 'lawful
lO
to the right in national legislation. The operation of the right was suspended until the enactment of
the envisaged legislation. Also see ffu 24, 25 and 27 Chap 1 for the effect of non-compliance with
the enactment requirement.
The various thresholds (see fn 6) that qualified the right to 'administrative justice' in sec 24 IC by
affording access to certain classes of persons whose rights, interests or legitimate expectations had
been affected or threatened (Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill
of Rights (1994) 167), was done away with in order to cast the right to 'just administrative action'
in sec 33 FC wider or more generously. (See fn 9 above for an explanation of 'wider or more
generously'.) Everyone has the right to 'just administrative action' in sec 33 FC (see fnA above).
It was therefore no longer necessary to structure the requirements of 'lawfulness',
'reasonableness', and 'procedural fairness' in separate subsections in order to create different
thresholds for the different requirements (like in sec 24 IC, see fn 6 above).
Sec 24(b) explicitly included the concept of 'legitimate expectations' while the concept was absent
from sec 24(a), 24(c), and 24(d). The inference was therefore that persons with 'legitimate
expectations' were excluded from the application of sec 24(a). (See fn 6 above.)
See fn 46 and 48 Chap 4.
According to Currie, the word 'affected' could mean either 'deprived' or 'determined'. The
meanings of 'deprived' and 'determined' is illustrated by an example. If a person applies for a
II
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administrative action', whereas, 'everyone' has the right to 'administrative action that is
lawful' in section 33(1) Fe, as it is not qualified by a threshold. The interpretations of
'lawfulness' in section 24(a) can therefore only be applied to the discussion on
'lawfulness' in section 33(1), if these differences are borne inmind.
The object of section 24(a) was to prevent ouster clauses, which are clauses used in
legislation to exclude powers of the court to review certain administrative actions." In
the previous dispensation, the government often obstructed administrative justice through
ouster clauses. The main object of section 24(a) was therefore to extend the reach of the
guarantee of 'administrative justice' by preventing ouster clauses. The wider or more
14
license for the first time, and the application fails, the refusal of the application will not deprive
that person of a right. The decision would however determine the person's rights. Therefore, if
'affected' meant 'deprived', it would have covered a much narrower class of administrative
actions than if it meant 'determined'. (See De Waal, Currie, & Erasmus The Bill Of Rights
Handbook (2000) 462.) According to Mureinik, the meaning of 'affected' differed in each
subsection of sec 24 IC. In sec 24(a) and 24(c), 'affected' meant 'determined', as the term
'interests' was used simultaneous with 'affected'. However, in sec 24(b) 'affected' meant
'deprived' as the term 'interests' was absent from the section. Because of policy considerations,
Mureinik argued that 'affected' meant 'determined' (therefore had a wide meaning) in sec 24(d).
(See Mureinik "A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights" (1994) 10 SAJHR 31
42-43.) Du Plessis and Corder assumed that the 'affecting' of a right constituted a more
immediate and real invasion of a right than a mere 'threat' to such a right. This is so particularly
in the light of the different parts of the right to 'administrative justice' afforded by sec 24 IC (see
fil 6 above). (See Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights
(1994) 166.)
'Threatened' in sec 24(a), (b), and (c) IC might have indicated that the broadest range of
administrative actions was contemplated. If afforded that meaning, 'threatened' supplemented the
conventional meaning of 'affected' (see fil 13 above) to broaden the range of administrative
actions covered by 'affected'. On the other hand, 'threatened' might have been intended to merely
extend the ambit of the right to 'administrative justice' to administrative actions consisting of
advisory opinions. (See De Waal et al Bill of Rights Handbook (2000) 463, and fil 13 above for
the view ofDu Plessis and Corder.)
An example of an ouster clause is a clause that excludes the review of an administrative action
performed by an administrator in order to detain a political antagonist without affording him a
15
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generous guarantee of 'just administrative action' in section 33 FC, compared to the
guarantee of 'administrative justice' in section 24 IC, strengthens the tendency to extend
administrative justice through the prevention of ouster clauses.i" However, several
authors'" argue that some ouster clauses could still be valid in terms of section 33 IC, the
equivalent of section 36 FC.IS
Section 24 IC did not enumerate the grounds for review, but left the grounds for review
and their further development to the courts through their interpretation of the common
law. There are cases that considered section 24 IC to be the equivalent of the common
law grounds for review.19 However, the weight of authority suggests that the impact of
section 24 was to widen the grounds for judicial review and, by implication, the grounds
relating to the requirement of 'Iawfulness'r'" In the Farjas case, Dodson J stated that to
hearing, for an excessive period of time. It therefore purported to exclude jurisdiction of the
courts in certain situations.
16 See fn 9 above.
Corder "Administrative Review in South African Law" (1998) 9 Public Law Review 89 89-97 and
Devenish "The Interim Constitution and Administrative Justice in South Africa" 1996 TSAR 458
17
459.
18 The limitation clauses in both Constitutions (interim and final) provide that a right in the Bill of
Rights can be limited by a law of general application (including legislation and the clauses in
them) if the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom. (See SvMakwanyana 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC).)
In Pennington v The Minister of Justice and Others 1995 (3) BCLR 270 (C) Steyn AJ mentioned
sec 24 IC only to buttress his ruling. He accordingly ruled that where potential prejudice to the
accused would jeopardise the fairness of his hearing, although cheaper and more convenient
circumstances are created by the potential prejudice, the fairness of the hearing should dominate
the outcome of the decision. In deciding that he would not substitute his own discretion for that of
the Minister, the test for review remained that which had been set forth in Johannesburg Stock
Exchange v Witwatersrand Nigel Ltd 1988 (3) SA 132 (A) 152 A-D (the locus classicus for the
grounds for review of administrative action in the common law), and no effort was made to
interpret sec 24 and develop the common law in solving the problem. The implication from the
judgment was therefore that sec 24 enumerated the common law grounds for review.
See Farjas (Pty) Ltd and Another v Regional Land Claims Commissioner, Kwazulu-Natal 1998
(2) SA 900 (LCC) where the judge refers to the following to illustrate the point that sec 24
widened the common law grounds for review: Kotze v Minister of Health and Another 1996 (3)
19
20
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hold that section 24 did not widen the common law grounds for review would be to deny
the reason for the inclusion of section 24 by the framers of the interim Constitution. This
inference, he argued, would be against the presumption that the legislature does not
include superfluous provisions in a statute. Another reason why section 24 widened the
grounds for review, mentioned by the judge, was that the right to lawful administrative
action in section 24(a) elevated the right to intra vires" administrative action to the status
of a fundamental constitutional right. Accordingly, these reasons cast a duty on
reviewing courts to be judicious'f to ensure that public officials confme themselves
strictly to the law that confers powers on them_23
The wider or more generous guarantee for 'just administrative action' in section 33 FC
confers an even greater duty on courts to be judicious in the review of administrative
action and to further develop the common law grounds for review. Section 33, like
section 24 FC, therefore widens the common law grounds for review and, by implication,
the grounds for review relating to the requirement of 'lawfulness'.
It has been suggested that 'lawful' in section 24(a) could be interpreted in a wide or
narrow sense according to one's view of the concept of ultra vires/" However, De
21
BCLR 417 (T), Tseleng v Chairman, Unemployment Insurance Board, and Another 1995 (2)
BCLR 138 (T), Standard Bank of Bophuthatswana Ltd v Reynolds NO and Others 1995 (3) BCLR
305 (B), Maharaj v Chairman, Liquor Board 1997 (2) BCLR 248 (N), and Roman v Williams NO
1997 (9) BCLR 1267 (C). The judge also referred to Rudolph and Another v Commissioner for
Inland Revenue and Others 1996 (2) SA 886 (A), where the court considered sec 24 to have
impacted on the common law grounds for review, thereby rendering the matter a constitutional
matter, and accordingly felt compelled to refer the case to the Constitutional Court.
See fn 9 Chap 1.
Judicious means 'having or exercising sound judgment', 'wise in adopting means to an end', and
'capable and careful in action'. (See Simpson and Werner The Oxford English Dictionary (1989)
Vol VIII.)
Farjas (Pty) Ltd and Another v Regional Land Claims Commissioner, Kwazulu-Natal1998 (2) SA
900 (LCC) 913 A-D.
Carpenter "Administratiewe Geregtigheid: Meer Vrae as Antwoorde" (1994) 57 THRHR 467 469.
Ultra vires can be interpreted in a wide or narrow sense. Wiechers Administratiefreg (1984) 198-
200 prefers the narrow interpretation. Accordingly, ultra vires means that the formal grounds
afford review for administrative action performed ultra vires ('outside power'). The formal
22
23
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Ville25 submits that the theories relating to the ultra vires doctrine have no bearing on the
interpretation of 'lawful' in section 24(a) IC, which refers to both the statutory and
common law grounds of legality (apart from those guaranteed in sections 24(b), (c) and
(d)).26 In interpreting 'lawful' in terms of the ultra vires doctrine, authors favour the
narrow Interpretation." Accordingly, 'lawful' refers only to the statutory grounds for
legality'" based on the perspective of section 24 IC as a whole?9 The interpretation by
De Ville is therefore preferred as it includes the requirements which relate to the
qualifications and attributes of the administrator and the scope and nature of his statutory
authority, as well as the statutory and common law requirements which relate to form and
25
grounds for review are those that have to do with administrative action exceeding the express
limits of power, or failing to comply with express statutory prerequisites. Baxter Administrative
Law (1984) 307-312 prefers the wide interpretation. Accordingly, ultra vires is a justificatory
doctrine for the existence of judicial review. The wide interpretation of ultra vires therefore
relates to all the grounds for review. Included in the grounds for review are the formal grounds for
review and the rules of the common law that postulate the intention of the ideal legislature. See
Staatspresident v United Democratic Front 1988 (4) SA 830 (A). (See fn 9 Chap 1.)
De Ville "The Right to Administrative Justice: An Examination of Section 24 of the Interim
Constitution" (1995) 11 SAJHR 264 269.
See fn 24 above and fn 9 Chap 1. 'Statutory and common law grounds for legality' here are
synonymous with 'formal grounds for review' and 'the rules of the common law that postulates
the intention of the ideal legislature', or conversely, 'statutory and common law requirements for
valid administrative actions'.
26
27 Carpenter (1994) 57 THRHR 467 469, Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South Africa's
Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) 168, Devenish 1996 TSAR 458 464, and Bums "Administrative
Justice" (1994) 9 SAPL 347 352.
See ffu 24 and 26 above. It could not be inferred from the Farjas judgment whether there was a
preference for the wide or narrow approach to the interpretation of 'lawfulness' in sec 24(a). Both
interpretations were possible as law in the phrase 'confine themselves strictly to the law that
confers powers on them' could mean only statutory or both common law and statutory
requirements for valid administrative action.
Carpenter (1994) 57 THRHR 467 468. Bums (1994) 9 SAPL 347 352 suggests that if section
24(a) referred to all the grounds for review of administrative action, 'procedural fairness' in
section 24(b), 'reasons for administrative action' in section 24(c) and 'justifiability in relation to
the reasons given' in section 24(d) would have been rendered nugatory, as the grounds for review
referred to by these sections would already have been covered by section 24(a).
28
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procedure (excluding the rules of natural justice), without creating the situation where the
grounds for review relating to 'lawfulness' in section 24(a) overlap with the grounds
relating to sections 24(b), (c) and (d).
The argument in favour of the interpretation of 'lawful' as preferred by De Ville, is also
relevant to section 33(1) FC. Although 'lawfulness' was only part of one component of
the guarantee for 'administrative justice' in section 24 IC, while 'lawfulness' is part of a
more general guarantee for 'just administrative action' in section 33 FC, section 33(1) FC
still contains the additional requirements of 'reasonableness' and 'procedural fairness'. 30
From these arguments it can be inferred that it is the structure of section 33 FC that
results in a wider or more generous guarantee than that offered by section 24 IC.
However, the object of 'lawfulness' in section 33 is still to prevent ouster clauses and,
further, to elevate 'lawful administrative action' to a constitutionally entrenched
fundamental right. Section 33 equally widens the common law grounds for review and
therefore the grounds relating to 'lawfulness'. Finally, 'lawful' refers to both the
statutory and common law grounds of legality (apart from those guaranteed by the rest of
the requirements in section 33(1) FC).
3. GROUNDS FOR REVIEW RELATING TO THE REQUIREMENT OF
'LAWFULNESS'
3.1 The statutory grounds"
Section 6 of the Act is an attempt to codify the common law grounds for review. All the
statutory grounds for review, including those relating to the requirement of 'lawfulness',
are therefore contained in section 6. The section is qualified by the following words of
section 6(1):
'Any person may institute proceedings in a court or tribunal for judicial review of administrative
action. ,32
30 De Ville (1995) Il SAJHR 264.
Breitenbach at the VeT New Legislation Seminars 6 April 2000.31
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The action concerned therefore has to be an administrative action for statutory grounds
for review to apply.
The definition of 'administrative action' in the Act, as in section 33 FC, makes mention
only of 'affected rights', as opposed to 'affected rights, interests and legitimate
expectations'. However, the Constitutional Court tends to interpret 'right' as widely as
possible.l" It is therefore suggested that 'affected rights, interests and legitimate
expectations' be inc!uded within the ambit of 'affected rights' .
Section 6(2), which contains the statutory grounds for review, is structured to move from
the formal grounds in subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b), which place emphasis on persons
authorised to perform the action as opposed to persons not authorised to perform the
action, to the rationality of the reasoning process in subsections (2)(d) and (2)(e), and
from there to the action itself in (2)(f) and (2)(g), and to the effect of the action in (2)(h).
The statutory grounds in section 6 relating to the requirement of 'lawfulness' are also
discussed in this order.
3.1.1 Statutory grounds relating to the authorised administrator
Sections 6(2)(a) and 6(2)(b) afford statutory grounds for review relating to the authorised
administrator and requirements relating to his personal qualifications. Section 6(2)(a)(i)
reads:
32 My emphasis. 'Administrative action' is defined in sec l(i) of Act 3 of2000. See ffn 57-63 Chap
1.
33 In Premier, Province of Mpumalanga v Executive Committee of the Association of Governing
Bodies of State-Aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) BCLR 151 (CC) [31], the
Constitutional Court indicated that the term 'right', for the purposes of sec 24 IC should be
interpreted wider than the definition of the term at private law. Further, the Court ruled that 'right'
should include liabilities incurred by the state through the making of unilateral promises or
undertakings. (See De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2000) 463 fn 53.) See also SA
Metal Machinery Company Ltd v Transnet Ltd 1999 (1) BCLR 58 (W) 65 H where the judge,
while interpreting 'interests' as found in sec 24(a) and 24(c) IC, noted that vested interests was
sufficiently covered by the protection afforded to rights which have been affected.
34
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'A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if the
administrator who took it was not authorised to do so by the empowering provision. ,34
The statutory ground in section 6(2)(a)(i) relates to the common law ground for review
that arose in similar circumstances.V There are various reasons for the retention of the
ground. In some cases, for instance, firm procedures need to be followed to appoint
specific administrators validly so that they are permitted to perform certain administrative
actions. Further, in some cases the administrative actions that have to be exercised
require the expert knowledge of specific administrators. In both instances, specific
administrators have to be authorised by empowering provisions, which determine
compulsory personal requirements for the performance of administrative aotions.t''
Section 6(2)(a)(ii) reads:
'A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if the
administrator who took it acted under a delegation of power which was not authorised by the
empowering provision.'
This statutory ground relates to the common law ground for review derived from the
common law rule delegatus delegare non potest. 37 The rule prohibits the delegation of
discretionary powers from an authorised administrator to another, unless the delegation is
authorised by legislation." The reasons for the retention of the statutory ground in
section 6(2)(a)(i) apply here equally.
34 In sec I(vi) of the Act, 'empowering provision' is defined as 'a law, a rule of common law,
customary law, or an agreement, instrument or other document in terms of which an administrative
action was purportedly taken'.
See Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 426-430.
See S v Lasker 1991 (I) SA 558 (C).
See Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 432-434.
G v Superintendent, Groote Schuur Hospita/1993 (2) SA 255 (C).
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The statutory ground in section 6(2)(b) reads:
'A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review administrative action if a mandatory and
material procedure or condition prescribed" by an empowering provision was not complied
with.'
The ground in this section relates to the common law ground affording review of non-
compliance with the rules determining the form of specific administrative actions and the
procedures to be followed in the performance of each." These forms and procedures are
usually clearly defined in legislation. For example, the non-compliance with a stipulated
publication requirement for administrative action renders the action reviewable."
3.1.2 Statutory grounds relating to the reasoning process of the administrator
Sections 6(2)(d) and 6(2)(e) encompass statutory grounds for review relating to the
reasoning process of the administrator. Section 6(2)(d) reads:
'A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if the action was
materially influenced by an error oflaw.'
This statutory ground refers to the common law ground that arose under similar
circumstances.Y This ground for review has recently been restated in Hira and Another v
Booysen and Another.43 Accordingly, the non-performance or wrong performance of a
39 See sec l(x) of Act 3 of 2000. 'Prescribed' in this context refers to which is prescribed by the
empowering provision concerned.
See Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 444-452.
To determine whether non-compliance with the requirement was reviewable in the common law,
the question was usually asked whether the statutory stipulation was cast in a directory or
mandatory form. If it were cast in a mandatory form, non-compliance would lead to invalidity.
As all statutory stipulations are mandatory and binding, the correctness of this approach could be
questioned. Wiechers Administratiefreg (1984) 225 therefore suggested that the question should
have been whether the organ had the authority to dispense with the requirement. As the ground in
the Act now explicitly states that an action becomes reviewable when a mandatory or material
condition prescribed by the empowering provision was not complied with, this problem is solved.
See Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 457-472.
1992 (4) SA 69 (A).
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statutory duty or power will entitle persons injured thereby to common law review. The
grounds, on which the court may exercise its common law review, are limited to the
grounds set out in Johannesburg Stock Exchange v Witwatersrand Nigel.44 Where the
complaint is that a tribunal has committed a material error of law, the reviewability of the
decision depends on whether the legislature intended the tribunal to have the exclusive
authority to decide the question of law. This is a matter of statutory interpretation.Y
Where the tribunal's function is of a purely judicial nature (or where the administrator is
required to decide whether the conduct falls within a defined or objectively ascertainable
statutory criterion) the court will be slow to conclude that the tribunal has exclusive
jurisdiction to decide all questions, or that a misrepresentation of statutory criterion will
not render the decision assailable by way of common law review. The question of
whether or not an erroneous interpretation of a statutory criterion renders the decision
invalid depends upon whether it is material. In cases where the decision of the tribunal is
discretionary rather than purely judicial (where it is required to take policy considerations
or the general interest into account), the approaches may be somewhat different.46
Section 6(2)( e) affords review of administrative action on three grounds. The first
statutory ground in section 6(2)(e)(i) reads:
'A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if the action itself
was taken for a reason not authorised by the empowering provision. '
This statutory ground relates to the common law ground for review applied where
administrators exceeded their powers when acting upon the object of the action." The
administrator therefore has to stay within the scope of authority bestowed upon him by
the empowering provision when acting upon the subject matter of an administrative
44 1988 (3) SA 132 (A) 152 A-E.
Hira v Booysen NO 1992 (4) SA 69 (A) 93G-1.
Hira v Booysen NO 1992 (4) SA 69 (A) 93A-94A and Burns Administrative Law Under the 1996
Constitution (1998) 204.
See Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 458-459.
45
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action." In respect of the subject matter of the administrative action, the scope .of
authority is defined mainly in legislation, although certain common law rules may also be
applicable.f
Section 6(2)(e)(ii) reads:
'A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if the action was
taken for an ulterior purpose or motive.'
The ground in section 6(2)(e)(ii) relates to the common law ground for review that arose
when an administrator exercised powers given for a specific purpose, for another or
ulterior purpose. There are contrasting views as to whether the motive or subjective state
of mind of the administrator could be relevant only to determine whether the exercise of
administrative power was for an ulterior purpose, or whether 'ulterior motive' constitutes
an independent ground for review in the common law.50 Baxter submits that the frequent
reference in judicial dicta to 'motive' indicates that judges often contemplate that they
might go so far as to control the unbecoming action by public authorities, even if such
action is notionally within the purpose envisaged by the legislation." The Act follows
Baxter's view by using the word 'or' between 'purpose' and 'motive' in section
6(2)(e)(ii) instead of the word 'and' . This means that review is afforded for
48 For example, Moulder v Thom 1974 (1) SA 336 (T), where the Administration of Transvaal was
authorised to declare roads, and without the presence of the statutory requirements authorising its
declaration, declared apublic road. The declaration was ruled invalid.
Some of the common law rules relating to the subject matter of an administrative action include
that an administrator cannot prohibit matters when he is empowered by the empowering provision
only to control and regulate them. (See Vrystaat Ko-operasie Bpk v Minister van Landbou-
Ekonomie en Bemarking 1965 (3) SA 377 (A).) He can however provide limitations.
Furthermore, an administrator cannot interfere with the jurisdiction of the courts by ordering
sentences for non-compliance with directions imposed by him. (See Phalaborwa Verhuur v
Stadsraadvan Phalaborwa 1979 (3) SA 1260 (A).)
See Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 507-515 513 and Bums Administrative Law Under the
1996 Constitution (1998) 160. An example of an administrative action performed for an ulterior
purpose is found in Hardman NO v Administrator, Natal 1975 (1) SA 340 (N) where
expropriation power, authorised for the purpose of any main road, was used to build an amenity
for the road user.
See Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 513.
49
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administrative actions taken for an 'ulterior motive' and administrative actions taken for
an 'ulterior purpose'. As 'ulterior motive' is an independent statutory ground for review,
it is therefore sufficient to prove an ulterior motive for the invalidation of an
administrative action.
The statutory ground in section 6(2)(e)(iii) reads as follows:
'A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if the action was
taken because irrelevant considerations were taken into account or relevant considerations were
not considered.'
This ground relates to the common law ground afforded under similar circumstances.Y
The ground points to the administrator's 'failure to apply his mind to the matter', a sort of
catch-all phrase that covers most instances of bad decision-making. Sometimes, fairly
detailed statutory guidance as to the factors that have to be taken into account by the
administrator in particular is provided. When this is not the case, the view of what
constitutes relevant or irrelevant considerations is a highly subjective matter.53
The statutory ground in section 6(2)(e)(iv) reads:
'A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if the action was
taken because of the unauthorised or unwarranted dictates of another person or body.'
The statutory ground in section 6(2)(e)(iv) relates to the common law ground for review,
which is implicit in the common law rule delegatus delegare non potest,54 afforded where
an administrator allowed a decision to be bound by prescriptions or the advice of a third
person. 55 As such a decision was not considered on merit, but taken in accordance with
advice or prescriptions, the empowered administrator did not perform the administrative
action independently. However, if an administrator gathers advice on his own account
and considers the merits of the case in terms of the advice, he acts independently.
52 See Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 501-507.
Anchor Publishing Co (Pty) Ltd v Publishing Control Board 1987 (4) SA 708 (N) (see Boulle,
Harris & Hoexter Constitutional and Administrative Law (1989) 349-350).
G v Superintendent, Groote Schuur Hospital 1993 (2) SA 255.
53
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Section 6(2)(e)(v) reads:
'A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if the action was
taken in bad faith.'
This relates to the common law ground for review that points to the rule requiring an
administrator to apply his mind to all the requirements for a valid administrative action
when performing the action. 56 There are contrasting views on whether mala fides
qualified as an independent ground for review of administrative action in the common
law.57 According to the view that mala fides was not an independent ground for review,
the concept was used to prove that an administrator continued with the administrative
action, despite knowledge of the invalidity. However, the subjective state of mind of the
administrator was irrelevant if the action adhered to all the validity requirements for
administrative actions. In other words the mala fide exercise of a valid administrative
action could not render the action reviewable." The inclusion of the statutory ground in
section 6(2)(e)(v) therefore changed the situation that existed in the common law, as the
ground explicitly renders the mala fide exercise of an otherwise valid administrative
action reviewable.
55 See Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 442-443. Also see Opperman v Uitvoerende Komitee van
die Verteenwoordigende Owerheid 1991 (I) SA 372 (SWA) and Government of the Province of
KwaZulu Natal vNgwane 1996 (4) SA 943 (A).
See Rapholo v State President 1993 (1) SA 680 (T).
See Bums Administrative Law Under the 1996 Constitution (1998) 163-165. Mala fides is
however recognised as an independent ground for review by some authors and case law. Baxter
Administrative Law (1984) 515-517 for example suggests that mala fides may be used in two
ways. Accordingly, the concept refers to fraud, dishonesty or corruption (in a strict sense), and in
a less pejorative sense, it refers to wrongful use of power even where the official concerned had
been perfectly honest.
However, according to this view, important consequences flowed from conscious non-compliance
with the requirements for validity. For instance, where judicial review was excluded by statute,
review was still possible in the case of mala fides as a gross form of invalidity. As it caused
invalidity ab initio (from the very beginning), the exclusion was ineffective because the
administrative action was void and not voidable. Courts further ordered the performance of a
specific administrative action, and not reconsideration by the administrator, in cases where the
absence of another requirement for a valid administrative action was proved by malafides.
56
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3.1.3 The statutory grounds relating to the action itself
The action itself is the focus of section 6(2)(f)(i), 6(2)(g) and 6(2)(i). Section reads as
follows:
'A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if the action itself
contravenes a law, or is not authorised by the empowering provision.'
This ground relates' to the common law ground for review afforded for administrative
action that was not authorised by law. In the former dispensation of parliamentary
supremacy, there was a common law presumption that statutes do not bind the state.59
The presumption was applied as a principle of effectiveness to ensure that the state was
not unduly hampered in the execution of its governmental functions. As the state is
bound by the Constitution and legislation is subordinate to the Constitution, this
presumption seems unconstitutional. The statutory ground that affords review of a
decision that contravened a law further strengthens this seeming unconstitutionality.t''
Section 6(2)(g) reads:
'A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if the action
concerned consists of a failure to take a decision.'
This ground is recognised in the common law and also correlates with the biggest
concern raised in relation with the inclusion of a right to 'just administrative action' in
59 Bums Administrative Law Under the 1996 Constitution (1998) 256. See also Administrator, Cape
v Raas Rontgen and Vermeulen (Pty) Ltd 1992 (1) SA 245 (A) and Somfongo v Government of the
Republic of South Africa 1995 (4) SA 738 (Tk).
However, Bums suggests that the state could rely on the limitation clause (sec 36 FC) in order to
prove that the contravention was a reasonable and justifiable limitation of the right to 'just
administrative action' in sec 33 FC. For instance, where the police contravened traffic laws while
in pursuit of a criminal, it can be argued that the limitation on the right to 'just administrative
action' of the criminal, was reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom. (Bums Administrative Law Under the 1996 Constitution
(1998) 256.) The suggestion of Bums is incorrect, as a law of general application does not exist in
her example. (See Langa J in Walker v Stadsraad van Pretoria 1997 (3) BCLR 416 (T).) As the
example does therefore not constitute a limitation of a right by a law of general application, it
rather illustrates the absence of 'unlawfulness' .
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the Bill of Rights.?' The concern was that administrators would refrain from performing
administrative actions for fear of being reviewed. This would have an inhibitory effect
on policies of reconstruction and development. The insertion of the statutory ground
therefore compels administrators to act by affording review for a failure to act.
Section 6(3) further defines the ground in section 6(2)(g). Accordingly, where the
administrator had a duty to take a decision but no law prescribed the period in which he
had to take the decision, and he consequently failed to take the decision, judicial
proceedings can be instituted on the ground that there has been an unreasonable delay in
taking the decision.62 Further, where the administrator had a duty to take the decision
and a law that prescribes the period in which he had to take the decision did exist, and he
failed to take the decision before the expiry of the prescribed period, judicial proceedings
can be instituted on the ground that the administrator has a duty to take the decision
notwithstanding the expiry of the period.63
Section 6(2)(i) reads:
'A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if the action is
otherwise unconstitutional or unlawful.'
The section contemplates review of administrative actions on other grounds than the
statutory grounds in section 6. The statutory ground in section 6(2)(i) does not only
relate to 'lawfulness' like the rest of the grounds under discussion. Instead, it relates to
all the requirements for valid administrative action in section 33(1) FC, that of
'lawfulness', 'reasonableness', and 'procedural fairness'. It also makes the development
of new grounds possible that relate to 'lawfulness', 'reasonableness', and 'procedural
fairness' in section 33(1), and to other requirements in the final Constitution that could
render an administrative action reviewable.64 Finally, section 6(2)(i) is the statutory
mechanism used when a ground for review omitted from the Act, that continues to be
61 See Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 414 and Chotabhai v Union Government 1911 AD 13.
Also see fn 9 above.
See sec 6(3)(a) Act 3 of2000.
See sec 6(3)(b) Act 3 of2000.
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte The President of The Republic of
South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [44] and [45].
62
63
64
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relevant to the review of administrative action through the direct application of section.33
Fe, is employed in the review of an administrative action.65
3.2 The grounds omitted from the Act: adherence to a rigid policy or standards,
contractual restrictions and estoppel
At first glance, the common law ground that relates to the adherence to a rigid policy or
standards, which has been omitted from the Act, seems to be included in section 6(2)(g)
that affords review for a failure to take a decision. However, at closer inspection in terms
of section 6(3), it turns out that section 6(2)(g) becomes inapplicable where a decision
had been taken, even though a discretion was not exercised because of adherence to a
rigid policy or standards.
The reason for the existence of the ground in common law is that adherence to a rigid
policy or standards impose an unlawful limitation on the power of the administrator.f
Policies that merely guide the administrator in the exercise of his decision are allowed.
However, as soon as the policy becomes so rigid that the exercise of a discretion is
negated, the decision is reviewable on the common law ground relating to adherence to a
rigid policy or standards/" Policies or standards may accordingly be applied when they
do not preclude the exercise of a discretion, when they are compatible with the enabling
legislation and when they are disclosed to the person affected by the decision taken in
terms of them. 68
To determine the continued relevance of the common law ground relating to the
adherence to a rigid policy or standards, which has been omitted from the Act, the test for
65 De Lange Parliament 12 June 2000. Also see Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re:
ex parte The President of The Republic of South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [33].
See Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 415-419.
See Mafuya v Mature City Council 1984 (2) SA 124 (ZCH) where the granting of licenses to the
first 300 applicants was rendered invalid as the administrator did not exercise a discretion after
considering the merits of all the applicants.
See Tseleng v Chairman, Unemployment Insurance Board, and Another 1995 (2) BCLR 138 (T).
66
67
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relevance developed in Chapter One is applied. First, the question is whether one. or
more of the statutory grounds overlap the omitted common law ground.
The statutory ground that affords review of an administrative action taken by an
administrator not authorised by an empowering provision in section 6(2)(a)(i), overlaps
review of an administrative action taken in terms of a rigid policy or standards. An
administrator has to be authorised by an empowering provision to use a rigid policy or
standards validly. If the administrator was not authorised by an empowering provision to
use a rigid policy or standards in his decision, therefore, and he subsequently used them,
his decision can be reviewed through the application of the statutory ground in section
6(2)(a)(i).
Further, the statutory ground in section 6(2)(a)(ii) overlaps the omitted common law
ground for review. An administrator not authorised to exercise an administrative action
in accordance with a rigid policy or standards cannot delegate an action to another
administrator to perform it in accordance with a rigid policy or standards. As the
delegate himself had not been empowered to adhere to a rigid policy or standards in the
performance of an administrative action, he delegated more power than he himself had.
Since the delegation of power had been unauthorised, the administrative action
subsequently performed, which adhered to a rigid policy or standards can be reviewed
through the application of the statutory ground in section 6(2)(a)(ii).
The statutory ground in section 6(2)( e)(i) also overlap the common law ground for review
that relates to adherence to a rigid policy or standards. An administrative action has to be
taken for the reason the empowering provision authorised. If the action was taken for
reasons of adherence to a rigid policy or standards and not for authorised reasons, the
administrative action can be reviewed through the application of the statutory ground in
section 6(2)( e)(i).
A decision on whether or not to design new municipal gardens can be used as an
example. In terms of the empowering provision, the reasons for not designing new
gardens may, for example, only relate to the upkeep of existing gardens. If, in these
circumstances, the administrator decides not to design a new municipal garden because
he wants to plant 300 trees per annum in a nearby township, he imposed the rigid policy
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or standard. The decision was therefore taken to adhere to a rigid policy or standard and
not for the reason authorised by the empowering provision.
The statutory ground in section 6(2)(e)(iii) also overlaps the common law ground for
review relating to adherence to a rigid policy or standards. If the aggrieved party can
prove that the rigid policy or standards incorporated irrelevant considerations or omitted
relevant ones, the decision taken in terms of them can be reviewed in terms of section
6(2)( e)(iii).
Most importantly, the statutory ground in section 6(2)(e)(iv) overlaps the omitted
common law ground for review if the rigid policy or standards postulates unauthorised or
unwarranted dictates by another person or body. If an unauthorised person or body
dictates the decision of an administrator by imposing upon him a rigid policy or
standards, the administrative action consequently exercised in adherence to the rigid
policy or standards so imposed, can be reviewed through the application of the statutory
ground in section 6(2)(e)(iv).
Section 6(2)(f)(i) affords review of an administrative action that was not authorised by an
empowering provision. If the administrator performed an administrative action in
adherence to a rigid policy or standards, although such an action was not authorised, it
becomes reviewable through the application of the statutory ground in section 6(2)(f)(i).
This statutory ground therefore also overlaps the omitted common law ground relating to
adherence to a rigid policy or standards.
Finally, if the rigid policy or standards renders the action not rationally connected to the
purpose for which it was taken, the purpose of the empowering provision, the information
before the administrator and the reasons given for it by the administrator, the statutory
grounds in section 6(2)(f)(ii)(aa) to (dd) affords review of the administrative action taken
in adherence of the rigid policy or standards.ï"
However, adherence to a rigid policy or standards is a separate ground for review and,
although difficult to conceive, will under certain circumstances be the only ground for
review that is applicable. It is submitted that section 6(2)(i) of the Act is the most
69 See 3.2 Chap 3.
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suitable section to deal with the review of administrative actions performed under those
circumstances.
Therefore, if in the performance of an administrative action the administrator adhered to a
rigid policy or standards, the administrative action can be reviewed through the
application of section 6(2)(a)(i) and (ii), section 6(2)(e)(i), (iii) and (iv), sections
6(2)(t)(i) and (ii)(aa) to (dd) and section 6(2)(i).
The first question asked in the test for relevance is therefore answered in the positive.
Since one or more of the statutory grounds for review in section 6 of the Act overlap the
common law ground for review relating to adherence to a rigid policy or standards and
although the omitted common law ground does not afford review for administrative
action per se, the ground continues to be relevant to the review of administrative action
through the application of other statutory grounds for review. Accordingly, it is
unnecessary to ask the second question in the test for relevance.
Two further traditional common law grounds for review have been omitted from the Act.
They constitute two additional ways in which an administrator can fetter his own
discretion. Accordingly, an administrator can also fetter his discretion by way of
contractual restrictions." As a general principle, administrators cannot commit
themselves in advance against exercising their discretionary powers to act for the public
good. However, there is little South African case law on the subject."
Further, where an administrator has a power of decision, he cannot fetter that power by
stipulating in advance that he will act in a certain way.72 In other words, he cannot be
held estopped on the basis of his prior representations. The courts are however likely in
this regard to reject technical quibbles to the affect that the public authority was not
acting within the scope of its powers.Ï''
For the same reasons as was the case with the ground for adherence to a rigid policy or
standards, section 6(2)(a)(i) and (ii), section 6(2)(e)(i), (iii) and (iv), sections 6(2)(t)(i)
70 See Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 419-424.
See Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 419.
See Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 424-426.
Cf Diedericks vMinister of Lands 1964 (1) SA 49 (N) 58A-59B.
71
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73
46
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
and (ii)(aa) to (dd) and section 6(2)(i) overlap the grounds relating to contractual
restrictions and estoppel. These grounds therefore continue to be relevant to the review
of administrative action through the application of other statutory grounds for review.
3.3 Conclusion
All the common law grounds for review relating to the requirement of 'lawfulness' in
section 33(1) Fe, with the exception of the grounds relating to adherence to a rigid policy
or standards, contractual restrictions and estoppel, have been taken up by the Act.
However, although the common law grounds for review relating to adherence to a rigid
policy or standards, contractual restrictions and estoppel have been omitted from the Act,
they continue to be relevant to the review of administrative action through the application
of the statutory grounds that overlap them.
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CHAPTER3
REASONABLENESS
1. INTRODUCTION
Section 33(1) of the final Constitution! demands administrative action that is 'lawful',
'reasonable', and 'procedurally fair'. In this Chapter, the requirement of reasonableness
is discussed with reference to section 24 IC/ and section 33 FC. The various grounds for
review of administrative action that relate to the requirement of reasonableness are then
discussed individually. Finally, the continued relevance of the grounds for review
relating to the requirement of reasonableness that have been omitted from the Promotion
of Administrative Justice Act ('the Act'),3 is determined with reference to the test for
relevance developed in Chapter One."
2. THE INTERPRETATION OF 'REASONABLENESS'
2.1 Section 24 IC and section 33 FC
The Supreme Court has inherent common law jurisdiction with regard to the judicial
review of administrative action. However, a court has to be granted statutory jurisdiction
to hear an appeal on the merits of an administrative decision, as it would otherwise usurp
the power conferred on administrators by legislation. The distinction between appeal and
review becomes important in this regard.' since review on the ground of reasonableness
2
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. See fil 2 Chap 1.
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993.
Act 3 of 2000.
See 2.4.2 Chap 1.
It is sometimes very difficult to distinguish between appeal and review. Important differences
between the two are, first, that a court in review proceedings cannot substitute the decision of an
administrator with that of its own, but has to set the decision aside or prevent implementation
thereof. The opposite is true in the case of an appeal. Furthermore, in review proceedings the
court is not confined to the record of the administrative process, as the validity of the decision is at
stake. In appeal proceedings, however, the appellate body is confined to the record of the
4
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could seem like, or come close to, an appeal on the merits of a decision. Because of this,
courts were reluctant to invalidate administrative action on the ground of
unreasonableness before the adoption of the interim Constitution.6 However, courts did
start to take the first tentative steps towards treating unreasonableness as an independent
ground for review.'
There were conflicting views on whether reasonableness should have been included in
the right to 'administrative justice' in the interim Constitution, and specifically on
whether reasonableness should have been included as a ground for judicial review of
administrative action in the transitional period.' However, the opposing parties reached a
6
administrative process as the correctness of the decision is at stake. Finally, in appeal proceedings
the merits of decisions are assessed in order to determine the correctness of decisions, while the
validity of decisions is considered in review proceedings. (See Baxter Administrative Law (1984)
258-259.)
The courts followed the view that unreasonableness did not constitute an independent ground for
review unless it indicated that another requirement for the valid exercise of administrative action,
such as performing an administrative action independently and not in accordance with a rigid
policy, was absent. Gross unreasonableness was regarded as a ground for review, as it indicated
mala fides, an ulterior purpose or that the administrator did not apply his mind to the matter. (See
National Transport Commission v Chetty's Motor Transport (Pty) Ltd 1972 (3) SA 726 (A).) This
was called symptomatic unreasonableness. (See Union Government v Union Steel Corporation
Ltd 1928 AD 319.) However, Hoexter "The Future of Judicial Review in South African
Administrative Law" (2000) 117 SALJ 26 (forthcoming) submits that even though judges hid
behind notions such as 'gross' or the search for irregularities such as 'the failure to apply the
mind', they inevitably entered into the merits of administrators' decisions and reviewed them on
the ground of unreasonableness.
In Theron v Ring van Wellington van NG Sending Kerk in Suid Afrika 1976 (2) SA 1 (A) the
Appellate Division adopted the "extended formal yardstick" for cases involving judicial
administrative actions, based on the common law presumption of English law that the legislature
intends power to be exercised reasonably. The adoption of this approach was based on the view
that the courts had been applying the presumption unconsciously in South African law.
The conflicting views on 'reasonableness' related to other conflicting views on how to formulate
the actual grounds for review of administrative action in the interim Bill of Rights. Some argued
for a formulation that refers generally to grounds (such as 'the duty to act fairly'), as this would
allow courts room to develop the actual content of the right. However, it was further argued,
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compromise that allowed for the adoption of the requirement of 'justifiability in relation
to the reasons given' in section 24(d) IC.9 The concept of reasonableness was finally
included in the right to 'just administrative action' in section 33 Fe.
As section 33 FC has been in force only since 3 February 2000, ID a small volume by way
of academic views and jurisprudence is available on the requirement of reasonableness in
section 33(1) FC. Conversely, there is a reasonable volume of academic views and
jurisprudence on 'justifiability in relation to the reasons given' in section 24(d) IC. The
interpretations and jurisprudence on section 24(d) IC are therefore used in the discussion
on the requirement of reasonableness in section 33(1) FC. However, the general and
structural differences between section 24 IC and section 33 FC should be borne in
mind. II The most important of these differences is the fact that 'justifiability in relation
to the reasons given' in section 24(d) was only part of one component of the guarantee
for 'administrative justice' in section 24 IC, while 'reasonableness' in section 33(1) FC is
part of a more general guarantee for 'just administrative action'. Furthermore, thresholds
qualified the application of 'justifiable in relation to the reasons given' in section 24(d)
IC, while no such qualification exists for 'reasonable' in section 33(1) FC. Consequently,
only persons whose 'rights,12 were 'affected'{' or 'threatened'!" had a right to
lO
specifically with the ground for unreasonableness in mind, that the inherently conservative courts
should be encouraged to move in a certain direction in their development of the content of the
right to 'administrative justice'. Others argued that it was necessary to spell out the grounds for
review clearly but narrowly in the right to 'administrative justice', as this would protect the
decisions and intentions of the democratically elected Parliament and its executive from frustration
by an undemocratic body such as the courts. Further, in the light of the volatile situation
Parliament would be faced with during the transitional period, it was argued that review on the
ground of unreasonableness should be suspended during this period. (See Corder "Administrative
Review in South African Law" (1998) 9 Public Law Review 89-97.)
Mureinik developed the concept of 'justifiability in relation to the reasons given' in sec 24(d) IC.
It required some degree of reasonableness but was qualified by 'in relation to reasons given for it'.
(Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) 169.)
Sec 24 IC had been in operation since the entering into force of the interim Constitution on 27
April 1994 until the passage of the Act on 3 February 2000. See Item 23(2)(b) Schedule 6 FC.
See ffn 9 and 10Chap 2.
See fn 46 Chap 4.
9
II
12
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'administrative action that is justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it' in section
24(d), while 'everyone' has the right to 'administrative action that is reasonable' in
section 33(1).15
Apart from the general and structural differences between the two sections, there are
more specific differences between 'reasonableness' in section 33(1) FC and 'justifiability
in relation to the reasons given' in section 24(d) IC. The first specific difference is
terminology: 'reasonable' obviously means something other than 'justifiable in relation to
the reasons given'. Some authors suggested that 'justifiable' is narrower than
'reasonable', as it related only to the reasons supplied for the decision, while 'reasonable'
extends also to the effects of the decision.l" Others suggested that the two concepts are
synonymous.l"
IJ See fit 13 Chap 2.
See fn 14 Chap 2.
'Everyone' in section 33(1) FC now includes all persons with affected or threatened rights,
interests and legitimate expectations. See sec 2 Chap 2.
Bums "Administrative Justice" (1994) 9 SAPL 347 357, Corder (1998) 9 Public Law Review 89
89-97 and Carpenter "Administratiewe Geregtigheid: Meer Vrae as Antwoorde" (1994) 57
THRHR 467 472.
14
15
16
17 Mureinik, who constructed 'justifiability in relation to the reasons given', is included in this group.
(Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) 169 fit 156
and De Waal, Currie & Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook (2000) 473.) Hoexter (2000) 117
SALJ28 (forthcoming) further suggests that it seems as if Froneman DJP in Carephone (Pty) Ltd v
Marcus NO 1998 (Il) BLLR (LAC) supported this view. The judge points out that the dictionary
meaning of 'justifiable' defines the word as 'able to be legally or morally justified, able to be
shown to be just, reasonable, or correct; defensible'. It does not, he says, mean 'just', 'justified' or
'correct' .
51
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
2.2 The interpretation of 'justifiability in relation to the reasons given' in section
24(d) IC
Mureinikl8 endorsed the view that 'justifiable in relation to the reasons given' in section
24(d) IC guaranteed a rational decision-making process that would give a reasonable
result.l" He accordingly formulated the following test:
'A good starting point would be to recognise that the justifiability of an administrative decision
is a matter not of second-guessing the policy choices that it entails, which is the prerogative of
the decisionmaker, but rather the soundness of the process of deciding which went into its
making. It is suggested that an administrative decision cannot be taken to be justified unless (a)
the decisionmaker has considered all serious objections to the decision taken and has answers
which plausibly meet them; (b) the decisionmaker has considered all the serious alternatives to
the decision taken, and has discarded them for plausible reasons, and (c) there is a rational
connection between premises and conclusions - between the information (evidence and
argument) before the decisionmaker and the decision taken. ,20
According to Mureinik, a rational decision-making process therefore requires a rational
link between the information before the administrator and the decision taken in terms of
it. Seen like that, section 24(d) removed the need for a test based on symptomatic
unreasonableness," as it expressly permitted a court to inquire into the justification of an
18 See Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights 169 and Burns
(1994) 9 SAPL 359.
Mureinik further endorsed the view that sec 24(c) and sec 24(d) should not be read together as it
would place too great a burden on officials who would then be obliged to supply reasons for their
administrative conduct in terms of sec 24(c). (See De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook
(2000) 474, Devenish "The Interim Constitution and Administrative Justice in South Africa" 1996
TSAR 458 466 fn 72 and Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of
Rights (1994) 169).
My emphasis. Mureinik "A bridge to where? Introduction to the interim Bill of Rights" (1994) 10
SAJHR 3141.
In Standard Bank of Bophuthatswana Ltd v Reynolds NO and Others 1995 (3) SA 74 (BG) it was
ruled in relation with 'justifiability in relation to the reasons given', that the test of 'gross
unreasonableness' had to be rejected for being too stringent. Itwas accordingly out of step with
the modern approach to judicial review in a constitutional dispensation entrenching fundamental
human rights binding on legislative and executive organs. The judge as a resuIt replaced the test
for 'gross unreasonableness' with a test for 'reasonableness'. Currie (see De Waal et al The Bill of
19
20
21
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administrative action.22 However, saying that symptomatic unreasonableness was
replaced by a more general reasonableness review could lead to disregarding the appeal-
review distinction. Some authors and judges therefore suggested that 'justifiable in
relation to the reasons given' in section 24(d) gave the courts power to assess the merits
of a decision in order to determine whether the decision was right or wrong,z3 In other
words, they suggested that section 24(d) erased the line between appeal and review"
However, the preferred view amongst authors and judges was that 'justifiable in relation
to the reasons given' in section 24(d) did not erased the line between appeal and review.25
This was strengthened by Carephone (Ply) Ltd v Marcus NO and Others in which the
view was endorsed that the appeal-review distinction remained intact. The judge ruled
that, in determining whether an administrative action was 'justifiable in relation to the
reasons given',
22
Rights Handbook (2000) 473) with reference to the Reynolds case suggested that although
unreasonableness review of delegated legislation, the drafting of which is an administrative action,
is available at common law (see Kruse v Johnson 1898 (2) (QB) 91), unreasonableness is now also
a ground for review of other administrative actions.
Devenish 1996 TSAR 458 467.
Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution: Text and Notes led (1994) 35 fn l. (See De Ville
"The Right to Administrative Justice: An Examination of Section 24 of the Interim Constitution"
(1995) Il SAJHR 264 272.
De Ville (1995) Il SAJHR 264 265 fn 1 and 273 fn 61. Further, in Kotzé vMinister of Health and
Another 1996 (3) BCLR 417 (T), Spoelstra J ruled that the difference between appeal and review
might have been eroded by the inclusion of sec 24(d) IC. De Ville submitted that the viability of
this view depended on the adequacy of 'reasons' furnished by the administrator in terms of sec
24(d). Should the reasons not include a reference to the evidence or other materials upon which
the findings were based, it would be impossible to ascertain from them whether requirements (a)
to (c) laid down by Mureinik (page 49 above), needed for a decision to be 'justified in relation to
the reasons given', had been complied with. (De Ville (1995) Il SAJHR 264 273.)
Roman v Williams NO 1997 (9) BCLR 1267 (C). Further, Govender "Administrative Justice"
(1999) 14 SAPL 62 89-90 submits that it does appear cavalier to conclude on the basis of one
word, 'justifiable', in the Bill of Rights, that the review-appeal distinction had been largely
eroded. He cannot reconcile that approach with the continued commitment to the doctrine of the
separation of powers, especially as the carefully constructed sec 24 IC was designed to give
limited overseeing powers to the judiciary. Also see Hoexter (2000) 117 SALJ27 (forthcoming).
23
24
25
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' ... value judgments will have to be made which will, almost inevitably, involve the.
consideration of the "merits" of the matter in some way or another. As long as the judge
determining this issue is aware that he or she enters the merits not in order to substitute his or her
own opinion on the correctness thereof, but to determine whether the outcome is rationally
justifiable, the process will be in order. ,26
In Roman v Williams NO, decided before the Carephone case, the judge ruled that review
powers no longer entailed scrutiny only of the way in which decisions were made,27 and
therefore required an objective test for 'justifiability in relation to the reasons given' in
section 24(d).28 The rational-objective-basis test was formulated as follows in the
Carephone case:
' ... [IJs there a rational objective basis justifying the connection made by the administrative
decision-maker between the material properly available to him and the conclusion he or she
eventually arrived at?,29
A decision that is 'justifiable in relation to the reasons given' therefore had to have a
rational objective basis.
De Ville30 submitted that proportionality" fitted into the context of the Constitution as a
whole and therefore that section 24(d) required proportionality for legality in
26 See Carephone (Ply) Ltd vMarcus NO 1998 (Il) BLLR (LAC) 1337 D and Deacon v Controller
of Customs and Excise 1999 (6) BCLR 637 (SE).
See Carephone (Ply) Ltdv Marcus NO 1998 (11) BLLR (LAC) and Hoexter (2000) 117 SALJ27
(forthcoming).
See Roman v Williams NO 1997 (9) BCLR 1267 (C), Deacon v Controller of Customs and Excise
1999 (6) BCLR 637 (SE) and Kotzé v Minister of Health and Another 1996 (3) BCLR 417 (T).
My emphasis. See Carephone (Ply) Ltd vMarcus NO 1998 (II) BLLR (LAC) 1337 F-G.
See De Ville "Proportionality as a Requirement for Legality in Administrative Law in Terms of
the New Constitution" (1994) 9 SAPL 360 360 and Roman v Williams NO 1997 (9) BCLR 1267
(C) 1275 F. Bums strengthens this by stating that the courts would be faced with the distinction
between terms such as 'rationality', 'reasonableness', 'justifiability', and 'proportionality' in their
interpretation of the phrase 'justifiable in relation to the reasons given'. (Bums (1994) 9 SAPL
347355.)
See Govender (1999) 14 SAPL 62 79 fn 54 where he cites the definition of proportionality with
reference to Halsbury Halsbury's Laws of England vol 1 (I989) as: 'the court will quash exercise
of discretionary powers in which there is not a reasonable relationship between the objective that
27
28
29
JO
Jl
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administrative law.32 In terms of the requirement of proportionality, the measure which
least infringes upon fundamental rights must be adopted where there is more than one
suitable measure for attaining a statutory purpose" In other words, proportionality
requires administrative decisions that are 'suitable' and 'necessary', in other words, that
certain broad but specifically determined issues be considered.
No certainty existed as to whether section 24(d) required proportionality for
administrative actions. This is illustrated by the different tests for 'justifiability in
relation to the reasons given' suggested by Van Deventer J and Froneman DIP. In the
Roman v Wiliams NO, Van Deventer J, with reference to De Ville, required that decisions
objectively meet the requirements of 'suitability', 'necessity', and 'proportionality' .34 In
the Carephone case, Froneman DIP required, without substituting the concept of
substantive rationality with formulations such as 'proportionality' and the like, that
decisions have a rational objective basis in order to meet the requirement in section
24(d).35
2.3 The interpretation of 'reasonableness' in section 33(1)Fe
Hoexter36 uses ordinary dictionary meanings in order to define 'reasonableness' in
section 33(1): 'reasonableness' requires decision-making 'in accordance with reason' or
'within the limit of reason'. 'Within the limit of reason' suggests 'a space within which
various reasonable choices may be made'. It therefore excludes capricious decision-
making, but does not include the substitution of the administrator's decision for that of
32
is sought to be achieved and the means used to that end, or where punishment imposed by
administrative bodies or inferior courts are wholly out of proportion to the relevant misconduct ... '
Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 528-529 viewed proportionality as a facet of unreasonableness
that was compatible with South African law as long as judges confine themselves to the review of
action that had been of such an excessive degree that no reasonable man would consider it to be
appropriate.
Bums Administrative Law Under the 1996 Constitution (I998) 194.
See Roman v Williams NO 1997 (9) BCLR 1267 (C) 1276 C.
See Carephone (Pty) Ltdv Marcus NO 1998 (11) BLLR (LAC) 1337 E.
Hoexter (2000) 117 SALJ 27 (forthcoming).
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the court. Consequently, 'within the limit of reason' captures exactly the right standard.
Review for reasonableness does therefore entail scrutiny of the merits of administrative
decisions," as it is impossible to judge whether the decision was 'within the limit of
reason' without looking carefully at aspects such as the information before the
administrator, the weight given to the various factors and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the action."
The question arises what the elements of 'reasonableness' are and whether they are
different form the concept of 'rationality' .39 Currie, with reference to 'reasonableness' in
section 33(1), submits that the Constitution ushers in full-blown rationality review, which
was restricted by the courts in the system of parliamentary supremacy.t" The question
therefore has to be answered by establishing what 'rationality' means within the context
of the Constitution and, further, how 'reasonableness' in section 33(1) FC relates to the
concept of 'rationality'.
Govender suggests that the test for the rationality of the exercise of public power requires
a rational connection between the decision taken and a legitimate governmental
purpose." Further, with reference to the Makwanyane case, the author submits that the
purpose of the rationality test is to ensure that government in a constitutional state does
not act arbitrarily or capriciously.V This is strengthened by the Pharmaceutical
37 See Carephone (Pty) Ltd vMarcus NO 1998 (11) BLLR (LAC) 1337 D and Deacon v Controller
of Customs and Excise 1999 (6) BCLR 637 (SE).
Hoexter (2000) 117 SAL!27 and 28 (forthcoming). (See also the passage cited on page 49 above.)
Hoexter (2000) 117 SAL! 27 (forthcoming).
De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2000) 473.
Govender (1999) 14 SAPL 62 78.
See Govender (1999) 14 SAPL 62 79. In S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) [156],
Ackermann J characterised the new constitutional order as one in which state action must be such
that it is capable of being analysed and justified rationally. He further stated that a constitutional
State presupposes a system whose operation can be rationally tested against or in terms of law.
Ackermann J therefore viewed arbitrariness as being dissonant with the perception of the new
constitutional order. See also Yacoob J in Jooste v Score Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2)
BCLR 139 (CC).
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Manufacturers case,43 in which the President, acting in good faith, prematurely brought
an Act of Parliament into operation. Although the action did not constitute administrative
action for the purposes of section 33 FC, the Constitutional Court held that the bringing
into force of the Act by the President constituted the exercise of public power'" and
therefore had to be consistent with the Constitution.f The Court also ruled that in the
exercise of public power, decisions have to be rationally connected to the purpose for
which the power was given. Such a 'rational connection' is the minimum requirement in
terms of the standards demanded by our Constitution. As irrational decisions might
otherwise pass muster simply because they were taken in good faith, the question of
whether the decision rationally related to the purpose for which it was taken calls for an
objective enquiry.l"
Administrative action is a component of the exercise of public power in the operation of a
constitutional state. It is governed by section 33 FC. 'Rationality' is therefore part of
section 33 and is consequently included in the requirement of reasonableness in section
33(1).47 'Rationality' is therefore part of 'reasonableness' in section 33(1) FC. The
suggestion of Hoexter that, as the dictionary meaning of 'rational' entails 'rejecting what
43 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte The President of The Republic of
South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC).
The action required a political judgment as to when the Act should enter into force, a decision that
is necessarily antecedent to the legislative process. In substance the decision was therefore closer
to the legislative process than the administrative process. (See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association In Re: ex parte The President of The Republic of South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241
(CC) [79], and page 23 Chap I.)
See Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburgh Transitional Metropolitan
Council and Others 1998 (I2) BCLR 1458 (CC) [33] to [45], President of the Republic of South
Africa and Others v South African Rugby and Football Union and Others 1999 (10) BCLR 1059
(CC) [132] to [149], and 2.5.4 Chap 1 for the doctrine of constitutional legality.
See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte The President of The Republic of
South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [85] and [86].
This notion correlates with the way in which the review of administrative action for 'justifiability
in relation to the reasons given' in section 24(d) had been conducted. See Carephone (Pty) Ltd v
Marcus NO 1998 (II) BLLR (LAC) 1337 F-G.
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IS unreasonable' 'rational' has either a lesser meaning or IS synonymous with
'reasonable', strengthens the fact that 'rationality' is a part of 'reasonableness' .48
Delegated legislation, the drafting of which constitutes administrative action, in most
instances involve issues of high policy. Govender discusses the role of 'rationality' in
policy decisions with reference to the Soobramoney case." In this case, the provincial
health authorities of KwaZulu-Natal advanced a policy that afforded dialysis treatment
only to patients with reversible renal failure. The applicant, a patient with irreversible
renal failure, argued that he had a right in terms of section 27(3) FC50 to be admitted to
the dialysis programme at a state hospital. The Constitutional Court stated that a court
would be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the political
organs and authorities whose responsibility it is to deal with certain matters. Govender
therefore submits that the implication of this judgment is that policy decisions, including
the drafting of delegated legislation," should be rational to avoid judicial interference.Y
The drafting of delegated legislation should therefore also be exercised 'rationally' in
order to adhere to the requirement of reasonableness in section 33(1) FC.
The uncertainty regarding whether both rationality and proportionality were elements of
'justifiable in relation to the reasons given' continues for 'reasonableness' in section
33(1) FC. Hoexter submits, with reference to 'reasonableness' in section 33(1) FC, that
while reasonableness requires rationality, it is not confined to rationality as reasonable
decisions also reveal proportionality between means and end, benefits and detriments. 53
However, Govender submits, with reference to review of delegated legislation in terms of
section 33 FC,s4 that 'reasonableness' in section 33(1) simply requires 'rationality' .55 He
48
53
Hoexter (2000) 117 SAL! 27-28 (forthcoming).
Soobramoney vMinister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) [29].
"Health care, food, water and social security
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment ... "
The drafting of delegated legislation is an administrative action that includes a significant measure
of policy.
See Govender (1999) 14 SAPL 62 78-79. See also Jooste v Score Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd
1999(2) BCLR 139 (CC) in this regard.
Hoexter (2000) 117 SAL! 27 (forthcoming).
See fn 51 above and Govender (1999) 14 SAPL 62 78-79.
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bases his submission firstly on Prinsloo v Van Der Linde and Another." in which. the
applicants argued that the section which they were seeking to impugn lacked rationality
because it did not use the least onerous means of achieving its objectives. Sachs J
dismissed the argument, stating that:
'The question whether the legislation could have been tailored in a different and more exactable
way is relevant to the issue of justification, but irrelevant to the question of whether there is a
sufficient relationship between the means chosen and the end sought, for purposes of the present
enquiry. ,57
Consequently the test for rationality, applied in the above manner, would leave no room
for the application of the proportionality test in the first phase of a constitutional case.
Secondly, Govender argues that 'proportionality' requires a balancing process between
means and end, as adopted in S v Makwanyane,58 only after a constitutional right had
been infringed. This balancing process is therefore applied during the second phase of a
constitutional case in terms of the limitations clause (section 36 FC) as justification for
courts to look closely at legislative and executive choices.i" The following paragraph by
O'Reagan J in the Dawood case indicates that the Constitutional Court is still applying
this approach:
'Section 36(1) of the Constitution provides that a limitation of a constitutional right may be
justified. It will be justified only if the Court concludes that the limitation of the right,
considering the nature and importance of the right and the extent of its limitation on the one
hand, is justified in relation to the purpose, importance and effect of the provision causing the
limitation, taking into account the availability of less restrictive means to achieve the purpose of
the provision, on the other.t'"
55 See Govender (1999) 14 SAPL 62 78-79.
Prinsloo v Van Der Linde andAnother 1997 (Il) BCLR 1498 (CC).
See Prinsloo v Van Der Linde and Another 1997 (Il) BCLR 1498 (CC) [35]. See also fil 31
above for Govender's definition of 'proportionality'. (See Govender (1999) 14 SAPL 62 79 fil
54.) See also Jooste v Score Supermarket Trading (Ply) LTD 1999 (2) BCLR 139 (CC) in this
regard.
1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC).
Govender (1999) 14 SAPL 62 79.
Dawood, Shalabi and Thomas v The Minister of Home Affairs and Others (CC) 07/06/2000 Caes
no. CCT 35/99 [40].
56
57
58
59
60
59
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Accordingly, it seems as if 'rationality' constitutes the only element of 'reasonableness'
in section 33(1) FC. '[P]roportionality' plays a role only in the limitation analysis that
follows after a finding that the right to 'just administrative action' in section 33 FC had
been infringed." Furthermore, as politicians were not impressed with the idea of
proportionality.f the formulations of the statutory grounds for review of unreasonable
administrative action in sections 6(2)(e)(vi), (f)(ii)(aa) to (dd) and (h) of the Act do not
include proportionality. This contrasts with the statutory ground for 'unreasonableness'
proposed by the law commission, which did include proportionality.l"
In section 24(d) IC, a threshold qualified the right to 'administrative action that is
justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it'. Accordingly, the right was only
afforded where a person's 'rights,64 were 'affected,65 or 'threatenedJ" Conversely, the
right to 'administrative action that is reasonable' is afforded to 'everyone' in section
33(1) FC. The ambit of the guarantee afforded by section 33(1) therefore depends on the
interpretation of 'everyone'. As thresholds were done away with in order to afford a
wider or more generous guarantee in section 33, 'everyone' in section 33(1) includes all
persons with affected or threatened rights, interests and legitimate expectations."
61 This approach of the Constitutional Court, based upon Canadian authority (R v Big M Drug Mart
(1985) 18 DLR (4th) 321 and R v Oaks (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200) stipulates that 'proportionality'
only features in the limitation analysis (the second phase of a constitutional case) once it has been
established that a right in the Bill of Rights had been infringed upon (the first phase of a
constitutional case).
Breitenbach at the VCT New Legislation seminars Thursday 6 April 2000.
See the South African Law Commission's Discussion Paper 81 project 115 annexure E section
4(1)(t)(iv)(cc). According to Hoexter (2000) 117 SALf 34 (forthcoming), the formulation
proposed by the law commission prevented the conflation between rationality and proportionality.
Sec 24(b) IC explicitly included persons with 'legitimate expectations' within the ambit of the
right to 'procedurally fair administrative action' while all the other subsections in sec 24 IC did
not mention it. The inference could therefore have been that persons with 'legitimate
expectations' were excluded from sec 24(a), (c), and (d) IC.
See fn 13 Chap 2.
See ffn 13 and 14 Chap 2.
See sec 2 Chap 2.
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Section 33 FC, of which 'reasonableness' is a part, affords a wider or more generous
guarantee of 'just administrative action' than the guarantee of 'administrative justice' in
section 24 IC.68 As it related only to the reasons supplied for the decision, while
'reasonable' extends also to the effects of the decision, 'justifiable' in section 24(d) IC is
either narrower than 'reasonable' in section 33(1) FC or synonymous with 'reasonable' in
section 33(1) FC.69 Accordingly, 'reasonableness' also does away with symptomatic
unreasonableness in terms of both interpretations of 'justifiable', but even more so if
'justifiable' was narrower than 'reasonable'. Requiring 'reasonableness' in section 33(1),
in other words, affording review for unreasonableness and not only for 'gross' or any
other form of unreasonableness, strengthens this.
As 'symptomatic unreasonableness' falls away and 'reasonableness' might also extend to
the effects of and not merely the reasons for a decision, the appeal-review distinction is
questioned. However, Govendcr " submits that the appeal-review distinction is important
in our law as it recognises that the role of the courts are to ensure legality and
constitutionality and not to act as second deliberator in respect of every administrative
decision. This is consistent with the separation of powers principle, which is central to
our constitutional democracy. Further, the right to 'just administrative action' focuses on
judicial review of, and not appeals against, administrative actions." The view preferred
for 'justifiability', namely that the appeal-review distinction remains intact, and that the
merits of a decision are scrutinised only to determine whether the decision (and perhaps,
its effects) is rationally justifiable, is therefore applicable to the interpretation of
'reasonableness' in section 33(1). Finally, in terms of both the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers case and the interpretation of section 24(d) IC, the rationality of a decision
68
70
See fn 9 Chap 2.
See fn 16 and 17 above.
Govender (1999) 14 SAPL 62 88.
See sec 33(3)(a) FC that reads: 'National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights,
and must- (a) provide for the review of administrative actions ... ' (My emphasis.}
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IS determined by applying a rational-objective-basis test, which is therefore also
applicable for 'reasonableness' in section 33(1).72
3. GROUNDS FOR REVIEW RELATING TO 'REASONABLENESS'
3.1 Section 6(2)(e)(vi): action taken arbitrarily or capriciously
Section 6(2)(e)(vi) reads:
'A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if the action was
taken arbitrarily or capriciously.t "
A decision may be said to be arbitrary and capricious when it is irrational or senseless,
without foundation or apparent purpose.Ï" The Constitutional Court perceives
arbitrariness as being dissonant with rational state action.75 Section 6(2)(e)(iv) therefore
also refers to 'rationality' as a requirement for 'reasonableness' in section 33(1).
Accordingly, administrative action that is 'arbitrary and capricious' is contrary to the
reasonableness requirement and amounts to irrational administrative action."
72 See Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO 1998 (11) BLLR (LAC) 1337 F-G and Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte The President of The Republic of South Africa 2000 (3)
BCLR 241 (CC) [85] and [86].
73 Arbitrary means 'to be decided by one's own liking', 'dependent upon will or pleasure' or 'at the
discretion or option of anyone', while capricious means 'guided by whim or fancy rather than by
judgment or settled purpose'. (See Simpson & Werener The Oxford English Dictionary (1989)
Vol I.) Baxter (see Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 521-522) views this as the ultimate form of
unreasonableness as it is implicit in the concept of discretion that the decision-maker should base
his decisions on rational principles and standards.
See Boulle, Harris & Hoexter Constitutional and Administrative Law (1989) 350 fn 176. In the
common law, a decision that was arbitrary and capricious amounted to a failure by the
administrator to apply his mind to the matter (Northwest Townships (Pty) Ltd v Administrator,
Transvaal 1975 (4) SA 1 (T». See fn 6 above.
See Sv Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) [156].
Hoexter (2000) 117 SAL.! 29 (forthcoming).
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3.2 Section 6(2)(t)(ii): rationality
Section 6(2)(:t)(ii) confirms that 'rationality' is an element of 'reasonableness' in section
33(1). The section affords review of administrative action that is not rationally connected
to the purpose for which it was taken, or to the purpose of the empowering provision, or
to the information before the administrator, or to the reasons given for it by the
administrator. Review for irrationality therefore encompasses four statutory grounds for
review. The grounds are independent from each other and can be used jointly and
independently in the review of administrative action." Further, an objective test has to
be used for the determination of 'rationality' of administrative action in terms of the four
grounds."
Section 6(2)(:t)(ii)(aa) reads as follows:
'A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if the action itself
is not rationally connected to the purpose for which it was taken.'
The section therefore confirms the requirement of 'rationality' for the exercise of public
power in terms of the Constitution." Accordingly, the purpose for which the
administrative action was taken has to be a legitimate governmental purpose in terms of
law.8o
Section 6(2)(:t)(ii)(bb) reads as follows:
'A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if the action itself
is not rationally connected to the purpose of the empowering provision.'
If the administrative action is not rationally connected to the empowering provision, the
power was not exercised in terms of the empowering provision, even if the specific action
was authorised. Section 6(2)(:t)(ii)(bb) therefore relates to the statutory ground in section
6(2)(e)(i) that is discussed in Chapter Two, which affords review of administrative action
77 Section 6(f)(ii)(aa)-(dd) is divided by the word 'or' and not 'and' that would have had the opposite
effect.
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See Carephone (Pty) Ltdv Marcus NO 1998 (Il) BLLR (LAC) 1337 E.
See Sv Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) [156] and Govender (1999) 14 SAPL 62 79.
See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte The President of The Republic of
South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [85] and [86].
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taken for reasons not authorised by the empowering provision." For example, where an
administrator decides to use municipality workers to paint the town hall a week before
her daughter's wedding, the action is not rationally connected to the empowering
provision, although she is empowered by an empowering provision to maintain the town
hall.
Section 6(2)(f)(ii)(cc) reads:
'A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if the action itself
is not rationally connected to the information before the administrator.'
Further, section 6(2)(f)(ii)(dd) reads:
'A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if the action itself
is not rationally connected to the reasons given for it by the administrator.'
Sections 6(2)(f)(ii)(cc) and (dd) therefore require a rational decision-making process for
'justifiable in relation to the reasons given' in section 24(d) IC, as suggested by
Mureinik. 82 In addition, the decision-maker is required to consider all serious objections
to the decision taken and to provide answers that plausibly meet them.83
3.3 Section 6(2)(h): gross unreasonableness
Section 6(2)(h) reads as follows:
'A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if the exercise of
the power or the performance of the function authorised by the empowering provision, in
pursuance of which the administrative action was purportedly taken, is so unreasonable that no
reasonable person could so have exercised the power or performed the function .. .'84
81 This statutory ground relates to the common law ground for review applied where administrators
exceeded their powers when acting upon the object of the action. (See Baxter Administrative Law
(1984) 458-459, Moulder v Thom 1974 (1) SA 336 (T) and page 39 and fn 49 Chap 2.)
See Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) 169 and
Bums (1994) 9 SAPL 347 359.
Mureinik(1994) 10SAJHR3141.
Breitenbach suggested that the formulation is circular, since an unreasonable administrative action
is axiomatically something that no reasonable person would perform. (Breitenbach at the UCT
82
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The section therefore has the merit of dealing with gross unreasonableness head-on .and
not as a symptom of some other defect.85 Although the formulation of the statutory
ground in section 6(2)(h) seems to confirm the gross unreasonableness test,86 it is only
one component of a greater test for reasonableness that consists of all the statutory
grounds for review relating to 'reasonableness' in section 33(1) Fe.
Section 6(2)(h) does therefore not seem to qualify the right to 'administrative action that
is reasonable' in section 33(1) Fe to such an extent that it merits the direct application of
section 33 Fe for the review of administrative action that was unreasonable. The reason
is that review of unreasonable administrative action can take place in terms of five
statutory grounds for review, which specifically confirms that 'rationality' is the only
element of 'reasonableness' in section 33(1), and further, in terms of the statutory ground
in section 6(2)(h). It is difficult to imagine an unreasonable administrative action that
cannot be reviewed by applying either one of these statutory grounds for review.
86
New Legislation Seminars Thursday 6 April 2000.) Hoexter "The Future of Judicial Review in
South African Administrative Law" (2000) 117 SAL.! 34-35 (forthcoming) criticises the
formulation 'so unreasonable that no reasonable person could so have exercised the power or
performed the function' for closely resembling the Wednesbury test (see Associated Provincial
Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corpotaion 1948 1 KB 223) that requires a decision to be 'so
unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever come to it' before affording review. She
argues that courts will therefore conclude that the statutory ground in sec 6(2)(h) requires the same
sort of egregiousness as the Wednesbury test. Further, as Jansen JA in Theron v Ring van
Wellington van NG Sending Kerk in Suid Afrika 1976 (2) SA 1 (A) noted that judicial self-restraint
(as illustrated by the Wedensbury test) was being loosened in England (Baxter Administrative Law
(1984) 480 fn 19), Hoexter critisises the formulation of sec 6(2)(h) as the test in the Wednesbury
case is questioned in its home country.
Hoexter (2000) 117 SAL.!34 (forthcoming).
However, De Lange (parliament Monday 12 June 2000) suggests that the ground constitutes the
via media between a ground for gross unreasonableness and the abrogation of the distinction
between appeal and review.
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3.4 The common law ground for review omitted from the Act: vague and
uncertain administrative action
The common law ground that affords review of vague or uncertain administrative action
was omitted from the Act, although it was incorporated in the 1999 Draft Administrative
Justice Bill.87 In common law, the ground is afforded for the review of an administrative
action that was vague, confusing or embarrassing. In other words, administrative actions
are required to be clear and comprehensible. It is unreasonable to expect individuals to
comply with directives if they are unable to make sense of them."
The ground for vagueness or uncertainty is primarily used in the realm of the drafting of
delegated legislation but is applicable to all administrative actions. The test for invalidity
is 'whether a reasonably precise meaning is ascertainable,89 and is therefore objective.
However, the determination of certainty differs according to the circumstances of each
case. Where delegated legislation is for example addressed to a specialised audience, the
court will judge the clarity of the words according to the understanding of the audience.
In the Dawood case, decided in terms of section 10 FC ('human dignity'), the
Constitutional Court ruled that direct guidance was necessary for officials untrained at
law to exercise their discretion in a manner consistent with the Bill of Rights. Further,
those affected by a discretionary power that contains no express constraints would not
know what is relevant to the exercise of those power, or in which circumstances they are
entitled to seek relief from an adverse decision, if no guidance is given to officials for the
exercise of their discretion. The Court brought the drafting of delegated legislation (and
by implication administrative actionj'" within the realm of the judgment with the
following statement:
87 See the South African Law Commission's Discussion Paper 81 project 115 annexure E section
4(1)(f)(ii).
88 For example, a regulation concerning the presence of an overly broad group of people in a vaguely
demarcated area is unreasonable for being vague or uncertain, as anybody could be arrested for
being present in the area, including those that has to be there for business purposes: S v Lasker
1991 (1) SA 558 (C).
R vJopp 1949 (4) SA 11 (N) 14.
See fn 51 above.
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'Guidance will often be required to ensure the Constitution takes root in the daily practice of .
governance. Where necessary, such guidance must be given. Guidance could be provided either
in the legislation itself, or where appropriate, by a legislative requirement that delegated
legislation be properly enacted by a competent authority.'?'
In the Dawood case, the Constitutional Court therefore, by implication, referred to the
importance of clear administrative actions.
The continued relevance of the common law ground for review relating to vague and
uncertain administrative action, which was omitted from the Act, therefore needs to be
determined." In determining relevance, two questions are asked. The first question is
whether one or more of the statutory grounds overlap the common law ground that has
been omitted from the Act.93 The second is whether the constitutional common law
principles that previously provided the common law ground for review have been taken
up by the Constitution.
The statutory ground in section 6(2)(vi), the ground relating to administrative action
taken arbitrarily or capriciously, can in certain circumstances overlap vague or uncertain
administrative action. The following serves as an example: the drafting of delegated
legislation that empowers a town clerk to terminate hawking activities that influences
formal markets. The administrative action is arbitrary firstly for being senseless, as the
majority of hawking activities influences formal markets. Secondly, the administrative
action is arbitrary for not having any apparent purpose. The purpose of the action cannot
be to protect formal markets, as more stringent measures would be needed for such an
undertaking and, further, the purpose of the action cannot be to prohibit hawking
activities as such, as only an uncertain class of hawking activities is affected.
The statutory grounds in section 6(2)(f)(ii), the grounds relating to rationality, can
overlap vague or uncertain administrative action in certain circumstances. The following
set of facts can serve as an example: if 'harbour' had been vaguely demarcated as 'Table
Bay' in delegated legislation that empowers a policeman to order any member of the
91 See Dawood, Shalabi and Thomas v The Minister of Home Affairs and Others Dawood (CC)
07/06/2000 Case no. CCT 35/99 [54].
See 2.4.2 Chap 1.
See fn 48 Chap 1.
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public to leave the 'harbour', and therefore includes the Cape Town Harbour, Greenpoint,
the area around the Castle and Robben Island, the drafting of the delegated legislation
amounts to a vague or uncertain administrative action." In terms of section
6(2)(t)(ii)(aa), the administrative action in question is not rationally connected to the
purpose for which it was taken, that is, to keep unwelcome persons like prostitutes out of
the 'harbour'. The area covers a far greater area than merely the 'harbour' and the
administrative action therefore seems to have been taken to empower policemen to order
any member of the public to leave any part of the area included in Cape Town Harbour,
Greenpoint, the area around the Castle and Robben Island, if the policeman feels that the
person is 'unwelcome'. In other words, the purpose of the action seems to be to make
policing in this greater area easier.
Further, in terms of section 6(2)(t)(ii)(bb), the administrative action in question is not
rationally connected to the purpose of the empowering provision objectively. The
purpose of the empowering provision in terms of which the legislation was drafted is to
keep unwelcome persons, like prostitutes, out of the 'harbour area' in order for them not
to obstruct the daily activities in the 'harbour' and further, for their own safety. The
regulations consequently drafted in terms of this empowering provision, are not rationally
connected to the provision, as they usurp more power than empowering provision
afforded them.
In terms of section 6(2)(f)(ii)(cc), the administrative action in question is also not
rationally connected to the information before the administrator objectively. 'Harbour',
under normal circumstances, includes the fenced in area around the docks. However, the
administrator used the word 'harbour' to include an area that has nothing to do with the
daily activities taking place in a 'harbour', but that has to do with an area in which
normal daily activities take place.
Finally, in terms of section 6(2)(f)(ii)(dd), the administrative action in question is not
rationally connected to the reasons given for it by the administrator objectively. Keeping
prostitutes out of the 'harbour area' in order for them not to obstruct the daily activities in
94 Sv Lasker 1991 (1) SA 558 (C).
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the 'harbour' and for their own safety is no reason for arresting a prostitute on Robben
Island.
The example can be used to demonstrate that the statutory ground in section 6(2)(h) also
overlaps vague or uncertain administrative action. The administrative action affects not
only prostitutes, but could also affect a businessman that is 'unwelcome' in the eyes of a
certain policeman. Ordering such a businessman, who needs access to the area in order
to earn his livelihood, to leave the area for being unwelcome, 'is so unreasonable that no
reasonable person could so have exercised the action or performed the function'. In other
words, the administrative action in question seems to be grossly unreasonable.
However, vagueness is a separate ground for review and will under certain circumstances
be the only ground for review that is applicable. Section 6(2)(i) is then the most suitable
section to deal with administrative action that was performed vaguely.
More than one of the statutory grounds for review in the Act therefore overlap the
common law ground for review relating to vague or uncertain administrative action that
has been omitted from the Act. The statutory grounds that could overlap a vague or
uncertain administrative action are the statutory grounds in sections 6(2)(e)(vi),
6(2)(f)(ii)(aa) to (dd), 6(2)(h) and 6(2)(i). The common law ground for review relating to
vague or uncertain administrative action that has been omitted from the Act, therefore
continues to be relevant to the review of administrative action through the application of
the statutory grounds that overlap it. It is therefore unnecessary to answer the second
question in the test for continued relevance.
3.5 Conclusion
Both sections 6(2)(e)(vi) and 6(2)(f)(ii) confirms that 'rationality' is the main element of
'reasonableness' in section 33(1). Section 6(2)(f)(ii) contains four statutory grounds for
review, which are independent from each other and can be used jointly and independently
in the review of administrative action. The formulation of the statutory ground in section
6(2)(h) seems to confirm the gross unreasonableness test. However, as it is only one
component of a greater test for reasonableness, which consists of all the statutory grounds
69
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
for review relating to 'reasonableness' in section 33(1) Fe, it is difficult to imagine an
unreasonable administrative action that cannot be reviewed by applying either one of
these grounds. Although the common law ground that affords review of vague or
uncertain administrative action was omitted from the Act, it continues to be relevant to
the review of administrative action through the application of the statutory grounds in
sections 6(2)(e)(vi), 6(2)(f)(ii)(aa) to (dd), 6(2)(h) and 6(2)(i) that overlap it.
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CHAPTER4
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
1. INTRODUCTION
Section 33(1) FC' demands administrative action that is 'lawful', 'reasonable' and
'procedurally fair'. This Chapter concerns the requirement of 'procedural fairness'. As
the requirement of 'reasons for administrative action' in section 33(2) FC relates to the
requirement of 'procedural faimess'r' 'procedural fairness' is discussed with reference to
both sections 24(b) and 24(c) IC,3 and both sections 33(1) and 33(2) FC. Finally, the
grounds for review relating to the requirement of 'procedural fairness' are discussed.
2. THE INTERPRETATION OF 'PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS'
2.1 Section 24(c) and (d) IC and section 33(1) and (2) FC
Section 24 IC was in operation for five years and nine months." A reasonable volume of
academic views and jurisprudence on 'procedural fairness' in section 24(b) and 'reasons
for administrative action' in section 24(c) arose in this period. Section 33 FC only
entered into force on 3 February 2000. Consequently there is very little by way of
academic views and jurisprudence on section 33(1) and (2). Academic views and
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. See fil 2 Chap 1.
Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 567 the fact that an unreasoned decision is arbitrary and unfair
is the strongest argument for natural justice (see fil 14 below) implying a right to reasons. Further,
Boulle, Harris & Hoexter Constitutional and Administrative Law (1989) 328 fil 30 noted before
the inception of a right to 'reasons for administrative action' into our law (see sec 2.1 below) that
although the giving of reasons was not yet recognised as a component of natural justice, a failure
to give reasons in certain circumstances can lead to (or strengthen) an inference of unfairness.
Wiechers Administratiefreg (1984) 240 stated that the rule that an administrator should give
reasons for administrative actions points to the third requirement of the audi alterem partem
principle. (See fil 15 and 35 below.)
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993.
See 2.4 Chap 1.
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jurisprudence on section 24(b) and (c) are therefore used in the discussion on the
requirement of 'procedural fairness' in section 33(1). However, the differences between
sections 24 and 33 need to be kept in mind when referring to academic views and
jurisprudence on section 24.5
Although 'procedural fairness' appears in both sections 24 IC and 33 FC, there are
important differences between 'procedural fairness' in section 24(b) and 'procedural
fairness' in section 33(1). 'Procedural fairness' in section 24(b) was only part of one
component of the guarantee of 'administrative justice', while 'procedural fairness' in
section 33(1) is part of a more general guarantee of 'just administrative action'.
However, the most important difference relates to the qualification of the right to
'procedurally fair administrative action' by thresholds. A threshold qualified the
guarantee of 'procedurally fair administrative action' in section 24(b) by affording it only
to those with affected" or threatened? rights" and legitimate expectations.' However, the
guarantee of 'administrative action that is procedurally fair' in section 33(1) is
unqualified and afforded to everyone.
See ffn 9 and 10Chap 2.
See fn 13 Chap 2.
See fn 14 Chap 2.
See fn 33 Chap 2.
Sec 24(b) was the only subsection in sec 24 IC that explicitly included those with 'legitimate
expectations'. In Administrator, Transvaal v Traub 1989 (4) SA 731 (A) 758 D-E Corbet CJ
defined the doctrine of legitimate expectations as follows: '[T]he legitimate expectation doctrine is
sometimes expressed in terms of some substantive benefit, advantage or privilege which the
person concerned could reasonably expect to acquire or retain and which it would be unfair to
deny such person without prior consultation or a prior hearing; and at other times in terms of a
legitimate expectation to be accorded a hearing before a decision adverse to the interests of the
person concerned is taken'. There is no definition for 'legitimate expectation' in the interim or
final Constitutions. However, the court has indicated that a definition was unnecessary since the
doctrine of legitimate expectation has already become part of the common law encompassed by
sec 24(b) (Jenkins v Government of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (8) BCLR 1059 (Tk)). See
Bums Administrative Law Under the 1996 Constitution (1998) 177-178, and Van Huysteen NO v
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 1995 (9) BCLR 1191 (C).
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Finally, the 'reasons for administrative action' component of the guarantee. of
'procedurally fair administrative action' was afforded to persons with affected rights or
interests in section 24(c), while the 'reasons for administrative action' component of the
guarantee for 'administrative action that is procedurally fair', is afforded to everyone
whose rights have been adverselyv' affected in section 33(2).11 Further, a specific
qualification was included in 'reasons for administrative action' in section 24(c), as no
reasons could be requested if they had already been made public. There is no such
qualification of 'reasons for administrative action' in section 33(2).
The academic views and jurisprudence on sections 24(b) and 24(c) can therefore be
applied to the discussion on 'procedural fairness' in section 33(1) and 'reasons for
administrative action' in section 33(2) if the differences are kept in mind.
2.2 The interpretation of 'procedural fairness'
'Procedural fairness' relates to the application of certain common law rules. These rules
were designed to afford an affected individual12 a fair procedure before an administrator
10 Adversely means 'antagonistic', 'actively hostile', 'acting against or in opposition to', 'opposing'
or 'contrary'. (See Simpson & Werner The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) Vol I.)
The reason for the qualification of the right to 'reasons for administrative action' in sec 33(2)
relates to a concern about the effect of including a right to 'just administrative action' in the final
Constitution. The concern was raised by the frequent use of the right to 'reasons for
administrative action' in sec 24 IC, together with the right to 'access to information' in sec 23 IC
in the interim period to gain access to information and reasons for administrative action from the
state and government at all levels. (See fn 9 Chap 2.) The qualification of the right to 'reasons for
administrative action' by affording it only to those whose rights had been adversely affected was
inserted to address that concern. Further, the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000
was put in place to regulate access to information.
If an administrative action impacted generally on a community or class of individuals, procedural
fairness did not require a hearing at common law. Prior to South African Roads Board v
Johannesburg City Council 1991 (4) SA 1 (A), the courts applied the distinction between
'legislative' and 'non-legislative' acts as a mechanism to restrict the reach of natural justice. The
application of the rules of natural justice was confined to non-legislative acts. In the Roads Board
case the Appellate Division replaced this distinction with a distinction between (a) statutory
II
12
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performs an administrative action." These common law rules, referred to as the rules of
natural justice," have traditionally been classified under the headings of audi alterem
partem (persons affected by a decision should be given a fair hearing by the decision-
maker prior to the making of the decision, hereafter 'the audi principle'Y' and nemo
13
powers which, when exercised, affect members of the community at large equally and (b) those
which, while possibly also having general impact, are calculated to cause particular prejudice to an
individual or particular group of individuals. Only the exercise of powers in type (b) attracted the
requirements of natural justice. It was further ruled that less onerous procedures than a hearing
(not speci tied in the case) would suffice for procedural, fairness in this regard. (See De Waal,
Currie and Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook (2000) 460 fn 35 and 470 fn 80.)
In Du Preez v Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1997 (3) SA 204 (A) 231 the Appellate
Division ruled that the duty to act fairly is concerned only with the manner in which a decision is
taken and not whether the decision itselfis fair or not.
Wiechers Administratiefreg (1984) 208 believes that the rules of natural justice encompass more
than mere rules of procedure. In essence the rules represent a fundamental or primeval justice by
guaranteeing simple justice between man and man. (Burns Administrative Law Under the 1996
Constitution (1998) 166 fn 145.) According to Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 538-540 the
rules of natural justice can be equated with a duty to act fairly. (Burns Administrative Law Under
the 1996 Constitution (1998) 166 fn 144.)
According to Baxter, the audi principle requires that the administrator should afford the affected
individual a fair hearing. (Burns Administrative Law Under the 1996 Constitution (1998) 166 fn
144.) Fairness includes two fundamental requirements namely notice of the intended action and a
proper opport~nity to be heard. However, Wiechers (Wiechers Administratiefreg (1984) 240)
states that 'reasons for administrative action' constitutes the third requirement for the audi
principle. (See fn 2 above.) The notice of the intended action needs to specify the factors
motivating the proposed action together with the time and place where an opportunity to be heard
will be afforded. A fair opportunity to be heard means an opportunity to present evidence, and to
contradict and challenge evidence presented against you. This involves disclosing of information
and reasons for the looming decision that is in the possession of the decision-making authority
adequately (Loxton v Kenhardt Liquor Licensing Board 1942 AD 275). Finally, reasonable time
has to be given to prepare for representations. 'Reasonable' depends on the circumstances of each
case (Turner v Jockey Club 1974 (3) SA 633 (A».
14
15
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iudex in propria causa (the decision maker must be, and must be reasonably perceived to
be, impartialj.l"
The right to 'procedurally fair administrative action' in section 24(b) IC was not
restricted to the application of the rules of natural justice. In the Van Huysteen casel7
Farlam J stated that although natural justice and procedural fairness are similar in scope,
content and application, the constitutional right to 'procedural fairness' should not be
regarded as a codification of the principles of natural justice. The interpretation of
16 According to the nemo iudex in propria causa principle, an administrator must be free from bias
and unprejudiced when performing an administrative action. The test for bias is whether the
administrator accused of bias, had associated himself with one of the opposing views in such a
way that it appeared to a reasonable man that he was going to be biased or that there was a real
likelihood of bias. (See City and Suburban Transport (Pty) Ltd v Local Board Road
Transportation, Johannesburg 1932 WLD 100 and Sculte v Van den Berg and Others NNO 1991
(3) SA 717 (C).) Therefore, even ifno bias is proved, invalidation can result ifbias was apparent.
The circumstances under which bias can arise include firstly, situations where the administrator
has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of an administrative action. The pecuniary interest can be
direct, like bribery for instance, or indirect, like a long-term financial benefit for a private business
(see Rose v Johannesburg Local Road Transportation Board 1947 (4) SA 272 (W». However,
there are different degrees of indirect pecuniary interest and the courts will draw a line where the
interest is so remote that it does not satisfy the test for bias. Secondly, bias can arise where the
administrator has a personal interest in the outcome of the administrative action. It can for
example arise where the administrator has a personal relationship with one of the parties affected
by his decision (see Liebenberg v Brakpan Liquor Licencing Board 1944 WLD 52). Other
examples of personal interests that might cause bias are relationships of family, business, social or
otherwise. Thirdly, real or apparent prejudgment of the issue to be decided by the administrator
give rise to disqualification on the grounds of bias, for example, past relationships with the
aggrieved party that is expressed by a previous attitude towards him. Fourthly, current external
commitments or past activities of the decision-maker might indicate that he so identifies himself
with a particular view relevant to the administrative action, that there is a reasonable apprehension
that he cannot remain impartial. Finally, the manner of conduct of the administrator during the
decision-making process could create the appearance of prejudice (see Schoeman v Administrateur
17
OVS 1961 (4) SA 856 (0».
Van Huysteen NO v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 1995 (9) BCLR 1191 (C)
1212.
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section 24(b) IC had to be a generous one18 in order to give individuals the full measure
of the guarantee in the section. This in effect meant that section 24(b) IC encompassed
aspects of a fair procedure not yet addressed in the common law. The courts accordingly
developed the common law to include new aspects of a fair procedure within the ambit of
'procedurally fair' in section 24(b) IC.
'Procedural fairness' was only part of one component of the guarantee of 'administrative
justice' in section 24 IC, while 'procedural fairness' is part of a more general guarantee
of 'just administrative action' in section 33 FC. However, that does not preclude
consideration of the interpretation of 'procedural fairness' in section 24(b) after
considering the interpretation of 'procedural fairness' in section 33(1). As the
development of the common law with regard to 'procedural fairness' through the
application of section 24(b) illustrates the tendency to afford a wide or generous
guarantee for 'procedural fairness', 19 it could rather strengthen such a consideration of
section 24(b) IC.
While the right to 'procedurally fair administrative action' in section 24(b) is qualified by
a threshold, the right to 'administrative action that is procedurally fair' in section 33(1) is
afforded to everyone/" This could strengthen the consideration of the interpretation of
'procedural fairness' in section 24(b) in the consideration of 'procedural fairness' in
section 33(1). The unqualified right to 'procedural fairness' in section 33(1), like the
development of the common law with regard to 'procedural fairness' through the
application of section 24(b), both point to a wide or generous guarantee of 'procedural
fairness'.
The first development of the common law with regard to 'procedural fairness' in section
24(b) IC, related to the obligation that commissions of enquiry have to comply with the
audi principle. In this regard De Ville suggested that, as section 24(b) applied when a
18 Also see Jenkins v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Another 1996 (8) BCLR 1059
(Tk).
Van Huysteen NO vMinister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 1995 (9) BCLR 1191 (C).
As a result of doing away with thresholds, everyone in sec 33 means all persons with affected or
threatened rights, interests and legitimate expectations. (See fn 10Chap 2.)
19
20
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person's rights or legitimate expectations were affected or threatened, it might also
obligate commissions of enquiry to comply with the audi principle.i' In Transkei Public
Servants Association v Government of the Republic of South Africa,22 it was accordingly
ruled that the question whether 'procedural fairness' should be applied in a preliminary
investigation (like an investigation conducted by a commission of enquiry), depended on
the circumstances of each case. According to Bums, 'circumstances' include the
proximity between the initial investigation and the final decision, the terms of the
enabling provision, the importance of the subject matter to the individual, and the need
for administrative efficiency.v'
The court consequently applied section 24(b) IC to a preliminary investigation in Du
Preez v Truth and Reconciliation Commission24 in which it was ruled that the appropriate
committee of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission had to comply with the rules of
natural justice. The reason for this was that the envisaged process was potentially
prejudicial to the parties involved as it could result in criminal or civil proceedings
against them.
The next issue in which the audi principle could find application, that had been raised
since the implementation of section 24(b) IC, was the issue of persons being subpoenaed
to give evidence before a legally constituted tribunal.f In the Podlas case,26 the master
of the Supreme Court decided to hold an enquiry and issue notices for an urgent
interrogation in terms of section 152 of the Insolvency Act. In the event of seeking an
interim interdict to stop the interrogation, it was ruled that no liberties, property or other
existing rights were prejudicially affected. The application of the audi principle was
therefore not required and the application for the interim interdict was set aside.
21
23
De Ville "The Right to Administrative Justice: An Examination of Section 24 of the Interim
Constitution" (1995) Il SAJHR 264 270.
1995 (9) BCLR 1235 (Tk).
See Burns Administrative Law Under the 1996 Constitution (1998) 179-180.
See Du Preez v Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1997 (3) SA 204 (A) 233 E.
Burns Administrative Law Under the 1996 Constitution (1998) 180.
Pod/as v Cohen and Brydon 1994 (3) BCLR 137 (T).
22
24
25
26
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It is suggested with reference to the Podlas case and the precedents on commissions. of
enquiry" that the rules of natural justice should apply. This should be done where
persons have been subpoenaed to give evidence before a legally constituted tribunal in
cases in which the process followed by the tribunal is potentially prejudicial to the parties
involved. The potential prejudice has to be real or apparent, like prejudice that could
result in criminal or civil proceedings against the affected party and like prejudice that
affects liberties, property or other existing rights.
However, the following statement by the Constitutional Court in the Premier, Province of
Mpumalanga case should be kept in mind by the courts when developing the common
law with regard to 'procedural fairness':
'In determining what constitutes procedural fairness in a given case, a court should be slow to
impose obligations upon government which will inhibit its ability to make and implement policy
effectively. As a young democracy facing immense challenges of transformation, we cannot
deny the importance of the need to ensure the ability of the executive to act efficiently and
promptly. On the other hand, to permit the implementation of retroactive decisions without, for
example, affording parties an effective opportunity to make representations would flout another
important principle, that of procedural fairness ... ,28
Therefore, in developing the common law with regard to 'procedural fairness', a proper
balance needs to be struck between this guarantee and the importance to ensure that
government has the ability to make and implement policy effectively. This is
strengthened by Gardener v East London Transitional Local Council/" which warned,
prior to the Mpumalanga case, against affording a guarantee of 'procedural fairness' that
is too wide. The motivation was that a guarantee that is too wide would hamper
legislative and adjudicative functions of administrators that need to be expeditious and
inexpensive at this stage of South Africa's history.
27 See Du Preez v Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1997 (3) SA 204 (A) 233 E, Podlas v
Cohen and Brydon 1994 (3) BCLR 137 (T) and Transkei Public Servants Association v
Government of the Republic of South Africa1995 (9) BCLR 1235 (Tk).
Premier, Province of Mpumalanga v Executive Committee of the Association of Governing Bodies
of State-Aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) BCLR 151 (CC) [41].
1996 (3) SA 99 (E) 116 E.
28
29
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Further, the Constitutional Court appeared to countenance the departure in. the
Mpumalanga case from the standard required in Administrator, Transvaal v Traub.3D In
the Traub case the court interpreted fairness in the context of a 'legitimate expectation' as
requiring the decision-maker to afford the affected party a hearing prior to the making of
the decision. However, the Constitutional Court held that a hearing would not be
required to achieve 'procedural fairness' in all cases where there are legitimate
expectations." Based on the Mpumalanga case, Govender32 suggests with reference to
'procedural fairness' in section 33(1), that the objective of 'procedural fairness' is to
achieve procedural fairness and not to afford a hearing. In some circumstances, for
example, a balancing of interests might suggest that government need provide only a
rudimentary procedure before it acts and perhaps a more satisfactory procedure later.33
30 1989 (4) SA 731 (A).
In the Mpumalanga case, benefits to schoolchildren, given in the form of bursaries, were
withdrawn without granting them a prior hearing. The same type of situation arose in the Oranje
Vrystaatse Vereniging vir Staatsondersteunde Skole en 'n Ander v Premier van die Provinsie
Vrystaat en Andere 1996 (2) BCLR 248 (0). There a decision to suspend the payment of
subsidies to state-aided schools without granting the aggrieved parties a prior hearing, was set
aside for being procedurally unfair in terms of sec 24(b) IC. In the Mpumalanga case, O'Reagan J
accepted that it might be procedurally fair to withdraw benefits simply by giving adequate notice
of such intention. However, a number of factors such as the nature of the benefit, the impact of
the withdrawal, the benefits of the withdrawal to the state and society and the cost of affording a
hearing to the aggrieved party need to be taken into account. A measure of safeguard is therefore
required before a hearing could be refused.
Govender "Administrative Justice" (1999) 14 SAPL 62 87.
Under pre-constitutional law, natural justice did not apply with regard to the termination of
benefits. The situation changed since the inception of the interim Constitution. Where benefits
are withdrawn, the affected party is afforded a hearing, as there is a reasonable basis for a
'legitimate expectation' that the benefits would continue. (See Jenkins v Republic of South Africa
1996 (8) BCLR 1059 (Tk).) Because of the government's policy of reconstruction and
development, benefactory programmes of all sorts will become fixtures in South Africa and will
be seen as conferring 'rights' and 'legitimate expectations'. Consequently every reduction,
termination or denial of admission to a programme of this kind, will trigger a requirement that
'procedural fairness' needs to be complied with. As it is apparent that it is impossible to grant
hearings in all of these cases, narrowing is essential. (See Asimow "Administrative Law Under
31
32
33
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The idea behind section 33 was to afford a wider or more generous guarantee for 'just
administrative action' and then to limit and give effect to the right in legislation. One of
the concerns that gave rise to this idea was the inhibitory effect of a guarantee for 'just
administrative action' on government policies of reconstruction and development." As
the Mpumalanga case seems to address this concern, raised in the negotiations of section
33 FC, the interpretation of section 24(b) IC applies equally to 'procedural fairness' in
section 33(1) Fe.
It can therefore be said that the differences between 'procedural fairness' in section 24(b)
IC and section 33(1) FC can be ascribed to the differing structures of section 24 IC and
33 FC. 'Procedural fairness' encompasses the common law rules of natural justice, but is
not confined to it. Accordingly, the courts have developed 'procedural fairness' to
include aspects not yet addressed in common law. However, a balance needs to be struck
between the necessity of 'procedural fairness' and the importance to ensure that
government has the ability to make and implement policy effectively. Finally, affording
a hearing, which depends on the circumstances of each case, is not synonymous with
'procedural fairness'.
2.3 The interpretation of 'reasons for administrative action'
The guarantee in section 24(c) IC afforded a remedy that had been unavailable for
administrative law in the common law. As the guarantee entailed 'the giving of reasons
in writing for decisions that affected rights or interests', it extended the reach of
administrative justice. Requiring an administrator to give reasons for his decision
therefore provides a safeguard against arbitrary or unreasonable administrative action."
35
South Africa's Final Constitution: The need for an Administrative Justice Act" (1996) 113 SAL.!
613617and619.)
See fn 9 Chap 2.
See De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2000) 471. Wiechers argued that the refusal to
give reasons for administrative actions implied that the decision was arbitrary and unfair. (See
Wiechers Administratiefreg (1984) 241.) According to him, the notion in the common law that
34
80
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Section 24(c) IC included and section 33(2) FC includes 'reasons for administrative
action'. Further, both sections 24(c) IC and 33(2) FC afford 'reasons for administrative
action' its own subsection although it is a component of 'procedural fairness'. These
measures were and are taken to specifically guide the courts in their development of the
common law in relation with 'procedural fairness', as a ground for review relating to
'reasons for administrative action' did not exist in the common law. This shows the
importance attached to 'reasons for administrative action' as a component of 'procedural
fairness' by the drafters of both the interim and the final Constitutions.I? Another reason
for affording the right to 'reasons for administrative action' its own subsection in section
33(2) FC, is that it contains a threshold that qualifies the right to 'reasons for
administrative action' by affording it to everyone with adversely affected rights while
'procedural fairness' in section 33(1) FC is afforded to everyone.
Section 24(c) did not explicitly say whether reasons should be furnished as a matter of
course or on request. However, some authors'" have suggested that reasons needed to be
furnished only on request, because it would be a waste of time and money and would
hamper administrative efficiency if the opposite were true. The same seems to be true of
'reasons for administrative action' in section 33(2) FC.
Further, section 24(c) IC did not stipulate the kind of detail that was required or how
informative reasons should be. Currie38 submits that reasons are not reasons unless they
provide proper information. With reference to Moletsane v Premier of the Free State/9
he suggests that the degree of severity of the administrative action should determine the
detail required for reasons. The more drastic the action taken, the more detailed the
36
reasons weren't required where decisions involved a discretion, led to discretions being abused as
methods of secretive decision-making.
See fn 35 above.
See De Ville (1995) Il SAJHR 264 271 and De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2000)
474.
De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2000) 472.
1996 (2) SA 95 (0). The judge came to his conclusion by seeing sec 24( c) in the light of sec 24( d)
and therefore holding that there was a correlation between the action and the reasons required for
it.
37
38
39
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reasons advanced should be.4o The degree of particularity therefore differs according to
the circumstances. As the judge required a degree of particularity for 'reasons for
administrative action' in section 24(c), the ruling in the Rêan case reinforces this
submission." Although it was not expected from the administrator to produce reasons
with such a degree of particularity that it equated the draft judgment of a court, the
administrator had to produce reasons that were intelligible and comprehensible when
considered against the background circumstances.
Since it affords 'reasons for administrative action' to everyone whose rights have been
adversely42 affected, the 'reasons for administrative action' component of the right to
'administrative action that is procedurally fair' in section 33(2) FC is qualified by a
higher threshold than the right to 'reasons for administrative action' in section 24(c) IC.
A higher degree of effect is therefore required before 'reasons for administrative action'
are afforded in adherence to the guarantee of 'just administrative action' in section 33 FC
than was the case in the guarantee of 'administrative justice' in section 24 IC. However,
as the interpretation considers mainly the quality of and time when reasons should be
furnished, as opposed to the class of persons that should be furnished with reasons, this
interpretation does not influence the application of 'reasons for administrative action' in
section 24(c) IC to section 33(2) FC.
Once again, the differences between 'reasons for administrative action' in section 24(c)
IC and section 33(2) FC can be ascribed to the differing structures of sections 24 IC and
33 FC. Further, reasons need to be furnished only on request and the required degree of
particularity of reasons differs according to the circumstances of each case. Finally,
'reasons for administrative action' are afforded to everyone with adversely affected rights
in section 33(2) FC.
40 See De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2000) 473.
Rêan International Supply Company (Pty) Ltd and Others v Mpumalanga Gaming Board 1999 (8)
BCLR 918 (T).
See tb 10 above.
41
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3. GROUNDS FOR REVIEW RELATING TO THE REQUIREMENT, OF
'PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS'
3.1 Section 3 of the Act
The following thresholds in section 3(1) qualify section 3 of the Act:
'Administrative actions which materially and adversely affect the rights and legitimate
expectations of any person must be procedurally fair,' (My emphasis)
The cited subsection contains three thresholds. The first threshold, 'administrative
actions', refers to the definition of 'administrative action' in section lei) of the Act.43 As
'rights' and 'legitimate expectations' are included and 'interests' omitted from section
3(1), the omission of 'interests' could point to a second threshold." The final threshold
qualifies 'rights and legitimate expectations' by requiring them to be 'materially and
adversely affected' .45
As interests are not mentioned in any threshold in the Act, the absence of the concept of
interests from section 3(1) of the Act does not mean that section 3 is not afforded to those
with 'interests'. Further, as authors and the courts tended to interpret 'rights' for
43 See 2.5.2 Chap 1.
Hoexter (Hoexter "The Future of Judicial Revie in South African Administrative Law" (2000) 117
SAL.! 32-34 (forthcoming» argues, with reference to section 24(b) IC, that the class of persons
with 'interests' has been omitted from the application of sec 3 of the Act. The concept of
'interests' was omitted from sec 24(b) IC that afforded the guarantee of 'procedural fairness' to
persons with affected or threatened rights or legitimate expectations. All applicants (applicants for
licenses, permissions or concessions and benefits, advantages or privileges, see Hoexter (2000)
117 SAL.! 32 (forthcoming», at least, have interests in the outcome of their applications.
Conflicting views existed on whether sec 24(b) did afford the guarantee of 'procedural fairness' to
persons with 'interests' or not. (See Bums Administrative Law Under the 1996 Constitution
(1998) 179.)
44
45 Materially means 'important' or 'of serious or substantial import of much consequence'. (See
Simpson and Werner The Oxford English Dictionary (1998) Vol IX.) See fn 10 above for the
meaning of' adversely'. The inference from the fact that 'materially' has been used together with
'adversely' (that is used in isolation in sec I of the Act, see sec l(i)(b» is that a higher degree of
effect on rights (interests) and legitimate expectations by administrative action is required than for
other sections in the Act that do not include 'materially'.
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purposes of section 24 widely," and as everyone in section 33(1) and (2) is afforded a
wide interpretation and includes all persons with 'affected' or 'threatened' 'rights',
'interests' and 'legitimate expectations' ,47 it is submitted that 'rights' in section 1 of the
Act should also be afforded a wide interpretation in order to include the concepts of
'legitimate expectations' and 'interest'." It can therefore be said that section 3(1) of the
Act explicitly includes persons with 'legitimate expectations' in order to strengthen the
importance of section 3 for those with legitimate expectations.l"
Section 3(2)(b) of the Act' ... give[s] effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative
action'. The section therefore refers to the right to 'administrative action that is
procedurally fair' in section 33(1) Fe. Section 3(2)(a) further provides that' ... a fair
administrative procedure depends on the circumstances of each case'. Accordingly,
46 De Ville (De Ville (1995) Il SAJHR 264 270) suggested that 'rights' in section 24(b) should be
interpreted widely to include within its ambit 'property' and 'liberty', as well as other fundamental
rights in the Constitution. It was further suggested that 'rights' included common law and
statutory rights excluded from the Constitution. According to Currie, the Constitutional Court
strengthened a wide interpretation of 'rights', for the purpose of sec 24, in the Mpumalanga case.
(Further see Pretorius "The Outsider and Natural Justice: A Re-examination of the Scope of the
Application of the Audi Alterem Partem Principle" (2000) 63 THRHR 93 97-105, Premier,
Province of Mpumalanga v Executive Committee of the Association of Governing Bodies of State-
Aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) BCLR 151 (CC) [31], SA Metal Machinery Company
Ltd v Transnet Ltd 1999 (1) BCLR 58 (W) 65 H and De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook
(2000) 463 fn 53.)
See page 27 Chap 2.
De Lange noted in this regard that, as it hampers the notion of a 'culture of rights' in South Africa,
government in general wants to refrain from using the concept of 'interests'. It creates the idea
that some have rights and some merely have lower scaled interests in matters, thereby causing an
unwanted situation where some people are viewed as more important than others. (De Lange
Parliament 12 June 2000) One could infer from the discussion with De Lange that 'interests' are
included in 'rights' as the reason given by him for not using the concept of 'interests' differs from
the one proposed by Hoexter, namely, that all applicants are excluded from the ambit of sec 3(1)
of the Act. (See fn 44 above.)
See fn 62 Chap 1.
47
48
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section 3(2)(a) qualifies section 3(2)(b) and by implication section 33(1) Fe, as it renders
a fair procedure dependent on the circumstances of each case. 50
Section 3(2) of the Act refers to the rules of natural justice relating to the audi principle,
and sets out the procedure to be followed when an administrative action materially and
adversely affects the rights (and interests) or legitimate expectations of any person." The
audi principle encompasses two fundamental requirements, namely notice of the intended
action and a proper opportunity to be heard. Sections 3(2)(b)(a) and 3(2)(b)(b)
accordingly require:
' ... adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed administrative action;" and a
reasonable opportunity to make representations ... '
In terms of the common law, administrators had to make an adequate disclosure of
information and reasons that was in their possession for the awaited decisions.f
However, section 3(2)(b)(c) requires:
' ... administrator must give a person referred to in subsection (1) a clear statement of the
administrative action. '
This informs the party involved of the administrative action to be taken and allows him
an opportunity to decide whether to take steps or not. The clear statement of the
administrative action further affords him the knowledge of what type of information and
reasons he requires for the presentation of his case. The situation might call for
SO This correlates with Premier, Province of Mpumalanga v Executive Committee of the Association
of Governing Bodies of State-Aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) BCLR 151 (CC) where
O'Regan J held that a hearing would not be required in all cases where there is a legitimate
expectation, as the court should be slow to impose inhibitory obligations on government. In other
words, what constitutes a 'fair procedure' depends on the facts of each case.
See ffn 15 and 48 above.
In Du Preez v Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1997 (3) SA 204 (A) it was held that
reasonable and timeous notice depends on the circumstances of each case. In casu a notice
received on the Saturday that evidence was to be given as from the Monday, possibly on the
Monday, was under the circumstances not reasonable and timeous. It is suggested that adequate
notice means reasonable and timeous notice and should accordingly be afforded the meaning
given to it in the Du Preez case.
See Du Preez v Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1997 (3) SA 204 (A) and fn 15 above.
SI
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information or reasons in the possession of the state, or for information in his personal
possession, or that of a third party, which would assist the state and improve his chances
of a favourable decision.
The reason for requiring a clear statement of the administrative action to be taken instead
of the disclosure of information that was in the possession of the administrator, is the fact
that any decision taken or failure to take a decision in terms of any provision of the
Promotion of Access to Information Act54 has been omitted from the application of the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.55 If the party involved therefore requires a
disclosure of information, the Promotion of Access to Information Act regulates the
disclosure of information that was in the possession of the administrator before
performing an administrative action.
The reason for requiring a statement of the administrative action instead of a disclosure of
reasons, is the fact that section 5 of the Act regulates 'reasons for administrative action'.
If the party involved requires reasons for the administrative action, the statutory grounds
in section 5 must be employed. Accordingly section 3(2)(b)(c) cannot be employed to
acquire 'reasons for administrative action'. However, section 3(2)(b)( e) requires
administrators to:
'give a person referred to in subsection (1) adequate notice of the right to request reasons in
terms of section 5.'
Further, in terms of a requirement in section 3(2)(b)(d), an administrator has to give
adequate notice of any right of review or internal appeal where applicable.
Section 3(4)(a), which qualifies section 3(2)(b)(a) to (e), reads as follows:
'If it is reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances an administrator may depart from any of
the requirements referred to in subsection (2).'
The factors that must be taken into account to determine whether the departure was
'reasonable and justifiable' are all the relevant factors (section 3(4)(b)) as well as specific
54
55
Act 2 of 2000.
Sec l(i)(hh) Act 3 of2000.
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factors that are named in section 3(4)(b)(i) to (V).56This reinforces the submission by De
Lange that the drafters of the Act attempted to make it comprehensible and clear so that
administrators could use it in their efforts to act lawfully, reasonably and procedurally
fair.
Section 3(5), which qualifies section 3(2)(b)(a) to (e), reads:
'Where an administrator is empowered by an empowering provision to follow a procedure which
is fair but different from the provision of subsection (2), the administrator may act in accordance
with that different procedure. ,57
Both sections 3(4)(a) and 3(5) therefore relate to and further define the phrase, ' ... a fair
procedure depends on the circumstances of each case', in section 3(2).
Finally, section 3(2) is qualified by section 2(1)(a) and (b) of the Act. In terms of section
2(1)(a) the Minister may, in a notice in the Gazette, exempt an administrative action or
group or class of administrative actions from the application of any of the provisions in
sections 3,58 if it is reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances. In terms of section
2( 1)(b), the Minister may also, in order to promote an efficient administration and if it is
reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances, permit an administrator to vary any of the
requirements in section 3(2).59 Where such an exemption or permission has been
provided in terms of section 2(1)(a) and (b), Parliament has to grant approval before
publication in the Gazette in terms of section 2(2).
56 "In determining whether a departure as contemplated in paragraph (a) is reasonable and justifiable,
an administrator must take into account all relevant factors, including-
57
(i) the objects of the empowering provision;
(ii) the nature and purpose of, and the need to take, the administrative action;
(iii) the likely effects of the administrative action;
(iv) the urgency of taking the administrative action or the urgency of the matter; and
(v) the need to promote an efficient administration and good governance."
The empowering provision can, amongst others, refer to a notice published in the Gazette by the
Minister in terms of section 2{l)(a) and (b). See fil 58 and 59 below.
This section is also applicable for sec 4 and 5 of the Act, see sec 2{l)(a) Act 3 of2000.
This section is also applicable for sec 4(1)(a) to (e), (2) and (3) or 5(2) of the Act, see Act 3 of
2000.
58
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Like section 3(2), section 3(3) gives effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative
action in section 33( 1) Fe. Section 3(3) reads:
'In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative action, an administrator
may, in his or her discretion, also give a person referred to in subsection (1) an opportunity to-
(a) obtain assistance and, in serious or complex cases, legal representation;
(b) present and dispute information and arguments; and
(c) appear in person.'
Section 3(3) therefore contemplates a hearing in correlation with the Mpumalanga case.60
According to O'Regan J, a measure of safeguard has to be present before a hearing can
be refused. As a result, certain factors need to be taken into account by administrators
when exercising their discretion in terms of section 3(3) on whether to grant a hearing or
not. Therefore, in terms of both the Mpumalanga case and section 3(3), hearing and its
elements are flexible concepts dependent on the discretion of the administrator.
Furthermore, the fact that section 3(3) is qualified by section 2(1)(a) causes flexibility
dependent only on the discretion of the Minister.61
In conclusion, it can be said that any person whose rights, interests and legitimate
expectations have been materially and adversely affected can apply section 3 of the Act.
Section 3(2) of the Act refers to the rules of natural justice relating to the audi principle,
but requires a clear statement of the administrative action to be taken and an opportunity
to make representations. Further, an administrator has to give adequate notice of any
right of review or internal appeal, where applicable, and the right to request reasons. In
contrast, sections 3(4), 3(5) and 2(1)(a) and (b) allow for departures from the
requirements in section 3(2).
Section 3(3) contemplates a hearing in certain circumstances and sets out its elements.
The application of section 3(3) is subject to the discretion of the administrator and to
notices published by the Minister in terms of section 2(1)(a). Accordingly, both sections
3(2) and 3(3) can be applied differently in different circumstances in adherence to the
60 See Premier, Province of Mpumalanga v Executive Committee of the Association of Governing
Bodies of State-Aided Schools, Eastern Transvaa/1999 (2) BCLR 151 (CC).
See fn 58 above.61
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Mpumalanga case, which requires flexibility for 'procedural fairness' in section 33(1)
FC.
Section 3 articulates the way in which government VIews the audi principle as a
component of the requirement of 'procedural fairness' in section 33(1) FC. Further, the
Act seems to adhere to the way in which the courts, and the Constitutional Court in
particular, view 'procedural fairness' in section 33(1) FC62 and specifically the way in
which they view the requirements and prerequisites for affording a hearing." As no
common law grounds for review relating to the audi principle have been omitted from the
Act, or for that matter, the Act read with the Promotion of Access to Information Act, it is
difficult to imagine a situation where a person who cannot find a remedy in the Act,
would find a remedy in the common law. Review of administrative actions in terms of
the audi principle, would therefore probably be governed by section 3 of the Act in
future. However, as the statutory mechanism in section 6(2)(i) can be applied/" the
courts can still develop the common law with regard to the audi principle.f
3.2 Section 4 of the Act
Section 4 of the Act introduces grounds for review of administrative action which
materially and adversely affected the rights of the public. 'Procedural fairness' for
administrative actions with general impact, like subordinate legislation (in comparison
with 'procedural fairness' for administrative actions that affect individuals), is thereby
incorporated into the South African administrative law.66
62 See especially Du Preez v Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1997 (3) SA 204 (A) in this
regard.
See Premier, Province of Mpumalanga v Executive Committee of the Association of Governing
Bodies of State-Aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) BCLR 151 (CC).
De Lange Parliament 12 June 2000. Also see Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re:
ex parte The President of The Republic of South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [33].
See Van Huysteen NO v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 1995 (9) BCLR 1191 (C)
and ffu 20 and 22 Chap 2.
See fn 12 above. In the past, a significant volume of delegated legislation was promulgated
without opportunity for public comment and participation. A number of procedures were
63
64
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Section 4 is introduced by section 4(1), which reads as follows:
'In cases where an administrative action materially and adversely affects the rights of the
public, an administrator in order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative
action, must decide whether ... ' (My emphasis.)
Like in section 3, three thresholds in section 4(1) qualify access to section 4, namely,
'administrative action', 'materially and adversely', and the concept of 'affected rights'.
'Administrative action' refers to the definition of 'administrative action' in section lei) of
the Act,67 while 'materially and adversely' points to a higher degree of effect for the
application of section 4 than for the other sections in the Act.68 As suggested earlier,
'rights' should be interpreted widely to include all persons with affected or threatened
rights, interests and legitimate expectations/" 'Affected rights' in section 4(1) therefore
contemplates the same class of persons." Further, although section 4(1) omits the
concept of 'legitimate expectations', as opposed to section 3(1), the absence of
67
suggested for the achievement of public participation in the drafting of delegated legislation. (See
Govender (1999) 14 SAPL 62 73-75.) With reference to the federal Administrative Procedure Act
1946, Govender analysed four ways in which to achieve public participation. First, notice and
comment rule-making was analysed. Second, formal rule-making, where oral hearings allow
representations, evidence, and cross examination of witnesses by interested parties was analysed.
Third, Govender analysed negotiated rule-making, where negotiations are conducted amongst all
parties interested in the formulation of the rule. Fourth, hybrid rule-making, where public
hearings are conducted whilst developing the rule was analysed. The procedure preferred by a
number of authors was the notice and comment procedure (see Burns Administrative Law Under
the 1996 Constitution (1998) 212, Govender (1999) 14 SAPL 62 75, Asimow (1996) 113 SALf
613 621, and De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2000) 470), whereby the public
authority is required to publish its proposed legislation together with a reasoned explanation of its
purpose. The notice invites public comment in written or oral form, whereupon the comments are
analysed and the proposed legislation adopted. (Burns Administrative Law Under the 1996
Constitution (1998) 181 fn 212) The reason for the preference of the procedure is that it achieves
efficiency and accountability with the input of minimum time and costs.
See 2.5.2 Chap 1.
See fn 10 and 45 above.
See fn 46 and 48 above.
Here, in the context of the public, in other words where the public as a class of persons has
affected or threatened rights, interests or legitimate expectations.
68
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'legitimate expectations' from the threshold in section 4(1) does not mean that the section
cannot be afforded to those with legitimate expectations. Section 3 explicitly includes
persons with 'legitimate expectations' to strengthen the importance of the concept for the
application of the section."
In cases where the decision of the administrator will materially and adversely affect the
rights ofthe public, section 4(1)(a) to (e) lists different procedures that could be followed
prior to taking a decision in order to comply with the requirement of 'procedural fairness'
in section 33(1) Fe. This listing of the different procedures that could be followed by
administrators in section 4(1)(a) to (e), and the setting out of the two most important of
these procedures in sections 4(2) and 4(3), reinforces the views of De Lange that the Act
was intended to be used as a guideline by administrators.f
In terms of section 4(1)(a), the administrator could hold a public inquiry, the substance of
which is set out in section 4(2). Accordingly, the administrator may conduct the inquiry
or appoint a suitably qualified person or panel of persons to do SO.73 The administrator,
the person or the panel of persons must determine the procedure of the public inquiry,
which includes a public hearing." and must comply with the rest of the prescribed
procedures in connection with public inquiries.Ï'' The inquiry must therefore be
71 See fn 62 Chap 1.
De Lange suggests that that the drafters of the Act attempted to make it understandable and clear
so that administrators could use it in their efforts to act lawfully, reasonably and procedurally fair.
(De Lange Parliament 12 June 2000.)
See sec 4(2)(a) Act 3 of2000.
See sec 4(2)(b)(i)(aa) Act 3 of 2000. This is one of the procedures proposed by Govender. (See
Govender (1999) 14 SAPL 62 73-75 and fn 66 above.) Sec 4(2), which sets out the procedure to
be followed in the case ofa public inquiry, demands a public hearing in sec 4(2)(b)(i)(aa) although
a departure from this requirement is possible in terms of sec 4(4)(a). The word inquiry was
therefore used instead of hearing (as used by Govender), as a hearing is not always required.
Sec 4(2)(b)(i)(bb) Act 3 of2000. (See also sec 10(b).) Sec 10 requires that regulations must be
drafted within two years from the commencement of the Act (sec 10(6». This is the reason why
the Act has not entered into force yet. A wide variety of aspects are covered by sec 10 (see fn 39
Chap 2) but the notion does exist that the Act can enter into force without the regulations being
drawn up first. (De Lange Parliament 12 June 2000) As administrative law remains static for as
long as the Act is not in force, it is hoped that the Act will enter into force shortly even though
72
73
74
75
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conducted in terms of the procedure," which consists jointly of the prescribed and the
administrator's procedure.
Further, a written report must be compiled on the inquiry and reasons must be given for
the administrative action taken or recommended.Ï' The public must be afforded the
information on the inquiry by publishing it in the Gazette or the relevant provincial
Gazette.78 Finally, the administrator must communicate the information regarding the
public hearing to the public concerned in a way that she considers effective.79
Section 4(1)(b) allows the administrator to follow a notice and comment procedure, the
substance of which is set out in section 4(3). Section 4(3) requires the administrator to
communicate the administrative action to those likely to be materially and adversely
affected by it and to call for comments from them. so She must then consider the
comments received before she decides whether or not to take the administrative action
with or without changes." Again the administrator must comply with prescribed
procedures not yet drafted in terms of section lO(l)(c) (here, the procedures in terms of
notice and comment proceduresj.Y
In terms of section 4(1)( c) an administrator may decide to follow both procedures in
sections 4(2) and 4(3). Further, the administrator can follow a procedure that is fair but
different from those in sections 4(2) and 4(3) if she is empowered to do so by an
78
regulations haven't been drawn up yet. The Act contains enough detail, as seen in this thesis, to
function without regulations for a while even though such regulations are needed to provide
administrators with the necessary guidance (like the rest of the Act).
See sec 4(2)(b)(ii) Act 3 of2000.
See sec 4(2)(b )(iii) Act 3 of 2000. The administrator is therefore compelled to give reasons even
before the party involved requests them. This correlates with the qualification of sec 5 by sec 5(1)
that reads: ' ... and who has not been given reasons for administrative action may .. .' Accordingly,
sec 5 does not apply in situations where reasons had been furnished in terms of sec 4(2).
See sec 4(2)(b)(iv)(aa) Act 3 of2000.
See sec 4(2)(b)(iv)(bb) Act 3 of2000.
See sec 4(3)(a) Act 3 of2000.
See sec 4(3)(b) and (c) Act 3 of2000.
Sec 4(3)(d) Act 3 of2000. See fn 75 above.
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empowering provision, in terms of section 4(1)(d).83 Finally, an administrator can follow
another appropriate procedure that gives effect to section 3 of the Act, 'procedurally fair
administrative action affecting any person' in terms of section 4(1)(e). In this instance,
every affected member of the public has to be afforded 'procedural fairness' individually.
Where administrative action materially and adversely affects the rights of the public,
section 4(1)(a) to (e) therefore affords administrators a choice of at least five procedures,
each of which is also flexible.
Section 4(4)(a) authorises an administrator to depart from the requirements in sections
4(1)(a) to (e), 4(2) and 4(3) if the departure is reasonable and justifiable under the
circumstances. Section 4(4)(b) is a replica of section 3(4)(b). Accordingly, all relevant
specific factors named in section 4(4)(b)(i) to (v) must be taken into account when
determining 'reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances' .84 Further, the Minister
may, by notice in the Gazette, exempt an administrative action or any class of
administrative actions from the application of the provisions of section 4 if the exemption
is reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances.F He may also permit an administrator
to vary any of the requirements referred to in section 4(1)(a) to (e), (2) or (3) in order to
promote an efficient administration if such permission is reasonable and justifiable in the
circumstances." In both instances, Parliament has to grant permission before publication
in the Gazette.87
To conclude: in cases where the decision of the administrator will materially and
adversely affect or threaten the rights, interest and legitimate expectations of the public,
section 4(1)(a) to (e) lists different procedures that she could follow to adhere to the
requirement of procedural fairness. The administrator could hold a public inquiry or
follow a notice and comment procedure. Further, an administrator may decide to follow
both these procedures or follow a procedure that is fair but different if she is empowered
83 This refers to, amongst others, an empowering provision published in terms of sec 2(1)(a) and (b)
of Act 3 of2000.
84
85
See fn 56 above.
See sec 2(1)(a) Act 3 of2000.
See sec 2(1)(b) Act 3 of2000.
See sec 2(2) Act 3 of2000.
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to do so. An administrator can also follow other appropriate procedures that give effect
to section 3 of the Act. An administrator may depart from the requirements in sections
4(1)(a) to (e), 4(2) and 4(3), but must take general and specific factors into account
before undertaking such departures. Finally, the Minister may exempt an administrative
action or any class of administrative actions from the application of the provisions of
section 4 or permit an administrator to vary any of the requirements referred to in section
4(1)(a) to (e), (2) or (3). Section 4, in adherence to the Mpumalanga case,88 therefore
affords flexibility to administrators in their quest to be 'procedurally fair' in terms of
section 33 (1) FC, where the public is involved.
As there are no common law grounds for review relating to the audi principle where the
rights, interests or legitimate expectations of the public is concerned, those who cannot
find a remedy in the Act cannot resort to the common law either. However, the courts
remain empowered to develop the common law in this regard through the application of
section 6(2)(i).89
3.3 Section 5 of the Act
Section 5 of the Act contains grounds for review relating to the part of the guarantee for
'procedural fairness' that requires 'reasons for administrative action' in section 33(2) FC.
A threshold qualifies the guarantee of 'reasons for administrative action' in section 33(2),
as everyone with adversely affected rights is afforded the guarantee. The threshold in
section 5(1) requires:
'Any person whose rights have been materially and adversely affected by administrative action
and who has not been given reasons for the action may, within 90 days after the date on which
that person became aware of the action or might reasonably have been expected to have become
88 Premier, Province of Mpumalanga v Executive Committee of the Association of Governing Bodies
of State-Aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) BCLR 151 (CC).
See Van Huysteen NO vMinister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 1995 (9) BCLR 1191 (C),
De Lange Parliament 12 June 2000, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte
The President of The Republic of South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [33] and fIn 20 and 22
Chap 2.
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aware of the action, request that the administrator concerned furnish written reasons for the.
action.' (My emphasis)
As a higher degree of effect is required before section 5 of the Act can be resorted to, the
Act went even further in qualifying the right in section 33(2) Fe. Accordingly, rights
have to be materially and adversely affected before section 5 becomes applicable."
As it explicitly states that only those who had not been given reasons for the
administrative action in question may request reasons in accordance with section 5,
section 5(1) can be used only once to request reasons for administrative action. For the
same reason, section 5 does not apply in situations where reasons have been furnished in
terms of section 4(2) of the ACt.91
A procedure in section 5(2) qualifies the automatic furnishing, in writing, of adequate
reasons for administrative actions. In terms of section 5(2):
'The administrator to whom the request is made must, within 90 days after receiving the request,
give that person adequate reasons in writing for the administrative action."?
It is suggested that, like adequate notice, adequate reasons are 'reasonable and timeous'
reasons and, further, that what is 'reasonable and timeous' depends on the circumstances
of each case." Accordingly, a time period of shorter than 90 days might be adequate in
certain circumstances. This is strengthened by 'within 90 days' in section 5(2). Further,
in section 9 of the Act, 'variation of time' affords parties the opportunity to extend or
reduce the period of 90 days in terms of an agreement. Failing such an agreement, a
court or tribunal may extend or reduce the period of 90 days on application by the person
90 See fn 10 and 45 above for the meanings of materially and adversely.
See fn 77 above.
The party has to request reasons within 90 days from the date on which he became aware of the
action or was reasonably expected to become aware of it. See sec 5(1) Act 3 of2000. See also fn
23 Chap 5 with regard to the constitutionality of this section.
See fn 52 above and Du Preez v Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1997 (3) SA 204 (A). In
terms of a common law rule of statutory interpretation, the same words in the same statute bears
the same meaning throughout the statute.
91
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or administrator concerned." Section 5(2) therefore affords administrators flexibility
with regard to the period within which reasons requested can be furnished.
Further, in terms of section 2(1)(a), the Minister may, by notice in the Gazette, exempt an
administrative action or a class of administrative actions from the application of the
provisions in section 5 (therefore also section 5(2)), if this is reasonable and justifiable in
the circumstances. He may also, in order to promote an efficient administration, permit
an administrator to vary any of the requirements in section 5(2) in terms of section
2( 1)(b), if this is reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances.f
Section 5(3) raises a presumption in cases where an administrator fails to furnish
adequate reasons for an administrative action. The presumption reads:
'If an administrator fails to furnish reasons for an administrative action, it must, subject to
section (4) and in the absence of proof to the contrary, be presumed in any proceedings for
judicial review that the administrative action was taken without good reasons.'
This encourages administrators to give reasons for administrative actions.
However, section 5(3) is qualified by both section 2(1)(a)96 and section 5(4)(a). The
latter reads:
'An administrator may depart from the requirement to furnish adequate reasons if it is reasonable
and justifiable in the circumstances, and must forthwith inform the person making the request of
such a departure. '
The same type of construction used in sections 3 and 4, although slightly more stringent,
is therefore used in section 5 to assist administrators in determining what is reasonable
and justifiable." Accordingly, an administrator must take all relevant factors into
94 Note that the court or tribunal may grant the application in terms of sec 9(1) if the interests of
justice so requires. (See sec 9(2) of the Act.) See Moh/omi v Minister of Defence 1996 (12)
BCLR 1559 (CC).
'Any exemption or permission granted in terms of subsection (l) must, before publication in the
Gazette, be approved by Parliament.' (See sec 2(2) Act 3 of2000.)
See fn 58 above.
See fn 56 above.
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account as well as certain specified factors laid down by section 5(4)(b)(i) to (Vi).98
Section 5(5) allows an administrator to act in accordance with a procedure which is fair
but different from the provisions in section 5(2), provided that she is authorised to do so
by an empowering provision." Further, section 5(6) allows the Minister to compel
administrators, by notice in the government Gazette, to automatically furnish reasons for
a certain group or class of administrative actions without persons having to request
reasons in terms of section 5. This procedure adheres fully to section 33(2) FC and will
presumably be used where key administrative decisions are taken.
It could be argued that section 5(4)(a) of the Act is unconstitutional in terms of section
33(2) FC. The section empowers administrators to depart from the requirement to afford
reasons for administrative action, while the right to 'reasons for administrative action' is
specifically included in the Constitution.l" However, it is difficult to conceive a
situation where a departure from the obligation to furnish reasons in terms of the factors
in section 5(4)(b )(i) to (vi), would not pass the test implicit in the provisions of the
limitations clause (section 36 FC) or the provisions of section 33(3) FC.IOI Although it
98 "In determining whether a departure as contemplated in paragraph (a) is reasonable and justifiable,
an administrator must take into account all relevant factors, including-
(i) the objects of the empowering provision;
(ii) the nature, purpose and likely effects of the administrative action concerned;
(iii) the nature and extend of the departure;
(iv) the relation between the departure and its purpose;
(v) the importance of the purpose of the departure; and
(vi) the need to promote an efficient administration and good governance."
Administrators can therefore furnish oral reasons if empowered to do so. The reason for this is the
fact that many South African citizens, especially those from disadvantaged communities, are
illiterate. By implication, reasons therefore have to be conveyed to the illiterate via some other
way of communication in order to afford them the same measure of protection. (Breitenbach at
the VCT New Legislation Seminars 6 April 2000.) It is therefore doubtful whether a
constitutional challenge on sec 5 for not affording written reasons (as required by section 33(2)
FC) in all circumstances, would succeed. Finally, 'empowering provision' refers to, amongst
others, notices published in terms of sec 2(1) of Act 3 of2000.
See fn 4 Chap 2.
See fn 20 Chap 1.
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seems as if there is no reason for those who cannot find a remedy in the Act to turn to the
common law, the courts can still develop the common lawl02 with regard to 'reasons for
administrative actions' through the application of section 6(2)(i) of the ACt.103
In conclusion therefore, section 5 of the Act contains grounds for review relating to the
part of the guarantee for 'procedural fairness' that requires 'reasons for administrative
action' in section 33(2) Fe. However, a procedure in section 5(2) qualifies the automatic
furnishing of adequate reasons in writing for administrative actions. As section 5(3)
raises a presumption in cases where an administrator failed to furnish adequate reasons, it
therefore encourages administrators to furnish reasons. Further, section 5(4), 5(5) and
5(6), and 2(1)(a) and (b) afford administrators flexibility in furnishing reasons for
administrative action and therefore encourages procedural fairness, as required by the
Mpumalanga case. 104
3.4 Section 6(2)(a)(iii)
Section 6(2)(a)(iii) reads:
'A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review administrative action if the administrator
who took it was biased or reasonably suspected of bias.'
This refers to the nemo iudex in propria causa principle.l'" The statutory ground in
section 6(2)(a)(iii) fully adheres to the common law ground that afforded review for
actual or apparent bias,106 as the statutory ground equally affords review for
administrative actions taken by an administrator who was biased or reasonably suspected
102 'Reasons for administrative action' has been part of the common law since the inception of the
interim Constitution (and section 24(c» on 27 April 1994.
See Van Huysteen NO vMinister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 1995 (9) BCLR 1191 (C),
De Lange Parliament 12 June 2000, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte
The President of The Republic of South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [33] and ffn 20 and 22
Chap 2.
Premier, Province of Mpumalanga v Executive Committee of the Association of Governing Bodies
of State-Aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal1999 (2) BCLR 151 (CC).
See fn 16 above.
See Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 557-568.
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of bias.lo7 Therefore even if bias is not proved, invalidation can result if bias, is
reasonably suspected.
In contrast with all the other statutory grounds for review relating to the requirement of
'procedural fairness' in section 33(1), the statutory ground in section 6(2)(a)(iii) is not
qualified by requiring an adverse and material effect for its application.l'" The ground is
accordingly afforded to any person whose rights had been adversely affected by
administrative action, subject to section 38 Fe.I09 This illustrates the importance
attached to the function ofthis statutory ground for review.I'"
3.5 Conclusion
No grounds for review relating to the requirement of 'procedural fairness' in section
33(1) Fe have been omitted from the Act. It needs to be mentioned again that the Act
articulates the way in which government views the right to 'just administrative action' in
section 33 Fe. Once those sections in the Act pass constitutional muster, 'procedural
fairness' will probably be applied in accordance with the Act. As the Act regulates
procedural fairness thoroughly, situations in which a person would want to or could resort
to the common law would seldom arise. However, the courts remain empowered through
the application of section 6(2)(i) of the Act to develop the common law with regard to the
requirement of 'procedural fairness' in section 33(1) rc.!"
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See Sculte v Van den Berg and Others NNO 1991 (3) SA 717 (C).
Sec 6(2)(a)(iii) is afforded to those whose 'rights' had been adversely affected. (See fn 48 above
and fn 62 Chap 1.) 'Rights' include 'interests' and 'legitimate expectations'. (See fn 46 above.)
See ffn 5 and 7 Chap 5.
Allegations of corruption and nepotism in the ANC government are often made. A qualified
ground for review of administrative actions taken by administrators that was biased or reasonably
suspected of bias would have conveyed a very negative message.
See Van Huysteen NO vMinister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 1995 (9) BCLR 1191 (C),
De Lange Parliament 12 June 2000, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte
The President of The Republic of South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [33] and ffn 20 and 22
Chap 2.
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CHAPTERS
PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES
1. INTRODUCTION
Judicial review of administrative action in terms of statutory and common law grounds
for review that continues to be relevant, must be conducted with reference to certain
procedures, and applicants can be granted certain remedies in these proceedings. The
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act ('the Act')! attempts to codify administrative
law in general, and therefore also remedies and procedures for judicial review of
administrative action. Section 8 provides for the parallel existence of the Act and the
common law with regard to remedies in proceedings for the judicial review of
administrative action? However, no such provision is made with regard to procedures to
be followed in the judicial review of administrative action in section 7.3 This Chapter
discusses section 7 of the Act, 'procedure for judicial review', with reference to the
common law it attempts to codify, and section 8, 'remedies in proceedings for judicial
review' of the Act, with reference to its parallel existence with the common law.
2. SECTION 7: 'PROCEDURE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW'
2.1 Section7(1)
Section 7(1) reads:
Act 3 of 2000.
Provision is made in Act 3 of 2000 for the parallel application of the Act and the common law
with regard to grounds for review (compare section 8(1) and sec 6(2)(i) Act 3 of2000). No such
provision is made with regard to procedures for judicial review, although provision is made for the
utilisation of existing procedures until new statutory procedures are drawn up in terms of the Act.
(See ffn 11 and 12 below and De Lange Parliament 12 June 2000. Also see Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte The President of The Republic of South Africa 2000 (3)
BCLR 241 (CC) [33].)
Compare section 7(1),8(1) and 6(2)(i) of Act 3 of2000.
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'Any proceedings for judicial review in terms of section 6(1) must be instituted without
unreasonable delay and not later than 180 days after the date-' (My emphasis.)
Section 7 ('procedures for judicial review') accordingly applies to judicial review In
terms of section 6(1),which reads:
'Any person' may institute proceedings In a court or tribunal for the judicial review of
administrative action.' (My emphasis.)
In this section, any person is subject to section 38 Fe, the locus standi clause of the Bill
of Rights," This is so, as the Act and therefore also section 6 'gives effect to,6 section 33
Fe, the right to 'just administrative action' in the Bill of Rights, which is subject to
section 38 Fe. 'Any person' in section 6(1) is therefore equally subject to section 38 Fe,
which reads as follows:
"Enforcement of rights"
, ... The persons who may approach the court' are-
(a)
(b)
anyone acting in their own interest;
anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name;
4 In the common law, a person had to establish that he had a sufficient legally protected interest (a
personal or direct interest) in the administrative matter in order to acquire the necessary locus
standi for the judicial review of the administrative action. (See Cabinet of the Transitional
Governmentfor the Territory of South West Africa v Eins 1988 (3) SA 294 (A).) This was so as
the actio popularis of Roman law did not form part of the South African administrative law. In
terms of the actio popularis, every member of the public had an interest in the proper performance
of administrative functions. Any person could therefore freely challenge the validity of
administrative actions even if the person did not have a personal interest in the matter.
The common law, with regard to locus standi in administrative review matters, was duly changed
when the interim Constitution was promulgated. Sec 38 FC, like its predecessor in the interim
Constitution, extends the locus standi of persons in matters involving the Bill of Rights. Further,
as persons referred to in sec 38 are afforded legal standing as a constitutional right; any limitation
to the right must therefore be in accordance with sec 36 FC ('the limitations clause').
See the introduction of Act 3 of2000.
In terms of sec 38(d) FC, anyone acting in the public interest has locus standi to approach the
court. However, sec 34 FC affords everyone the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by
the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court, or where appropriate an
independent and impartial tribunal or forum. Sec 6(1) of the Act is therefore equally subject to
sec 38 FC when a tribunal, in terms of sec 7, performs judicial review of administrative action.
6
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(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons;
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members.'
'Judicial review of administrative action' in section 6(1) refers to the judicial review of
administrative action through the statutory grounds for review afforded by section 6.
Section 6(2)(c) reads:
'A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if the action was
procedurally unfair.'
As section 6(2)(c)8 represents the statutory grounds in sections 3, 4 and 5, which contain
all the statutory grounds for review relating to the requirement of 'procedural fairness' in
section 33(1) FC, those grounds are also included in 'judicial review in terms of section
6(1)' in section 7(1). The same is true for the common law grounds for review that have
been omitted from the Act, which continue to be relevant to the judicial review of
administrative action," and which are employed through the application of section 6(2)(i).
All the statutory grounds for review, in other words all the statutory grounds relating to
the requirements of 'lawfulness', 'reasonableness', and 'procedural fairness' in section
33(1) FC as well as the common law grounds for review that continue to be relevant, are
therefore either represented or present in section 6. Section 7(1) therefore refers to
judicial review in terms of all the statutory grounds for review in the Act, therefore those
in sections 3, 4, 5 and 6, and the common law grounds that continue to be relevant and
that are employed through the application of section 6(2)(i).10
Proceedings for judicial review must be instituted before a court or tribunal. In section
l(iv) of the Act, 'court' is defined as:
'(a) the Constitutional Court acting in terms of section 167(6)(a) of the Consutution;" or
!O
Sec 6(2)(c) of Act 3 of2000.
"A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if the action was
procedurally unfair."
See 2.4.2 Chap 1.
De Lange Parliament 12 June 2000. Also see Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re:
ex parte The President of The Republic of South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [33].
"Constitutional Court!!
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(b)(i) a High Court or another court of similar status; or
(ii) a Magistrate's Court, either generally or in respect of a specified class of administrative
actions ...'
In terms of the common law, the Supreme Court has an inherent jurisdiction to hear all
matters, including the review of administrative action, except for those matters removed
from its jurisdiction by statute. In the common law, Supreme Court Rule 53 governs
review of administrative actions by the Supreme COurt.12 Since lower courts, therefore
also magistrate's courts, are creatures of statute, they have no jurisdiction other than that
conferred on them by statute. In the common law, a magistrate's court could only
scrutinise the validity of an administrative action if it had a bearing on a specific
judgment, unless the court was prevented from doing so by statute. As the Act includes
magistrate's courts in the definition of 'court', magistrate's courts now also have the
jurisdiction to judicially review administrative actions together with the Constitutional
Court, a High court or a court of similar status.
Section 33(3)(a) FC states that the envisaged legislation must provide for review of
administrative action, where appropriate, by an independent and impartial tribunal. Apart
from courts, no other forum currently exists that has jurisdiction to review administrative
action in general." However, the Act provides for the possibility of establishing
tribunals for the review of administrative action by mentioning 'tribunal' together with
'court' throughout the Act. Further, section 10, ('regulations'), grants the Minister the
power to:
12
(6) National legislation or the rules of the Constitutional Court must allow a person, when it is in
the interests of justice and with leave of the Constitutional Court-
(a) to bring a matter directly to the Constitutional Court ... "
The rule governs applications for review of decisions of inferior courts, tribunals, boards and
officers performing judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
South Africa has no separate system of administrative courts. Further, there is no general
legislation that governs jurisdiction of tribunals to judicially review administrative action in
general. Sometimes, tribunals are simply court substitutes; specialised versions of the ordinary
courts, for example, the special income tax courts. However, some of these have superior court
status while others are subject to supervision by the Supreme Courts. (See Baxter Administrative
Law (1984) 180 and 244.)
13
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' ... make regulations relating to the appropriateness of establishing independent and impartial
tribunals, in addition to courts, to review administrative action and of specialised administrative
tribunals, including a tribunal with general jurisdiction over all organs of state or a number of
organs of state, to hear and determine appeals against administrative action' .14
In terms of section 7(I)(a), proceedings for judicial review must be instituted without
unreasonable delay. What is unreasonable will depend on the circumstances of each
case. IS However, proceedings have to be instituted within 180 days after the date on
which any proceedings instituted in terms of internal remedies as contemplated by section
7(2)(a) have been concluded." Where no such remedies are available, proceedings for
judicial review have to be instituted within 180 days after the date on which the person
affected was informed of the administrative action, or became aware of the administrative
action and reasons for it, or are expected to have become aware of the action and the
reasons.l"
Bums submits, with reference to the regulation or exclusion of state liability in the
previous dispensation, that legislation that prescribes conditions for state liability will
face a challenge on the basis of its possible unconstitutionality.l'' If so, the state must
prove that the limitation on state responsibility is reasonable and justifiable in terms of
the limitation clause (section 36 FC).
In Mohlomi vMinister of Defence, 19 the Constitutional Court found that section 113(1) of
the Defence Aceo was inconsistent with the interim Constitution's right of access to
court. The section permitted actions against the Minister of Defence to be instituted
within six moths after the cause of action arose and, if notice of the action had been given
to the Minister, one month before the commencement of the action. The Court further
found that the infringement of the right was not justifiable in terms of the limitation
14 Sec 1O(2)(a)(iii) Act 3 of2000.
See ffn 52 and 93 Chap 4.
Sec 7(1)(a) Act 3 of2000.
Section 7(1)(b) Act 3 of2000. See also sec 5(2) of the Act for a condition relating to the period in
which reasons have to be requested for administrative action.
Bums Administrative Law Under the 1996 Constitution (1998) 257.
1996 (12) BCLR 1559 ree»
Act 44 of 1957.
15
16
17
18
19
20
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clause after comparing the provisions of the Defence Act with similar limitations in.the
Prescription Act21 and the Police Service Act. 22 There, the court was allowed to condone
non-compliance with time provisions similar to the one under discussion in the Defence
Act. According to the Court, the provisions in those Acts were less stringent and less
detrimental to the interests of claimants. Less stringent procedure could accordingly be
used with regard to the Defence Act.
Accordingly, if section 7(1) of the Act causes a regulation or exclusion of state liability
which is stringent and detrimental to the interests of the claimant, without providing an
opportunity for the courts to condone non-compliance with the requirements in section
7(1), the section could infringe on the right to just administrative action in section 33 and
therefore face a challenge on the basis of its possible unconstitutionality." Section
9( 1)(b) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act does allow parties to extend the
180 day period in section 7(1) by agreement, or the court to extend the period on
application by the person or the administrator concerned failing such an agreement,
provided the application was in the interest of justice (section 9(2))?4
It therefore seems as if the drafters of the Act kept the judgment of the Constitutional
Court in the Mohlomi case in mind when drafting section 7(1) in terms of section 9, as it
gives the courts a wide discretion with regard to condoning non-compliance with the time
period." Accordingly, it seems as if a constitutional challenge on section 7(1) for
prescribing conditions for state liability and thereby infringing on the right to 'just
administrative action' in section 33 FC, would not succeed.
21 Act 68 of 1969.
Act 68 of 1995.22
23 For example, if an administrative action causes a situation that hampers the instituting of
proceedings within 180 days, like sending a representative oversees for 3 months to attend a
management course without the authority to do so. The representative returns after 182 days and
finds himself dismissed from his previous position for not being allowed to be absent without
leave for more than two days without permission by a person so authorised.
The same construction is used for a time period with regard to 'reasons for administrative action'
in sec 5 of the Act. See page 92-93 and fn 94 Chap 4.
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To summarise: section 7(1) refers to judicial review in terms of all the statutory grounds
for review in the Act and the common law grounds that continue to be relevant and that
are employed through the application of section 6(2)(i). Further, although magistrate's
courts does not have the jurisdiction to judicially review administrative actions in the
common law, they will have such jurisdiction together with the Constitutional Court, a
High court or a court of similar status once rules drafted in terms of the Act enters into
force. Further, the Act provides for the possibility of establishing tribunals for the review
of administrative action, although there are no tribunals with general jurisdiction to
review administrative action in the common law. Finally, as the drafters of the Act kept
the Mohlomi case in mind when drafting section 7(1) in terms of section 9, it seems as if
a constitutional challenge on section 7(1) would not succeed.
2.2 Section 7(2)
In terms of section 7(2)(a), no court or tribunal shall review an administrative action in
terms of the Act unless any internal remedy provided for in any other law has been
exhausted.i" Further, in terms of section 7(2)(b), the court or tribunal must be satisfied
that the internal remedy has been exhausted. If this has not happened, the court or
tribunal must direct the person concerned to exhaust the internal remedy before
instituting proceedings for judicial review in terms of the Act. However, in terms of
section 7(2)(c), a court or tribunal may exempt a person from the obligation to exhaust
25 SA Law Commission Discussion Paper 81 Project 115: Administrative Law January 1999 Chapter
5 10.
26 This requirement originates from the common law rule that suspended the right to judicial review
until internal remedies created by legislation had been exhausted. However, the rule was not
automatic. The intention of the legislature that recourse to the courts had been excluded until
internal remedies had been exhausted had to be clear. If the intention of the legislature was not
clear, two main factors were taken into account by the court before review was afforded. The first
factor was whether the internal remedy was capable of providing effective redress in respect of the
application, and the second, whether the alleged unlawfulness undermined the internal remedy.
(See Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 720-723.)
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internal remedies in exceptional circumstances and if the court or tribunal deems it in the
interest of justice.
Bums suggests that generally speaking, internal remedies should be exhausted before
courts are approached. This prevents the flooding of courts with judicial review for
administrative action by providing a sifting process. However, she submits that a person
should be able to rely directly on section 34 FC ('access to courts') without first
exhausting internal remedies where the affected party has evidence of bad faith or an
ulterior purpose by the administrator."
Like in the common law, internal remedies should therefore be exhausted before courts
are approached.
2.3 Section 7(3), 7(4) and 7(5)
Section 7(3) compels the Rules Board for Courts of Law to make and implement rules of
procedure for judicial review within one year of the 'commencement' of the Act.
'Commencement' can mean either 'entering into force' or 'passage'. 'Commencement'
was used instead of 'entering into force' or 'passage' to afford section 7(3) a flexible
meaning, as it was not necessary to compel the Rules Board for Courts of Law to draft
and implement rules for procedure for judicial review within a specified period while
nobody knew (nobody knows) when the Act will enter into force?8
While the rules of procedure are drafted and before they are implemented, proceedings
for judicial review can be instituted in the High COurt29 or the Constitutional Court." as
27 Bums Administrative Law Under the 1996 Constitution (1998) 220-222.
However, because of the flexible meaning, the Rules Board for Courts of Law can be compelled to
draft and implement rules within two different periods. First, within one year of the passage of the
Act (this could allow the drafting and implementation of rules of procedure for magistrate's courts
before the Act enters into force), second, within one year from the date the Act enters into force
(which is possible because of section 7(4), see fn Il and 12 above).
This can be done in terms of Supreme Court Rule 53. (See fn 12 above.)
See Sec I(iv)(a) of the Act. The Constitutional Court acts in terms of sec 167(6)(a) FC, which
allows direct access to the Constitutional Court when it is in the interest of justice.
28
29
30
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rules for procedure governing administrative law matters are already available in these
two courts. Further, section 7(4) explicitly affords the institution of proceedings for
judicial review in these two courts while rules for procedure are being drafted and before
they are implemented. Finally, any rule made has to be approved by Parliament before
publication it the Gazette in terms of section 7(5).
No provision is made for the -parallel application of the common law and the Act once
rules drafted by the Rules Board for Courts of Law, with regard to procedures for judicial
review in terms of section 7, enters into force. The Act contains most of the grounds for
review and those not present in section 6 are represented by sections 6(2)(c) and 6(2)(i)
respectively." Both review proceedings conducted in terms of the Act and of the
common law, in other words, judicial review by means of the application of both
statutory and common law grounds for review that continue to be relevant,32 will
therefore be performed in terms of procedures contained in the Act.
3. SECTION 8: REMEDIES IN PROCEEDINGS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
3.1 Section8(1)
Section 8(1) specifies that:
'The court or tribunal, in proceedings for judicial review in terms of section 6(1), may grant any
order that is just and equitable ...'
Accordingly, this section provides for the parallel application of the Act and the common
law with regard to remedies in proceedings for judicial review. Any order can therefore
be granted for judicial review in terms of all the grounds for review represented or
present in section 6 of the Act,33to any person subsequent to section 38 FC.34
31 De Lange Parliament 12 June 2000. Also see Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re:
ex parte The President afThe Republic of South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [33].
See 2.4.2 Chap 1.
Sec 6(2)(c) and 6(2)(i) of Act 3 of 2000 and De Lange Parliament 12 June 2000. Also see
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte The President of The Republic of
South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [33].
See the introduction of Act 3 of 2000 and fn 5 above.
32
33
34
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Section 8(1)(a) to 8(1)(f) specifies certain orders." The first order so specified, is the
order directing administrators to give reasons" and to act in a manner the court or
tribunal requires.I' This order comes close to the mandamus of the common law.38
However, it is broader than the common law remedy. First, it can be used to compel an
administrator to perform administrative actions in terms of duties other than statutory
duties (for example, in the manner the court or tribunal requires). Further, it provides
'reasons for administrative action', which has been a ground for review in the common
law only since the inception of the interim Constitution. A court or tribunal can further
grant an order prohibiting an administrator from acting in a certain way in terms of
section 8( 1)(b). Administrative law has always afforded this remedy for aggrieved
partiea'"
In terms of section 8(1)(c), courts or tribunals can set aside an administrative action, and
remit the matter for reconsideration, with or without directions. 'Directions' means
guidelines in this context, as section 8(1)(a)(ii) deals with orders that include
35 De Lange (Parliament 12 June 2000) noted that one of the ideas behind the Act was to encourage
administrators to act by informing them of the procedures to be followed and the consequences if
they are not followed. Specifying two of the orders that could be given in the judicial review of
administrative action does this.
This read together with the presumption in sec 5(3), that if an administrator fails to furnish
adequate reasons for administrative action, it must be presumed in the absence of proof to the
contrary that the administrator acted without good reason, is a stringent order. (Note however, that
the presumption is subject to sec 5(4) that allows the administrator to depart from the requirement
to furnish reasons ifit is reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances.)
The court or tribunal does not substitute the decision of the administrator with his or her own, but
orders him to perform the action again and in a certain way.
A mandamus is an order in the common law that requires an administrator to comply with a
statutory duty or to act in the remedying of a state of affairs brought about by his own unlawful
action. It cannot be used to compel an administrative organ to perform an administrative action or
remedy a state of affairs in terms of any other duty than a statutory duty. It is therefore limited in
its application.
In the common law, a peremptory interdict can be granted to prohibit an administrator from
performing an administrative action. (See Vereniging van Advokate v Moskeeplein (Edms) Bpk
1982 (3) SA 159 (T).)
36
37
38
39
109
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
requirements on how an administrator should act. In exceptional cases, the court or
tribunal can in addition to setting the action aside, substitute or vary the administrative
action, or correct a defect resulting from the administrative action."
In exceptional cases, a court or tribunal can set an administrative action aside and direct
the administrator or any other party to the proceedings to pay compensation in terms of
section 8(1)(c)(ii)(aa).41 There is a strong presumption that the legislature does not intend
to infringe rights (like expropriating property) without making provision for
compensation.Y Compensation can therefore be ordered by the court or tribunal in terms
of section 8(1)(c)(ii)(aa) in cases where administrators do not have a statutory duty to pay
compensation when infringing rights.
Administrators are, in terms of the common law, contractually liable for damages when
they breach their contractual obligations, and delictually liable for damages caused during
performance of their statutory duties. Delictual liability is confined to cases where the
actor is at fault and did not have a substantial degree of discretion, as the presence of
discretion limits the justiciability of a delict. However, administrators could escape
liability for damages if their actions were justified by statute." As administrative law
40 Sec 8(1)(c)(i) Act 3 of2000. The situation is the same in the common law, where the Supreme
Court in certain circumstances can correct administrative action. Examples of exceptional
circumstances warranting substitution, varying or correcting of a defect caused, include the
following: cases involving administrative action influenced by malafides, where the end result is a
foregone conclusion and reconsideration would merely be a waste of time; cases where the delay
can cause prejudice to the applicant (see Local Road Transport Board v Durban City Council
1965 (1) SA 586 (A) 598-599); and cases where the court is in as good a position as the
administrator to make the decision.
In the common law, there is a difference between an order for damages in respect of unlawful acts
and an order for payment of compensation as a precondition for acting lawfully. However, both
serve the purpose of indemnification. (See Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 636 fn 253.) For
example, where a statute explicitly requires that compensation have to be paid in cases of
expropriation or town planning, administrators have to pay compensation as a precondition for
acting lawfully.
See Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 636 fn 254.
Unfortunately, courts distinguish between prescription and statutory expiry terms with regard to
delictual actions for damages against the state. The courts accordingly rule that the cause of action
41
42
43
110
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
falls outside the law of delict, administrators do not have a delictual duty of care not to
act ultra vires.44 An action for damages can therefore not be instituted against ultra vires
actions of administrators.
Like in the common law, a court or tribunal can declare the rights of the parties in respect
of any matter to which the administrative action relates in terms of section 8( 1)(d). A
party can therefore apply for a declaration of rights where a clear legal dispute or legal
uncertainty regarding an administrative action exists. Although the remedy has no direct
effect of its own, it is remarkably effective as it determines how a legal issue will be
resolved. However, the court or tribunal will not concern itself with academic disputes in
such a declaration of rights."
The court or tribunal may grant a temporary interdict or other temporary relief in terms of
section 8(1)(e). An interim or temporary interdict can serve to prevent harm that might
be caused if the action is performed before the final order in a dispute between parties.
Finally, the court or tribunal can make orders as to cost in terms of section 8(1)(f).
Section 8(1) therefore mainly codifies the remedies afforded in proceedings of the
judicial review of administrative action as applied in the common law. No common law
remedies have been omitted from the Act and the only development with regard to
remedies provided in the common law is found in section 8(1)(a), which affords the
equivalent of the common law mandamus. As it can be used to compel an administrator
to perform administrative actions in terms of duties other than statutory duties, it is
broader than the common law remedy." Section 8(1) therefore provides for the parallel
expires when the statutory term for instituting the action lapses, and that the exceptions of the
Prescription Act do not apply. Wiechers Administratiefreg (1984) 370 argues that the approach is
wrong. It should be that the expiry of the term only influences the justiciability of the action, and
not that it erases the cause of action.
44 Breitenbach at the VCT New Legislation Seminars 6 April 2000.
See President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) and Reinecke v
Incorporated General Insurance Ltd 1974 (2) SA 84 (A).
See fn 38 above.
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existence of the Act and the common law with regard to remedies for judicial review,47
although the common law and the Act will in future become one system oflaw.48
3.2 Section 8(2)
Section 8(2) governs orders of review in terms of the statutory ground in section 6(2)(g),
the ground relating to an action consisting of a failure to take a decision. As the remedies
afforded by section 8(2) relate to a ground for review, which is introduced for the first
time in South African administrative law by the Act,49 the remedies provided for review
in terms of this ground are also introduced for the first time. Accordingly, a court or
tribunal may grant any order that is just and equitable, including the specified orders in
section 8(2)(a) to (d).5o In terms of section 8(2)(a), a court may grant an order directing
the administrator to perform the administrative action. Section 8(2)(a) is therefore not a
duplication of the common law remedy in section 8(1)(a), that affords an order directing
administrators to give reasons and to act in the manner the court or tribunal requires, as
the order directs an unwilling administrator to perform the administrative action and not
to act as required.
In terms of section 8(2)(b), a court or tribunal may declare the rights of the parties in
relation to the taking of the decision. Although an administrator is not directed to act by
this order, it is effective as it determines how a legal issue, resulting from the subsequent
failure to act, will be resolved."
47 ' ... any order that is just and equitable ... '
De Lange Parliament 12 June 2000, with reference to grounds for review, but it could by implied
that he referred to the Act and the common law in general.
See 3.1.3 Chap 2.
This refers to the parallel existence of the Act with the common law. Compare sec 8(1) and
6(2)(c) Act 3 of2000, see fn 48 above.
This remedy correlates with the common law remedy of a declaration of rights that was used with
regard to the performance of an administrative action, as opposed to afailure to act. Further, the
court or tribunal will not concern itself with academic disputes in such a declaration of rights.
(See President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) and Reinecke v
Incorporated General Insurance Ltd 1974 (2) SA 84 (A).)
48
49
50
51
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Section 8(2)(c) reads as follows:
'A court or tribunal may direct any of the parties to do, or refrain from doing, any act or thing
the doing, or refraining from the doing, of which the court or tribunal considers necessary to do
justice between the parties ... '
In other words, a court or tribunal may grant a directory or peremptory interdict where
the action under review consists of a failure to take a decision.f The court or tribunal
can accordingly direct any of the parties to act, or to refrain from acting in terms of a
directory interdict. (Bear in mind that the act consists of a failure to act.) Further, the
court or tribunal can prohibit any of the parties to act or to refrain from acting, in terms of
a peremptory interdict. (Bear in mind that the act consists of a failure to act.)
Finally, a court or tribunal may grant an order as to costs where the action under review
consists of a failure to act in terms of section 8(2)(e).
Therefore, in the case of remedies afforded in proceedings for the judicial review of
administrative action in terms of the statutory ground in section 6(2)(g), no codification
of existing common law remedies took place, as no such ground for review existed in the
common law. As the Act, and therefore the grounds for review introduced by it for the
first time, has not entered into force yet, review for a failure to act and remedies provided
in terms of review of a failure to act are not currently available in South African
administrative law. Further, remedies provided in section 8(2) for a failure to act, will be
governed only by section 8(2) once the Act enters into force, as there are no common law
remedies in this regard. However, the court can develop the common law in this regard
in terms of section 8(2) that allows for granting of any order that is just and_equitable.
3.3 Conclusion
Section 8(1) therefore provides for the parallel existence of the Act and the common law
with regard to remedies for judicial review. Section 8(2) affords remedies proceedings
52 This remedy, like the one in fn 51 above, correlates with the common law remedy of a peremptory
or directory interdict that was used with regard to the performance of an administrative action, as
opposed to a/ai/ure to act.
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for the judicial review of administrative action in terms of the statutory ground in section
6(2)(g). No codification of existing common law remedies therefore took place and as
the Act has not entered into force yet, review for a failure to act and remedies provided in
terms of the judicial review of a failure to act are not currently available in South African
administrative law. However, the common law could be developed in this regard.
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CHAPTER6
CONCLUSION
1. INTRODUCTION
The aim ofthis study was to resolve the question about the current and future grounds for
the judicial review of administrative action. To achieve this aim, the effect of the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case on the interaction between the Constitution and the
common law in the judicial review of administrative action was analysed. It was also
necessary to study the effect of the promulgation of the Promotion of Administrative
Justice Act ('the Act')' in terms of section 33(3) FC read with item 23 Schedule 6 FC, on
section 33 FC and the common law that informs the right contained in the section. A
further aim was to interpret the requirements of 'lawfulness', 'reasonableness' and
'procedural fairness' in section 33(1) FC and analyse the grounds for review that relate to
each. For the sake of completeness, the remedies and procedures contained by the Act
for judicial review of administrative action in terms of the available grounds were
examined to determine their relationship with the common law.
2. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON LAW
With regard to the relationship between the Constitution and common law, it was found
that Section 24 IC, which was in force until 3 February 2000,2 afforded a constitutionally
entrenched right to 'administrative justice'. However, on 3 February 2000, the right to
'just administrative action', which is afforded by section 33 FC, entered into force.3 As
in section 24 IC, the purpose of section 33 FC is neither to provide an exhaustive
statement of the grounds for review of administrative action, nor to create a codification
Act 3 of 2000.
See 2.4.1 Chap 1.
See 2.4.1 Chap 1
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of administrative law." The courts therefore remam empowered to develop
administrative law to give effect to the right to 'just administrative action' and to bring
administrative law in line with the Constitution.
In the assessment of the validity of an administrative action, it was found that the courts
have to determine whether the action in question conflicted with the constitutionally
entrenched right to 'just administrative action' in section 33 FC. In order to determine
the scope, content and application of this right, the courts have to take recourse to the
common law principles of administrative law that inform the content of the right. Since
the common law derives its force from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional
control, there is only one system of law.5
However, the common law grounds for review can only be used in the judicial review of
administrative action in so far as they continue to be relevant." Continued relevance is
determined with reference to entrenchment in the Constitution of a common law
constitutional principle that previously provided a certain common law ground for
review. If such a principle is entrenched in the Constitution, the common law ground
continues to be relevant. If not, the common law ground becomes irrelevant. 7
3. THE PASSAGE OF ACT 3 OF 2000
The study revealed that national legislation, which had to be enacted within three years
from the date on which the Constitution took effect, was passed only one day before the
4 Corder "Administrative Review in South African Law" (1998) 9 Public Law Review 89 89-97 and
Devenish "The Interim Constitution and Administrative Justice in South Africa" 1996 TSAR 458
459.
6
See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte The President of The Republic of
South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [44] and [45]. Although the case was decided in terms of
sec 24 IC, the Constitutional Court contemplated the entering into force of sec 33(1) and (2) Fe.
See ffn 30 and 31 and page 12-13 Chap 1.
See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte The President of The Republic of
South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [33].
See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte The President of The Republic of
South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [35], [37] and [40].
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deadline date on 3 February 2000.8 Although the Act has not entered into force yet, the
best view seems to be that the mere passage of the Act was sufficient to fulfill the
obligation to enact legislation," and further, that section 24 IC lapsed on 3 February 2000
when sections 33(1) and 33(2) FC entered into force.IO
At present the Act articulates the way in which government views the content of the right
to 'just administrative action' in section 33 FC. It contains most of the common law
grounds for review, although some have been omitted from the Act. The Act exists
parallel to the common law, but under the Constitution, as does common law. Those who
cannot find a remedy in the Act can therefore resort to section 33 FC, Il which is informed
by the common law. However, before a common law ground for review that has been
omitted from the Act can be employed in the judicial review of administrative action
through the direct application of section 33 FC, the continued relevance of the ground
must be determined.
In Chapter One a test was developed for the continued relevance of the common law
grounds for review that have been omitted from the Act. Two questions must be
answered. The first is whether one or more statutory ground(s) overlaps the omitted
common law ground. If the answer is 'yes', the common law ground continues to be
relevant through the application of the statutory ground(s) that overlaps it. If not, the
second question must be asked, that is, whether the omitted common law ground was
previously provided by a common law constitutional principle that has now been
entrenched in the Constitution. If the answer is 'yes', the ground continues to be relevant
to the judicial review of administrative action through the direct application of section 33
(FC). If the answer is 'no', the common law ground does not continue to be relevam.V
10
See sec 33(3) FC read with item 23 Schedule 6 FC, which further required that sec 33 FC had to
be read as if it had been phrased like sec 24 IC until the enactment of the envisaged legislation.
See the discussion on page 10 fn 24 Chap 1.
See 2.3 Chap 1.
Corder "Administrative Justice: A Cornerstone of South Africa's Democracy" (1998) 14 SAJHR
38 52, Breitenbach at the UCT New Legislation Seminars 6 April 2000 and De Lange Parliament
12 June 2000.
See 2.4.2 Chap I.
9
II
12
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The study has also shown that:
'What is "lawful administrative action", "procedurally fair administrative action" and
administrative action that is ''justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it" cannot mean one
thing under the Constitution, and another thing under the common law' .13
Now under the final Constitution," the grounds for review of administrative action are
divided into the requirements of 'lawfulness', 'reasonableness' and 'procedural fairness'.
Therefore, until the Act enters into force, the judicial review of administrative action
takes place in terms of the constitutional right to 'just administrative action' in section 33
FC as informed by the common law. In other words, the judicial review of administrative
action currently takes place through the direct application of section 33 FC in terms of
common law grounds for review that continue to be relevant, relating to the requirements
of 'lawfulness', 'reasonableness' and 'procedural fairness' in section 33(1) FC.
However, once the Act enters into force, administrative action, as defined in section lei)
of the Act,15will be reviewed through the application of the statutory grounds for review
contained by the Act and the common law grounds for review that have been omitted
from the Act, which continue to be relevant to the judicial review of administrative
action.
3. GROUNDS FOR REVIEW OF ADMINISTRA TIVE ACTION
3.1 Grounds for review relating to the requirement of 'lawfulness' in section
33(1) FC16
As section 33 FC has been in operation only since 3 February 2000, while section 24 IC
had been in operation since 27 April 1994 until 3 February 2000, there is little by way of
academic views and jurisprudence on section 33 FC. However, the academic views and
jurisprudence on 'lawfulness' in section 24(a) IC can be applied to the consideration of
13
14
See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte The President of The Republic of
South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [50].
See fn 5 above and page 12-13 Chap 1.
See ffn 58-63 Chap 1.
See sec 2 and 3 Chap 2.
15
16
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'lawfulness' in section 33(1) although the general differences between section 33 and 24,
as well as the specific differences between 'lawfulness' in section 24(a) IC and section
33(1) FC, must be born in mind.
The first difference found in the study is that the guarantee of 'just administrative action'
in section 33 is wider or more generous on the face of it than the guarantee for
'administrative justice' in section 24.17 Further, the thresholds that qualified access to the
right to 'administrative justice' in section 24 was done away with in order to afford the
wider or more generous guarantee in section 33.18 Accordingly, the guarantee of 'just
administrative action' in section 33 is afforded to everyone with affected or threatened
rights, interests and legitimate expectations.
The second difference concerns lawfulness. 'Lawfulness' in section 33(1) FC is part of
the more general guarantee of 'just administrative action', while 'lawfulness' in section
24(a) IC is only part of one component of the guarantee of 'administrative justice'.
Further, as a threshold qualified the right to 'lawful administrative action' in section 24(a)
IC, only persons whose 'rights' and 'interests' were 'affected' or 'threatened' had a right
to 'lawful administrative action', whereas, 'everyone' has the right to 'administrative
action that is lawful' in section 33(1) FC, which it is not qualified by a threshold.
In the light of the differences described above, the object of the inclusion of 'lawfulness'
in section 33(1) FC is to prevent ouster clauses. As government previously obstructed
administrative justice through ouster clauses, the main object of section 33(1) is to extend
the reach of the guarantee of 'justice administrative action' by preventing ouster clauses.
The theories relating to the ultra vires doctrine have no bearing on the interpretation of
'lawful,.19 Accordingly, 'lawfulness' includes the grounds for review relating to the
17
19
See fil 9 Chap 2.
See fil 10Chap 2.
De Ville "The Right to Administrative Justice: An Examination of Section 24 of the Interim
Constitution" (1995) Il SAJHR 264 269. Also see Carpenter "Administratiewe Geregtigheid:
Meer Vrae as Antwoorde" (1994) 57 THRHR 467 469, Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South
Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) 168, Devenish 1996 TSAR 458 464, and Burns
"Administrative Justice" (1994) 9 SAPL 347 352.
18
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qualifications and attributes of the administrator and the scope and nature of his statutory
authority, as well as the statutory and common law requirements relating to form and
procedure (excluding the rules of natural justice), but does not overlap with the grounds
for review relating to the remaining requirements in section 33(1) FC?O
The study further shows that 'lawfulness' does not enumerate the common law grounds
for review relating to it, but imposes a duty on courts to further develop the common law
grounds for review by way of interpreting the common law?' Accordingly, a duty is cast
on reviewing courts to be judicious=' to ensure that public officials confine themselves
strictly to the law that confers powers on them.
With regard to grounds for review, all the common law grounds relating to the
requirement of 'lawfulness' as interpreted by the courts and academic writers have been
included in the Act, except for the common law grounds for review relating to adherence
to a rigid policy or standards, contractual restrictions and estoppel.f Statutory grounds
for review, relating to the authorised administrator, for example, are afforded by sections
6(2)(a)(i) and (ii), and 6(2)(b), while those that relate to the reasoning process of the
administrator are afforded by sections 6(2)(d) and 6(2)(e)(i) to (v). The action itself is the
focus of the statutory ground for· review afforded by section 6(2)(f)(i) and of two
statutory grounds introduced for the first time in the South African administrative law in
sections 6(2)(g) and 6(2)(i) respectively. These are review for a failure to take the
administrative action concerned as afforded Py section 6(2)(g), which is further defined
in section 6(3), and review for administrative action that is otherwise unconstitutional or
unlawful, therefore contemplating review of administrative action through the direct
application of section 33 FC afforded by sections 6(2)(i).24 This latter ground will be
20
21
See fn 8 Chap 1 and fn 26 Chap 2.
See Farjas (Ply) Ltd and Another v Regional Land Claims Commissioner, Kwazulu-Natal 1998
(2) SA 900 (LCC).
See fn 22 Chap 2.
See 3.2 Chap 2.
De Lange Parliament 12 June 2000.
22
23
24
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used by courts in their development of the common law with reference to the Farjas
case."
The common law grounds that were omitted from the Act concern adherence to a rigid
policy or standards in the performance of an administrative action, contractual restrictions
on the exercise of a discretion and estoppel. However, these actions can be reviewed
through the application of section 6(2)(a)(i) and (ii), section 6(2)(e)(i), (iii) and (iv),
section 6(2)(f)(i) and (ii), and section 6(2)(i). One or more of the statutory grounds for
review in section 6 therefore overlap the common law grounds for review relating to
adherence to a rigid policy or standards, contractual restrictions and estoppel that have
been omitted from the Act. The omitted common law grounds therefore continue to be
relevant to the review of administrative action, through the application of the statutory
grounds that overlap them.
3.2 Grounds for review relating to the requirement of 'reasonableness' in section
33(1) FC26
The study showed that the interpretation of 'justifiable in relation to the reasons given' in
section 24(d) IC, as is the case with 'lawfulness', applies to the consideration of the
requirement of 'reasonableness' in section 33(1) FC. However, in doing this, the general
and structural differences between section 24 IC and section 33 FC should be borne in
mind.27 The most important of these differences is the fact that 'justifiability in relation
to the reasons given' in section 24(d) was only part of one component of the guarantee
for 'administrative justice' in section 24 IC, while 'reasonableness' in section 33(1) FC is
part of a more general guarantee for 'just administrative action'. Furthermore, thresholds
qualified the application of 'justifiable in relation to the reasons given' in section 24(d)
IC, while there is no such qualification for 'reasonable' in section 33(1) FC.
Consequently, only persons whose 'rights' were 'affected' or 'threatened' had a right to
'administrative action that is justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it' in section
25 De Lange Parliament 12 June 2000.
See sec 2 and 3 Chap 3.
See ffn 9 and 10 Chap 2.
26
27
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24(d), while 'everyone' has the right to 'administrative action that is reasonable.' in
section 33(1).
However, there are some specific differences between 'reasonableness' in section 33(1)
FC and 'justifiability in relation to the reasons given' in section 24(d) IC. The first of
these concerns terminology: 'reasonable' obviously means something other than
'justifiable in relation to the reasons given'. Some authors suggest that 'justifiable' is
narrower than 'reasonable', as it related only to the reasons supplied for the decision,
while 'reasonable' extends also to the effects of the decision_28 Others suggest that the
two concepts are synonymous.i"
In the light of these differences, the inclusion of 'reasonableness' in section 33(1) does
away with symptomatic unreasonableness.i'' Saying that symptomatic unreasonableness
was done away with could lead to disregarding the appeal-review distinction." However,
'reasonableness' does not extinguish the line between appeal and review. It means only
that a judge can enter the merits of a decision, not in order to substitute his or her own
opinion on the correctness of the decision, but to determine whether the outcome is
rationally justifiable.Y The test for 'reasonableness' is therefore the rational-objective-
basis test."
28 Bums (1994) 9 SAPL 347 357, Corder (1998) 9 Public Law Review 89 89-97 and Carpenter
(1994) 57 THRHR 467 472.
29
30
Mureinik, who constructed 'justifiability in relation to the reasons given', is included in this group.
(See Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) 169 fil
156, De Waal, Currie & Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook (2000) 473 and Hoexter "The
Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law" (2000) 117 SAU 28
(forthcoming). )
Standard Bank of Bophuthatswana Ltd v Reynolds NO and Others 1995 (3) SA 74 (BG).
See fil 21 Chap 3.
Carephone (Pty) Ltdv Marcus NO and Others 1998 (10) BCLR 1326 (LAC) 1337 D.
See Carephone (Pty) Ltdv Marcus NO and Others 1998 (10) BCLR 1326 (LAC) 1337 F-G.
31
32
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With regard to proportionality, it has been found that the increasing attention to, the
concept as an element of 'reasonableness' is ill-founded." The correct view seems to be
that 'proportionality' becomes applicable as part of the limitation analysis in accordance
with section 36 Fe only after a constitutional right had been infringed.i'' If this reasoning
is correct, proportionality is not an element of 'reasonableness'. However, once it has
been established that the right to 'just administrative action' in section 33 had been
infringed upon by an unreasonable administrative action, proportionality comes into play
to determine whether the limitation of the right was reasonable and justifiable in an open
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom."
With regard to the rationality being an element of 'reasonableness', in the exercise of
public power, a rational connection between the decision taken and a legitimate
governmental purpose is required." Administrative action is a component of the exercise
of public power in the operation of a constitutional state. It is governed by section 33 Fe.
'Rationality' is therefore part of section 33 and is consequently included in the
requirement of 'reasonableness' in section 33(1). 'Rationality' is therefore indeed the
main element of 'reasonableness' in section 33(1) Fe. As such, it is also required for
administrative action involving policy considerations, for example, the drafting of
delegated legislation."
Concerning the grounds for review afforded by sections 6(2)(f)(ii) and 6(2)(e)(vi) of the
Act, it is confirmed that 'rationality' is an element of 'reasonableness' in section 33(1)
Fe.39 Four statutory grounds for review, which specifically refer to rationality, are
34 De Ville "Proportionality as a Requirement for Legality in Administrative Law in Terms of the
New Constitution" (1994) 9 SAPL 360 360 and Roman v Williams NO 1997 (9) BCLR 1267 (C)
1275 F.
Govender "Administrative Justice" (1999) 14 SAPL 62 79, S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665
(CC), Dawood, Shalabi and Thomas v The Minister of Home Affairs and Others Case CC
07/06/2000 Case no. CCT 35/99 [40], R v Big M Drug Mart (1985) 18 DLR (4th) 321 and R v
Oaks (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200.
S vMakwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC).
Govender (1999) 14 SAPL 62 78.
See Govender (1999) 14 SAP L 62 78-79.
See 3.1 and 3.2 Chap 3.
35
36
37
38
39
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afforded by section 6(2)(f)(ii). Further, the statutory ground in section 6(2)(e)(vi) affords
review for administrative action taken arbitrarily or capriciously, which some consider
the ultimate form of unreasonableness. As no mention is made of proportionality, the Act
confirms that proportionality is not an element of 'reasonableness' in section 33(1) FC.4o
Although the formulation of the statutory ground in section 6(2)(h) seems to confirm the
gross unreasonableness test, it is only one component of a greater test for reasonableness
that consists of all the statutory grounds for review relating to 'reasonableness'. 41 As it is
difficult to imagine an unreasonable administrative action that cannot be reviewed by
applying any of the statutory grounds for review that relates to the requirement of
reasonableness, section 6(2)(h) does not seem to qualify the right to 'administrative
action that is reasonable' to such an extent that it merits the direct application of section
33 FC for the review of administrative action that was unreasonable.Y
The common law ground for review relating to vague or uncertain administrative action
that has been omitted from the Act, continues to be relevant to the review of
administrative action through the application of those statutory grounds that overlap it
(sections 6(2)(e)(vi), 6(2)(f)(ii)(aa) to (dd), 6(2)(h) and 6(2)(i».43
3.3 Grounds for review relating to the requirement of 'procedural fairness' in
section 33(1) FC44
As mentioned above, the academic views and jurisprudence on section 24 have to be
considered in this study in the interpretation of 'procedural fairness' in section 33(1).
However, the differences between sections 24 and 33,45 as well as differences between
the concepts of 'procedural fairness' in the two sections, need to be kept in mind. In
section 24(b) it was only part of one component of the guarantee of 'administrative
40 See fn 63 Chap 3.
See 3.3 Chap 3.
See 3.3 Chap 3.
See 3.4 Chap 3.
See sec 2 and 3 Chap 4.
See [fn 9 and 10Chap 2.
41
42
43
44
45
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justice', while in section 33(1) it is part of a more general guarantee. Another difference
is that a threshold qualified the guarantee in section 24(b) by affording it only to those
with affected or threatened rights and legitimate expectations, while the guarantee in
section 33(1) is unqualified and afforded to everyone.
Accordingly, 'procedural fairness' relates to the application of certain common law rules
referred to as the rules of natural justice, which have traditionally been classified under
the headings of audi alterem partem and nemo iudex in propria causa.46 However, as
explained in Chapter Four, the application of the right to administrative action that is
'procedurally fair' in section 33(1) FC is not restricted to the application of the rules of
natural justice." This means that the common law has to be developed in this regard. In
accordance with such a development of the common law, preliminary investigations now
have to adhere to the requirement of 'procedural fairness' in section 33(1) FC.48
Despite the obligation to develop the common law with regard to 'procedural fairness', a
proper balance needs to be struck between the guarantee of 'procedural fairness' and the
importance of refraining from inhibiting government and its ability to make and
implement policy effectively." Finally, the objective of 'procedural fairness' is to
achieve procedural fairness and not to afford a hearing. In some circumstances, for
example, a balancing of interests might suggest that government need provide only a
rudimentary procedure before it acts and perhaps a more satisfactory procedure later.
The requirement of 'reasons for administrative action', a component of 'procedural
I
fairness', is afforded its own subsection in section 33(2) FC. The reason for this is that a
threshold qualifies the right while no threshold qualifies the right to 'procedural fairness'
in section 33(1).50
46 See ffn 15 and 16 Chap 4.
Van Huysteen NO v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 1995 (9) BCLR 1191 (C)
1212.
47
48
so
See Du Preez v Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1997 (3) SA 204 (A) 233 E.
Premier, Province of Mpumalanga v Executive Committee of the Association of Governing Bodies
of State-Aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) BCLR 151 (CC) [41l.
This ground for review has been part of the South African administrative law since the
entrenchment of the interim Constitution that specifically included the ground.
49
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The study also revealed differences between 'reasons for administrative action' in section
24(c) IC and 'reasons for administrative action' in section 33(2) FC. The 'reasons for
administrative action' component of the guarantee of 'procedurally fair administrative
action' was afforded to persons with affected rights or interests in section 24(c), while the
'reasons for administrative action' component of the guarantee for 'administrative action
that is procedurally fair', is afforded to everyone whose rights have been adversely
affected in section 33(2). Further, a specific qualification was included in 'reasons for
administrative action' in section 24(c), as no reasons could be requested if they had
already been made public. There is no such qualification of 'reasons for administrative
action' in section 33(2).
In this light, an administrator is required to give reasons for his decision, which provides
a safeguard against arbitrary or unreasonable administrative action." Reasons should be
furnished only on request as the automatic furnishing of reasons is a waste of time and
money, and hampers administrative efficiency. 52 As more drastic actions require more
detailed reasons, the degree of particularity of the reasons required differs according to
the circumstances. 53
3.3.1 Section 3 Act 3 of 2000
With regard to statutory grounds for review that relate to the audi principle, section 3 of
the Act contains grounds for any person whose rights (interests)" and legitimate
expectations have been materially and adversely affected. Accordingly, section 3(2)
requires a clear statement of the administrative action to be taken (as opposed to
51 See fil 35 Chap 4.
See De Ville "The Right to Administrative Justice: An Examination of Section 24 of the Interim
Constitution" (1995) 11 SAJHR 264 271 and De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2000)
474.
See De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2000) 473 and Rêan International Supply
Company (Ply) Ltd and Others v Mpumalanga Gaming Board 1999 (8) BCLR 918 (T),
See ffn 46 and 48 Chap 4.
52
53
54
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information and reasons),55 and an opportunity to make representations. Further,. an
administrator has to give adequate notice of any right of review or internal appeal, where
applicable, and the right to request reasons. Departures from the requirements in section
3(2) are allowed for in sections 3(4), 3(5) and 2(1)(a) and (b).
Section 3(3) sets out the elements of a hearing. It contemplates a hearing in correlation
with the Mpumalanga case," which requires a measure of safeguard to be present before
a hearing can be refused. Accordingly, certain factors need to be taken into account by
administrators when exercising their discretion in terms of section 3(3) on whether to
grant a hearing or not. As the application of section 3(3) is also subject to the discretion
of the administrator and to notices published by the Minister in terms of section 2(1)(a),
both sections 3(2) and 3(3) provide for flexibility.
As the Act articulates the way in which government views section 33, and as no common
law grounds for review relating to the audi principle have been omitted from the Act, it is
difficult to imagine a situation where a person who cannot find a remedy in the Act,
would find a remedy in the common law. Review of administrative actions in terms of
the audi principle, would therefore probably be governed by section 3 of the Act in
future. However, as the statutory mechanism in section 6(2)(i) can be applied,57 the
courts can still develop the common law with regard to the audi principle. 58
3.3.2 Section 4 Act 3 of 2000
With regard to the application of the audi principle for the public in general, section 4
contains statutory grounds for review relating to administrative decisions that materially
55 'Reasons for administrative action' is governed by sec 50fthe Act, while the Promotion of Access
to Information Act 2 of 2000 governs information in possession of the state.
Premier, Province ofMpumalanga v Executive Committee of the Association of Governing Bodies
of State-Aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) BCLR 151 (CC).
De Lange Parliament 12 June 2000. Also see Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re:
ex parte The President of The Republic of South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [33].
See Van Huysteen NO vMinister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 1995 (9) BCLR 1191 (C)
and flit 20 and 22 Chap 2.
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and adversely affect or threaten the rights (interestj'" and legitimate expectations of .the
public. Section 4(1)(a) to (e) lists different procedures an administrator could follow to
adhere to the requirement of procedural fairness. She could hold a public inquiry, or
follow a notice and comment procedure, or follow both these procedures, or follow a
procedure that is fair but different if she is empowered to do so. An administrator can
also follow other appropriate procedures that give effect to section 3 of the Act.
An administrator may depart from the requirements in sections 4(1)(a) to (e), 4(2) and
4(3), taking general and specific factors into account. The Minister may exempt an
administrative action or any class of administrative actions from the application of the
provisions of section 4 or permit an administrator to vary any of the requirements referred
to in section 4(1)(a) to (e), (2) or (3). Section 4 therefore affords flexibility to
administrators in their quest to be 'procedurally fair' in terms of section 33 (1) FC in
adherence to the Mpumalanga case60where the public is involved.
As there are no common law grounds for review relating to the audi principle where the
rights, interests or legitimate expectations of the public is concerned, those who cannot
find a remedy in the Act cannot resort to the common law either. However, the courts
remain empowered to develop the common law in this regard through the application of
section 6(2)(i).61
3.3.3 Section 5 and 6 Act 3 of 2000
Concerning 'reasons for administrative action', section 5 of the Act contains grounds for
review relating to 'reasons for administrative action' in section 33(2) FC. However, a
procedure in section 5(2) qualifies the automatic furnishing of adequate reasons in
59 See ffn 46 and 48 Chap 4.
Premier, Province ofMpumalanga v Executive Committee of the Association of Governing Bodies
of State-Aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal1999 (2) BCLR 151 (CC).
See Van Huysteen NO v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 1995 (9) BCLR 1191 (C),
De Lange Parliament 12 June 2000, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte
The President of The Republic of South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [33] and ffn 20 and 22
Chap 2.
60
61
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writing for administrative actions. As section 5(3) raises a presumption in cases where an
administrator failed to furnish adequate reasons, it therefore encourages administrators to
furnish reasons. Further, section 5(4), 5(5) and 5(6), and 2(1)(a) and (b) afford
administrators flexibility in furnishing reasons for administrative action as required by
the Mpumalanga case.
It could be argued that section 5(4)(a) of the Act is unconstitutional in terms of section
33(2) FC. Although the section empowers administrators to depart from the requirement
in section 33(2) FC to afford reasons for administrative action, it is difficult to conceive a
situation where such a departure in terms of the factors in section 5(4)(b)(i) to (vi), would
not pass the test implicit in the provisions of the limitations clause (section 36 FC) or the
provisions of section 33(3) FC.62
As shown in Chapter Four, the Act articulates the way in which government views the
requirement to furnish reasons for administrative action in section 33(2) FC. Although it
seems as if there is no reason to tum to the common law, the courts can still develop the
common law63 with regard to 'reasons for administrative actions' through the application
of section 6(2)(i) of the Act.64
With regard to bias, an unqualified statutory ground in section 6(2)(a)(iii) affords review
for administrative actions taken by administrators that was biased or reasonably
suspected of bias, in terms of the nemo iudex in propria causa principle.f The fact that
the ground is unqualified, illustrates the importance attached to the function of this
statutory ground for review.
62 See fn 20 Chap 1.
'Reasons for administrative action' has been part of the common law since the inception of the
interim Constitution (and sec 24(c)) on 27 April 1994.
See Van Huysteen NO vMinister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 1995 (9) BCLR 1191 (C),
De Lange Parliament 12 June 2000, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association In Re: ex parte
The President of The Republic of South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [33] and [fn 20 and 22
Chap 2.
See fn 16 Chap 4.
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4. REMEDIES AND PROCEDURES
Section 7 of the Act contains procedures and obligations to draft procedures for the
judicial review of administrative action in terms of all the statutory grounds as well as the
common law grounds for review that continues to be relevant.t"
A time limit ('within 180 days'), qualifies the period within which proceedings for the
judicial review of administrative action have to be instituted. However, it seems as if the
drafters of the Act kept the judgment of the Constitutional Court in the Mohlomi case67 in
mind when drafting section 7(1) in terms of section 9, as it gives the courts a wide
discretion to condone non-compliance with this time period." Accordingly, a
constitutional challenge on section 7(1) for prescribing conditions for state liability and
thereby infringing on the right to 'just administrative action' in section 33 FC would
probably not succeed.
The Act affords jurisdiction to judicially review administrative action not only to the
Constitutional Court, a High court and a court of similar status, but also to a magistrate's
court and independent and impartial tribunalsf" Section 7(3) compels the Rules Board
for Courts of Law to make and implement rules of procedure for judicial review. While
the rules of procedure are drafted and before they are implemented, proceedings for
judicial review in terms of the Act can be instituted in the High Court'" or the
Constitutional Court," as rules for procedure governing administrative law matters
already exist in these two courts.
No provision is made for the parallel application of the common law and the Act once
rules drafted by the Rules Board for Courts of Law, with regard to procedures for judicial
review in terms of section 7, enter into force. Review proceedings conducted by means
66 See sec 6(2)(c) and sec 6(2)(i) Act 3 of2000.
Mohlomi v Minister af Defence 1996 (12) BCLR 1559 (cq.
SA Law Commission Discussion Paper 81 Project 115: Administrative Law, January 1999 Chapter
5 10.
See sec l(iv) Act 3 of2000.
This can be done in terms of Supreme Court Rule 53.
See sec l(iv)(a) of the Act. The Constitutional Court acts in terms of section 167(6)(a), that
allows direct access to the Constitutional Court when it is in the interest of justice.
67
68
69
70
71
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of the application of both the statutory and common law grounds for review that
continues to be relevant'? will therefore be performed in terms of procedures contained
by the Act.
Section 8( 1) provides for the parallel application of the Act and the common law with
regard to remedies in proceedings for judicial review.73 Section 8(1)(a) to 8(1)(f), which
specifies certain orders," mainly codifies the remedies afforded in proceedings of the
judicial review of administrative action as applied in the common law. No common law
remedies have been omitted from the Act and the only development with regard to
remedies provided in the common law is found in section 8(1)(a), which affords the
equivalent of the common law mandamus. As it can be used to compel an administrator
to perform administrative actions in terms of duties other than statutory duties, it is
broader than the common law remedy. As section 8(1) provides for 'any order', the
courts remain empowered to develop the common law in this regard.
Section 8(2) governs remedies afforded in proceedings of review in terms of the statutory
ground in section 6(2)(g), the ground relating to an action consisting of a failure to take a
decision. As the remedies afforded by section 8(2) relate to a ground for review, which is
introduced for the first time in South African administrative law by the Act,75 the
remedies provided for review in terms of this ground are also introduced for the first
time. No codification of existing common law remedies therefore took place.
As the Act, and consequently the grounds for review introduced by it for the first time,
has not entered into force yet, review for a failure to act and remedies provided in terms
of the judicial review for a failure to act, are not currently available in the South African
administrative law. Further, remedies provided in section 8(2) for a failure to act, will be
72
73
See 2.4.2 Chap 1.
De Lange Parliament 12 June 2000, with reference to grounds for review, but it could be implied
that he referred to the Act and the common law in general.
De Lange (Parliament 12 June 2000) noted that one of the ideas behind the Act, was to encourage
administrators to act by informing them of the procedures to be followed and the consequences if
they are not followed. Specifying two of the orders that could be given in the judicial review of
administrative action does this.
74
75 See 3.1.3 Chap 2.
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governed only by section 8(2) once the Act enters into force, as there are no common law
remedies in this regard. However, the court can develop the common law in this regard
in terms of section 8(2) that allows for granting of 'any order' that is just and equitable.
5. CONCLUSION
In conclusion it can therefore be said that that the Act, enacted on 3 February 2000, exists
parallel to the common law, which informs the content of the right to 'just administrative
action' guaranteed in section 33 FC, which entered into force on 3 February 2000 and
stands above both the common law and the Act. Judicial review of administrative action
will take place in terms of the statutory grounds for review and the common law grounds
for review that continue to be relevant to the judicial review of administrative action once
the Act enters into force. The procedures followed in the judicial review of
administrative action in terms of these grounds, are provided solely by the Act, while
remedies afforded in proceedings of review can be found in both the Act and the common
law. Courts remain empowered to develop the common law with regard to most aspects
of administrative law.
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Act No.3, 2000 PROMOTION OF ADMINISRATIVE JUSTICE ACT. 2000
(English text signed by the President.)
(Assented to 3 February 2000.)
ACT
To give effect to the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and
procedurally fair and to the right to written reasons for administrative action as
contemplated in section 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996; and to provide for matters incidental thereto.
PREAMBLE
WHEREAS section 33(1) and (2) of the Constitution provides that everyone has the
right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair and that
everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the
right to be given written reasons;
AND WHEREAS section 33(3) of the Constitution requires national legislation to be
enacted to give effect to those rights, and to-
* provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where
appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal;
* impose a duty on the state to give effect to those rights; and
* promote an efficient administration;
AND WHEREAS item 23 of Schedule 6 to the Constitution provides that the national
legislation envisaged in section 33(3) must be enacted within three years of the date on
which the Constitution took effect;
AND IN ORDER TO-
* promote an efficient administration and good governance; and
* create a culture of accountability, openness and transparency in the public
administration or in the exercise of a public power or the performance of a
public function, by giving effect to the right to just administrative action,
BE IT THEREFORE ENACTED by the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa,as follows:-
Definitions
1. In this Act, unless the context indicates otherwise-.
(i) "administrative action" means any decision taken, or any failure to take a 5
decision, by-
(a) an organ of state, when-
(i) exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial
constitution; or' ..- . ---
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms 10
of any legislation; or
(b) a natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state, when exercising
a public power or performing a public function in terms of an
empowering provision,
which adversely affects the rights of any person and which has a direct, 15
external legal effect, but does not include-
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(00) the executive powers or functions of the National Executive,
including the powers or functions referred to in sections 79(1) and
(4), 84(2)(a), (b), (c), (d), (j), (g); (h), (i) and (k), 85(2)(b), (c), (d)
and (e), 91(2), (3), (4) and (5),92(3),93,97,98,99 and 100 of the
Constitution; 5
(bb) the executive powers or functions of the Provincial Executive,
including the powers or functions referred to in sections 121(1) and
(2), 125(2)(d), (e) and (j), 126, 127(2), 132(2), 133(3)(b), 137, 138,
139 and 145(1) of the Constitution;
(cc) the executive powers or functions of a municipal council; 10
(d.d.) the legislative functions of Parliament, a provincial legislature or a
municipal council;
(ee) the judicial functions of a judicial officer of a court referred to in
section 166 of the Constitution or of a Special Tribunal established
under section 2 of the Special Investigating Units and Special 15
Tribunals Act, 1996 (Act No. 74 of 1996), and the judicial functions
of a traditional leader under customary law or any other law;
(jf) a decision to institute or continue a prosecution;
(gg) a decision relating to any aspect regarding the appointment of a
judicial officer, by the Judicial Service Commission; 20
(hh) any decision taken, or failure to take a decision, in terms of any
provision of the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000; or
(ii) any decision taken, or failure to take a decision, in terms of section
4(1);
(ii) "administrator" means an organ of state or any natural or juristic person 25
taking administrative action;
(iii) "Constitution" means the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996;
(iv) "court" means-
(a) the Constitutional Court acting in terms of section 167(6)(a) of the 30
Constitution; or
(b) (i) a High Court or another court of similar status; or
(ii) a Magistrate's Court, either generally or in respect of a specified
class of administrative actions, designated by the Minister by notice
in the Gazette and presided over by a magistrate designated in 35
writing by the Minister after consultation with the Magistrates
Commission,
within whose area of jurisdiction the administrative action occurred or
the administrator has his or her or its principal place of administration or
the party whose rights have been affected is domiciled or ordinarily 40
resident or the adverse effect of the administrative action was, is or will
be experienced;
(v) "decision" means any decision of an administrative nature made, proposed to
be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under an empowering
provision, including a decision relating to-- 45
(a) making, suspending, revoking or refusing to make an order, award or
determination;
(b) giving, suspending, revoking or refusing to give a certificate, direction,
approval, consent or permission;
(c) issuing, suspending, revoking or refusing to issue a licence, authority or 50
other instrument;
(d) imposing a condition or restriction;
(e) making a declaration, demand or requirement;
(j) retaining, or refusing to deliver up, an article; or
(g) doing or refusing to do any other act or thing of an administrative nature, 55
and a reference to a failure to take a decision must be construed accordingly;
(vi) "empowering provision" means a law, a rule of common law, customary
law, or an agreement, instrument or other document in terms of which an
administrative action was purportedly taken;
(vii) "failure", in relation to the taking of a decision, includes a refusal to take the 60
decision;
(viii) "Minister" means the Cabinet member responsible for the administration of
justice;
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(ix) "organ of state" bears the meaning assigned to it in section 239 of the
Constitution;
(x) "prescribed" means prescribed by regulation made under section 10;
(xi) "public", for the purposes of section 4, includes any group or class of the
~&; 5
(xii) "this Act" includes the regulations; and
(xiii) "tribunal" means any independent and impartial tribunal established by
national legislation for the purpose of judicially reviewing an administrative
action in terms of this Act.
Application of Act 10
2. (1) The Minister may, by notice in the Gazette-
(a) if it is reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances, exempt an administra-
tive action or a group or class of administrative actions from the application of
any of the provisions of section 3, 4 or 5; or
(b) in order to promote an efficient administration and if it is reasonable and 15
justifiable in the circumstances, permit an administrator to vary any of the
requirements referred to in section 3(2), 4(1)(a) to (e), (2) and (3) or 5(2), in
a manner specified in the notice.
(2) Any exemption or permission granted in terms of subsection (1) must, before
publication in the Gazette,be approved by Parliament. 20
Procedurally fair administrative action affecting any person
3. (1) Administrative action which materially and adversely affects the rights or
legitimate expectations of any person must be procedurally fair.
(2) (a) A fair administrative procedure depends on the circumstances of each case.
(b) In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative action, an 25
administrator, subject to subsection (4), must give a person referred to in subsection
(1)-
(a) adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed administrative
action;
(b) a reasonable opportunity to make representations; 30
(c) a clear statement of the administrative action;
(d) adequate notice of any right of review or internal appeal, where applicable;
and
(e) adequate notice of the right to request reasons in terms of section 5.
(3) In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative action, an 35
administrator may, in his or her or its discretion, also give a person referred to in
subsection (1) an opportunity to--
(a) obtain assistance and, in serious or complex cases, legal representation;
(b) present and dispute information and arguments; and
. (c) appear in person. 40
(4) (a) If it is reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances, an administrator may
depart from any of the requirements referred to in subsection (2).
(b) Indetermining whether a departure as contemplated in paragraph (a) is reasonable
and justifiable, an administrator must take into account all relevant factors, including-
(i) the objects of the empowering provision; 45
(ii) the nature and purpose of, and the need to take, the administrative action;
(iii) the likely effect of the administrative action;
(iv) the urgency of taking the administrative action or the urgency of the matter;
and
(v) the need to promote an efficient administration and good governance. 50
(5) Where an administrator is empowered by any empowering provision to follow a
procedure which is fair but different from the provisions of subsection (2), the
administrator may act in accordance with that different procedure.
Administrative action affecting public
4. (1) In cases where an administrative action materially and adversely affects the 55
rights of the public, an administrator, in order to give effect to the right to procedurally
fair administrative action, must decide whether-
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(a) to hold a public inquiry in terms of subsection (2);
(b) to follow a notice and comment procedure in terms of subsection (3);
(c) to follow the procedures in both subsections (2) and (3);
(d) where the administrator is empowered by any empowering provision to
follow a procedure which is fair but different, to follow that procedure; or 5
(e) to follow another appropriate procedure which gives effect to section 3.
(2) If an administrator decides to hold a public inquiry-
(a) the administrator must conduct the public inquiry or appoint a suitably
qualified person or panel of persons to do so; and
(b) the administrator or the person or panel referred to in paragraph (a) must- 10
(i) determine the procedure for the public inquiry, which must-
(aa) include a public hearing; and
(bb) comply with the procedures to be followed in connection with
public inquiries, as prescribed;
(ii) conduct the inquiry in accordance with that procedure; 15
(iii) compile a written report on the inquiry and give reasons for any
administrative action taken or recommended; and
(iv) as soon as possible thereafter-
(aa) publish in English and in at least one of the other official languages
in the Gazette or relevant provincial Gazette a notice containing a 20
concise summary of any report and the particulars of the places and
times at which the report may be inspected and copied; and
(bb) convey by such other means of communication which the adminis-
trator considers effective. the information referred to in item (aa) to
the public concerned. 25
(3) If an administrator decides to follow a notice and comment procedure, the
administrator must-
(a) take appropriate steps to communicate the administrative action to those
likely to be materially and adversely affected by it and call for comments from
them; 30
(b) consider any comments received;
(c) decide whether or not to take the administrative action, with or without
changes; and
(d) comply with the procedures to be followed in connection with notice and
comment procedures, as prescribed. 35
(4). (a) If it is reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances, an administrator may
depart from the requirements referred to in subsections (l)(a) to (e), (2) and (3).
(b) In determining whether a departure as contemplated in paragraph (a) is reasonable
and justifiable, an administrator must take into account all relevant factors, including-
(i) the objects of the empowering provision; 40
(ii) the nature and purpose of, and the need to take, the administrative action;
(iii) the likely effect of the administrative action;
(iv) the urgency of taking the administrative action or the urgency of the matter;
and
(v) the need to promote an efficient administration and good governance. 45
Reasons for administrative action
5. (1) Any person whose rights have been materially and adversely affected by
administrative action and who has not been given reasons for the action may, within 90
days after the date on which that person became aware of the action or might reasonably
have been expected to have become aware of the action, request that the administrator 50
concerned furnish written reasons for the action.
(2) The administrator to whom the request is made must, within 90 days after
receiving the request, give that person adequate reasons in writing for the administrative
action.
(3) If an administrator fails to furnish adequate reasons for an administrative action, 55
it must, subject to subsection (4) and in the absence of proof to the contrary, bepresumed
in any proceedings for judicial review that the administrative action was taken without
good reason.
(4) (a) An administrator may depart from the requirement to furnish adequate reasons
if it is reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances, and must forthwith inform the 60
person making the request of such departure.
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(b) In determining whether a departure as contemplated in paragraph (a) is reasonable
and justifiable, an administrator must take into account all relevant factors, including-
(i) the objects of the empowering provision; .'
(ii) the nature, purpose and likely effect of the administrative action concerned;
(iii) the nature and the extent of the departure; 5
(iv) the relation between the departure and its purpose;
(v) the importance of the purpose of the departure; and
(vi) the need to promote an efficient administration and good governance.
(5) Where an administrator is empowered by any empowering provision to follow a
procedure which is fair but different from the provisions of subsection (2), the 10
administrator may act in accordance with that different procedure.
(6) (a) In order to promote an efficient administration, the Minister may, at the request
of an administrator, by notice in the Gazette publish a list specifying any administrative
action or a group or class of administrative actions in respect of which the administrator
concerned will automatically furnish reasons to a person whose rights are adversely 15
affected by such actions, without such person having to request reasons in terms of this
section.
(b) The Minister must, within 14 days after the receipt of a request referred to in
paragraph (a) and at the cost of the relevant administrator, publish such list, as
contemplated in that paragraph. 20
Judicial review of administrative action
6. (1) Any person may institute proceedings in a court or a tribunal for the judicial
review of an administrative action.
(2) A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if-
(a) the administrator who took it- 25
(i) was not authorised to do so by the empowering provision;
(ii) acted under a delegation of power which was not authorised by the
empowering provision; or
(iii) was biased or reasonably suspected of bias;
(b) a mandatory and material procedure or condition prescribed by an empower- 30
ing provision was not complied with;
(c) the action was procedurally unfair;
(d) the action was materially influenced by an error of law;
(e) the action was taken-
(i) for a reason not authorised by the empowering provision; 35
(ii) for an ulterior purpose or motive;
(iii) because irrelevant considerations' were taken into account or relevant
considerations were not considered;
(iv) because of the unauthorised or unwarranted dictates of another person or
body; 40
(v) in bad faith; or
(vi) arbitrarily or capriciously;
if) the action itself-
(i) contravenes a law or is not authorised by the empowering provision; or
(ii) is not rationally connected to- 45
(aa) the purpose for which it was taken;
(bb) the purpose of the empowering provision;
(cc) the information before the administrator; or
(dd) the reasons given for it by the administrator;
(g) the action concerned consists of a failure to take a decision; . 50
(h) the exercise of the power or the performance of the function authorised by the
empowering provision, in pursuance of which the administrative action was
purportedly taken, is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so
exercised the power or performed the function; or
(i) the action is otherwise unconstitutional or unlawful. 55
(3) If any person relies on the ground of review referred to in subsection (2)(g), he or
she may in respect of a failure to take a decision;' where- -
(a) (i)' an administrator has a duty to take a decision;
(ii) there is no law that prescribes a period within which the administrator is
required to take that decision; and 60
(iii) the administrator has failed to take that decision,
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institute proceedings in a court or tribunal for judicial review of the failure to
take the decision on the ground that there .has been unreasonable delay in
taking the decision; or
(b) (i) an administrator has a duty to take a decision;
(ii) a law prescribes a period within which the administrator is required to 5
take that decision; and
(iii) the administrator has failed to take that decision before the expiration of
that period,
institute proceedings in a court or tribunal for judicial review of the failure to
take the decision within that period on the ground that the administrator has a 10
duty to take the decision notwithstanding the expiration of that period.
Procedure for judicial review
7. (1) Any proceedings for judicial review in terms of section 6(1) must be instituted
without unreasonable delay and not later than 180 days after the date-
(a) subject to subsection (2)(c), on which any proceedings instituted in terms of 15
internal remedies as contemplated in subsection (2)(a) have been concluded;
or
(b) where no such remedies exist, on which the person concerned was informed of
the administrative action, became aware of the action and the reasons for it or
might reasonably have been expected to have become aware of the action and 20
the reasons.
(2) (a) Subject to paragraph (c), no court or tribunal shall review an administrative
action in terms of this Act unless any internal remedy provided for in any other law has
first been exhausted:
(b) Subject to paragraph (c), a court or tribunal must, if it is not satisfied that any 25
internal remedy referred to in paragraph (a) has been exhausted, direct that the person
concerned must first exhaust such remedy before instituting proceedings in a court or
tribunal for judicial review in terms of this Act.
(c) A court or tribunal may, in exceptional circumstances and on application by the
person concerned, exempt such person from the obligation to exhaust any internal 30
remedy if the court or tribunal deems it in the interest of justice.
(3) The Rules Board for Courts of Law established by section 2 of the Rules Board for
Courts of Law Act, 1985 (Act No. 107 of 1985), must within one year after the date of
commencement of this Act, make and implement rules of procedure for judicial review.
(4) Before the implementation of the rules of procedure referred to in subsection (3), 35
all proceedings for judicial review must be instituted in a High Court or the
Constitutional Court.
(5) Any rule made under subsection (3) must, before publication in the Gazette, be
approved by Parliament.
Remedies in proceedings for judicial review
8. (1) The court or tribunal, in proceedings for judicial review in terms of section 6( 1),
may grant any order that is just and equitable, including orders-
(a) directing the administrator-
(i) to give reasons; or
(ii) to act in the manner the court or tribunal requires; 45
(b) prohibiting the administrator from acting in a particular manner;
(c) setting aside the administrative action and-· ....
(i)· remitting the matter for reconsideration by the administrator, with or
without directions; or
(ii)' in exceptional cases=- . 50
(aa) substituting or varying the administrative action or correcting a
defect resulting from the administrative action; or
(bb) directing the administrator or any other party to the proceedings to
pay compensation;
(d) declaring the rights of the parties in respect of any matter to which the 55
adininistrative action relates; ..
(e) granting a temporary interdict or other temporary relief; or
if) as to costs.
40
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(2) The court or tribunal, in proceedings for judicial review in terms of section 6(3),
may grant any order that is just and equitable, including orders-
(a) directing the taking of the decision;
(b) declaring the rights of the parties in relation to the taking of the decision;
(c) directing any of the parties to do, or to refrain from doing, any act or thing the 5
doing, or the refraining from the doing, of which the court or tribunal
considers necessary to do justice between the parties; or
(d) as to costs.
Variation of time
9. (1) The period of- 10
(a) 90 days referred to in section 5 may be reduced; or
(b) 90 days or 180 days referred to in sections 5 and 7 may be extended for a fixed
period,
by agreement between the parties or, failing such agreement, by a court or tribunal on
application by the person or administrator concerned. 15
(2) The court or tribunal may grant an application in terms of subsection (1) where the
interests of justice so require.
Regulations
10. (1) The Minister must make regulations relating to-
(a) the procedures to be followed by designated administrators or in relation to 20
classes of administrative action in order to promote the right to procedural
fairness;
(b) the procedures to be followed in connection with public inquiries;
(c) the procedures to be followed in connection with notice and comment
procedures; 25
(d) the procedures to be followed in connection with requests for reasons; and
(e) a code of good administrative conduct in order to provide administrators with
practical guidelines and information aimed at the promotion of an efficient
administration and the achievement of the objects of this Act.
(2) The Minister may make regulations relating to- 30
(a) the establishment, duties and powers of an advisory council to monitor the
application of this Act and to advise the Minister on-
(i) the appropriateness of publishing uniform rules and standards which
must be complied with in the taking of administrative actions, including
the compilation and maintenance of registers containing the text of rules 35
and standards used by organs of state; .
(ii) any improvements that might be made in respect of internal complaints
procedures, internal administrative appeals and the judicial review by
courts or tribunals of administrative action;
(iii) the appropriateness of establishing independent and impartial tribunals, 40
in addition. to the courts, to review administrative action and of
specialised administrative tribunals, including a tribunal with general
jurisdiction over all organs of state or a number of organs of state, to hear
and determine appeals against administrative action;
(iv) the appropriateness of requiring administrators, from time to time, to 45
consider the continuance of standards administered by them and of
prescribing measures for the automatic lapsing of rules and standards;
(v) programmes for educating the public and the members and employees of
administrators regarding the contents of this Act and the provisions of the
Constitution relating to administrative action; 50
(vi) any other improvements aimed at ensuring that administrative action
conforms with the right to administrative justice;
(vii) any steps which may lead to the achievement of the objects of this Act;
and
(viii) any other matter in respect of which the Minister requests advice; 55
(b) the compilation and publication of protocols for the drafting of rules and
standards;
(c) the initiation, conducting and co-ordination of programmes for educating the
public and the members and employees of administrators regarding the
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contents of this Act and the provisions of the Constitution relating to
administrative action;
(d) matters required or permitted by this Act to be prescribed; and
(e) matters necessary or convenient to be prescribed in order to-
(i) achieve the objects of this Act; or 5
(ii) subject to subsection (3), give effect to any advice or recommendations
by the advisory council referred to in paragraph (a).
(3) This section may not be construed as empowering the Minister to make
regulations, without prior consultation with the Public Service Commission, regarding
any matter which may be regulated by the Public Service Commission under the 10
Constitution or any other law.
(4) Any regulation-
(a) made under subsections (1)(a), (b), (c) and (d) and (2)(c), (d) and (e) must,
before publication in the Gazette, be submitted to Parliament; and
(b) made under subsection (l)(e) and (2)(a) and (b) must, before publication in 15
the Gazette, be approved by Parliament.
(5) Any regulation made under subsections (1) and (2) which may result in financial
expenditure for the State must be made in consultation with the Minister of Finance.
(6) The regulations contemplated in subsection (l)(e) must be approved by Cabinet
and must be made within two years after the commencement of this Act. 20
Short title and commencement
11. This Act is called the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000, and comes
into operation on a date fixed by the President by proclamation in the Gazette.
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